AFRIKA AXIS-ALLIED

Third Battle of Tobruk, (20–21 June 1942)

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German Ju-87 Stuka bombers flying over Tobruk, 21 June 1942.

The port of Tobruk in eastern Libya held great military significance but had also become a symbol of Allied defiance after it had withstood an eight-month Axis siege. During the 1941–1942 winter, the British commander in the Middle East, General Claude Auchinleck, had decided not to defend Tobruk in the event of another Axis advance. At the last moment, British Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill reversed this decision, and in March 1942, the 2nd South African Division took over the defense of Tobruk. The Tobruk garrison consisted of two brigades of the 2nd South African Division, the 11th Indian Brigade, the 201st Guards Brigade, and the British army’s 32nd Tank Brigade with 61 operational Valentine tanks and a few Matildas. South African Major General H. B. Klopper exercised command, but he and his men had little time to prepare for an approaching Axis assault. The defenses had deteriorated over time, and many of the mines had been removed and placed on the Gazala Line. As Major General Ettore Baldassarre’s Italian XX Motorized Corps and Major General Walther Nehring’s Afrika Korps (Africa Corps) approached, the overall Axis commander, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, feinted toward the Egyptian border as if in pursuit of Major General Neil N. Ritchie’s retreating British Eighth Army; then he wheeled north to the eastern end of the Tobruk defenses, which he reached on 18 June. In 1941, Rommel had attacked the western end and failed in a series of bloody assaults. This time, however, he had both momentum and surprise on his side, and he was determined not to leave an enemy’s fortified position to his rear as he advanced eastward.

The Axis attack began at dawn on 20 June 1941, led by assault engineers and supported by air attacks. The Afrika Korps had the most success, and the Italian XX Corps followed through a break in the defenses created by the Afrika Korps. A series of rapid movements within the fortress itself paralyzed the Allied response, and by the evening of 21 June, the last of the garrison had surrendered, destroying as many supplies and as much of the port facilities as possible beforehand.

The Allies had 32,220 troops captured, including virtually all of the 2nd South African Division. Axis forces also secured invaluable supplies, including nearly 2,000 tons of fuel, 5,000 tons of food, 2,000 vehicles, and large amounts of ammunition (including both German and Italian stores). This booty was of immense help to Rommel in resuming his eastward drive, although there was considerable squabbling over its distribution.

The fall of Tobruk provided a supply port for the Axis forces close to the front. Moreover, it was a tremendous psychological blow to the Allies. With this and the Axis victory at Gazala earlier in the campaign, Rommel and the Italian commander in chief in Libya, General Ettore Bastico, were promoted to field marshals. Conversely, the Allied defeat led Britain’s Middle Eastern commander, Auchinleck, to remove Ritchie from command of Eighth Army on 25 June and assume that position himself. The fall of Tobruk also led Adolf Hitler to delay an assault against Malta in favor of allowing Rommel to continue his advance eastward toward the Nile, setting the stage for the great First Battle of El Alamein.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. Rommel’s North Africa Campaign. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1994. Montanari, Mario. Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale. Vol. 3, El Alamein. Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1989.

Second Battle for Tobruk, (April 1941–January 1942)

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Important land battle between the Afrika Korps (Africa Corps) and British Commonwealth forces in Tripoli, Libya, North Africa. Spearheaded by German Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel’s 5th Light Division (later reconstituted as the 21st Panzer Division), Axis forces had driven Commonwealth units back through Cyrenaica to the Egyptian border in March and April 1941. Allied losses had been heavy, but the commander in chief for the Middle East, Lieutenant General Archibald Wavell, had made the crucial decision to defend the port of Tobruk.

Initially garrisoned by the Australian 9th Division, Tobruk repulsed several Axis attacks during mid-April. Throughout the following siege, Allied naval units and aircraft provided critical supplies and reinforcements to the garrison. During the summer and fall, Germany sent in the non-motorized Afrika Infantry Division, the remainder of the 15th Panzer Division, and some miscellaneous German units. Italy supplied both regular infantry and Bersaglieri, artillery, and better armor elements, upgrading its previously poor-performing units. All this was in preparation for an Axis seizure of Tobruk, followed by an advance on Egypt.

Axis forces also established a line of interlocking fortified posts at Bardia and along the Egyptian border, built around the Savona Division. Between Tobruk and the border, Rommel, nominally under the command of the Italian governor of Libya, General Ettore Bastico, established armor units centered on the Afrika Korps. The Italian Maneuver Corps was in support; it consisted of the Ariete Armored Division and elements of the Trieste Motorized Division.

In May and June, General Wavell conducted Operations BREVITY and BATTLEAXE, respectively, in an attempt to break through the frontier line and to relieve Tobruk. Both failed, and Wavell was relieved and replaced by Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck. Under him, Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham commanded Eighth Army. Auchinleck began gathering his growing strength for Operation CRUSADER, scheduled for November, while Rommel brought in siege artillery for a final assault of the now largely British-garrisoned Tobruk.

The Allies struck the first blow, their well-camouflaged preparations being complete by 17 November. The two-pronged Allied operation consisted of a slow but steady advance along the coast road by infantry and heavy tanks, while inland, Cunningham moved with his armor units. A portion of the Ariete Division repulsed the British 22nd Armour Brigade at Bir el Gobi on 18 November, but it was not until two days later that Rommel began to react to the Allied attack.

As Rommel shifted armored forces to attack and hammer some of the Allied mobile units, the British 70th Division in Tobruk assaulted the largely Italian infantry units holding the siege lines. Rommel wanted to force the Allies back so he might make his “dash to the wire” (the barbed wire along the Egyptian border erected by the Italians in the 1930s), but his advance failed to disrupt the Allies or to capture Allied supply dumps. Believing Cunningham was moving too slowly, Auchinleck replaced him with Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie. Meanwhile, the elite 2nd New Zealand Division continued its advance to link up with the 70th Division at Tobruk.

Throughout this period, the Allied naval stranglehold in the Mediterranean kept supplies from arriving in North Africa. The dramatic destruction of the Duisburg convoy on the night of 8–9 November resulted in the temporary halt of all Axis convoys to Libya at the same time that Rommel’s battles exhausted his ammunition and tanks. He had no choice but to retreat.

As Axis forces began to pull back near Gazala, just west of Tobruk, and the Allies linked up with Tobruk, the Second Battle of Bir el Gobi occurred on 4 December. The Giovani Fascisti (Young Fascists), a two-battalion volunteer unit, held off the advance of a brigade of the 4th Indian Division. However, with this battle and one other small action, Bastico and Rommel were in agreement by the middle of the month that Axis forces had to fall back through Cyrenaica in mid-December. The retreat went well, although all of Cyrenaica was lost. Isolated Axis units along the border were forced to surrender. The first German general of the war to be captured, Major General Arthur Schmitt, and 13,800 men marched off to prisoner-of-war camps.

This action was the first major victory by the British against an army with a substantial German element. Axis forces had sustained 38,300 casualties, with almost 30,000 of them prisoners. Allied losses were only 17,700 (7,500 prisoners).

The Axis supply situation from Italy soon improved, enabling the shipment of important reinforcements to North Africa. In January 1942, an Axis counterattack went as far as Gazala, where both armies would face each other over the next several months.

References Carver, Michael. Tobruk. London: B. T. Batesford, 1964. Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. Rommel’s North Africa Campaign. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1994. Harrison, Frank. Tobruk: The Great Siege Reassessed. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1996. Montanari, Mario. Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale. Vol. 2, Tobruk. Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1985.

First Battle for Tobruk, (6–22 January 1941)

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British soldiers patrolling in tanks at Tobruk, Libya.

North African battle between Italian and British forces. The Mediterranean port of Tobruk, located in northeast Libya some 70 miles from the Egyptian border, was an important focal point in the North Africa fighting between 1941 and 1942. On 9 December, 1940, Major General Richard O’Connor’s Western Desert Force launched Operation COMPASS to drive invading Italian forces from Egypt. On 11 December at Sidi Barrani in Egypt, O’Connor’s unit soundly defeated the Italians but was unable to capitalize on this victory immediately, as one of its two divisions, the Indian 4th Division, was withdrawn for service in the Sudan several weeks before the arrival of the replacement Australian 6th Division.

Following this necessary pause, O’Connor’s forces crossed into Libya, and on 5 January 1941, they took Bardia on the coast, just across the border and east of Tobruk. On 6 January, the British 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats) and the Australian 6th Division assaulted Tobruk, completely besieging the fortress there three days later.

Italian Lieutenant General Pitassi Mannela defended Tobruk with 32,000 men, 220 guns, and 70 tanks along a defensive perimeter of some 30 miles. Following preparations, the Australian 6th Division launched an attack on the morning of 21 January. It began with the largest artillery barrage in the western desert to that point, on a front about 2,500 yards wide along the southeast portion of the Italian perimeter, and it was supported both by British naval gun fire against the town itself and by Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers. Bangalore torpedoes blasted holes in the Italian wire, and the infantry moved forward, supported by Matilda tanks. That portion of the Italian defensive line was secured, and General Mannela was taken prisoner. The remainder of the Italian garrison surrendered the next day but not before destroying some of the port facilities.

At Tobruk, for a cost of some 500 casualties, the British took 25,000 prisoners. They also captured 208 guns, 23 medium tanks, and 200 trucks. In the campaign thus far, O’Connor’s forces had taken 100,000 Italian prisoners. The British were soon able to get the port of Tobruk back into working order. Most of the city, including two water-distillation plants, was undamaged. O’Connor then continued his drive west.

References Barnett, Correlli. The Desert Generals. New York: Viking, 1961. Carver, Michael. Tobruk. London: B. T. Batesford, 1964. Heckstall-Smith, Anthony. Tobruk: The Story of a Siege. London: Anthony Blond, 1959. Long, Gavin. To Benghazi. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952. Pitt, Barrie. Crucible of War: Western Desert, 1941. New York: Paragon, 1989.

Revealed in a letter home to mum: The daring five-man SAS raid into Rommel's territory that convinced top brass that special forces could help win the war.

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Military elite: SAS soldiers celebrate the end of the war with a beer.

By Emma Reynolds

One of the first recruits writes of how they blew up 40 enemy planes
He tells his mother he 'must have been born under a lucky star'

In the pitch-black Libyan desert 70 years ago this week, a former hotelier and four comrades crept through a German camp and blew up 37 enemy aircraft, cementing the status of the SAS.

Sergeant Jeff Du Vivier wrote of how 'plane after plane went up in flames' in a letter to his mother printed for the first time in historian Gavin Mortimer's new book.

The brave soldiers watched the airfield light up 'like daylight' during their daring raid, according to Sgt Du Vivier's vivid account published in The SAS in World War II: An Illustrated History.

On their way back to base, a delighted Brigadier Denys Reid apparently slapped his men on the back and declared: 'There's nothing to stop us now.'

The heroism of the five early SAS recruits helped convince the world that David Stirling's elite fighting force was an 'effective concept', Mr Mortimer claimed, according to The Times.

Sgt Du Vivier's letter, one of several new sources used by Mr Mortimer, ends: 'I don't know what star I was born under but it sure was a lucky one.'

The former soldier, who died last year leaving only one surviving original SAS member, became one of the first members of the special forces in the summer of 1941.

He was a Londoner who had joined the army after leaving his catering job in Felixstowe, Suffolk, at the outbreak of World War II.

His first desert raid that November was a disaster, with 33 out of 55 men either killed or captured. But in early December, the courageous man joined an attack on another aerodrome and helped blow up 14 planes and disable another ten.

It was soon afterwards that Sgt Du Vivier took part in the raid in Ajdabiya in Libya that he describes to his adored mother. His success marked a vital turning point, and was much celebrated by British media as it followed worrying German progress in North Africa.

He admitted to his mother, who he addressed as 'Dear Old Ma' that civilians might find it hard to believe the 'job' was done by just one officer, two sergeants and two privates.

The group were taken to within 10 miles of the airfield in the dead of night. They travelled on foot, carrying two days' worth of iron rations and water and eight time bombs apiece (known as Lewes Bombs).

The sergeant wrote that the rain and cold was a good thing for the British fivesome because 'Jerry doesn’t like fighting in bad weather'.

They snatched some rest bunched together for warmth, sipping from flasks of rum they had each brought to 'induce a little sleep'.

As day broke, they realised they were in full view of a German camp and crawled back on their stomachs to take cover behind rocks, 'which were only about a foot high but provided ample cover if we kept flat'.

During a day of observation an 'arab shepherd' passed with his sheep, but the sergeant wrote, 'luckily, probably because he didn’t recognise our uniforms and know who we were, he did not give us away'.
Under the cover of darkness, they stole 'damn quickly' through the camp to the aerodrome, where they planted 40 bombs on Italian and German fighter planes.

On finding a sentry asleep under the wing of a Savoya bomber, Sgt Du Vivier covered him with a tommy gun and a bomb was placed on a wing above his head. In a line of great pathos, the soldier tells his mother: 'He did not wake again.'

After hiding a bomb in a building filled with enemy weapons, the soldiers fled. As the planes exploded 'with a blood curdling deafening roar ... we felt the concussion press on our lungs.'
The RAF arrived in the camp illuminated by the fires, as planned, and 'heavy bombs rained down on hangars and town.'

The sergeant adds: 'The whole area was in a turmoil and alive with shouting and excited men.
'Our bombs were still going off and the burning aircraft full of ammunition sounded like a thousand machine guns going off all at the same time. Petrol tanks exploded and the flames soared hundreds of feet into the air.

'What chaos! The poor old Jerries were far too bewildered with the goings on to worry about 5 very ordinary looking men hurrying through their camp away from the scene of devastation.'
The proud young man jokes that Crystal Palace 'would look small fry compared with our exhibition'.
He was awarded a military medal for his part in the raid and served until 1945, when he was sent home after being shot.

He lived out his days working as a restaurant manager in Glasgow and was married to wife Rea for 63 years, after they met in 1940 while he was on an army training exercise. Sgt Du Vivier died last year, but his heroism now lives on in the words of author Mr Mortimer, who was a friend of the brave SAS man.

The SAS in World War II: An Illustrated History

South-African Forces in North Africa I

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The Marmon-Herrington armoured car as used by the 1^st Division in the East Africa and Western Desert Campaigns. Source: Imperial War Museum

During the North African campaign, South Africa committed two divisions and an air wing. The first South African soldiers to arrive in Egypt, Pienaar’s First Brigade, established a headquarters at Amariya in May 1941 and were soon incorporated into Britain’s new Eighth Army. By September 1941 there were 60,000 South African soldiers, including 15,000 blacks, in Egypt. In November 1941 the British launched an offensive, known as Operation Crusader, along the Egyptian-Libyan border to relieve Tobruk where a mostly Australian garrison had been holding out against an Axis siege. The First South African Division was part of this push. This offensive culminated in a large and chaotic tank battle in the open desert around the Axis airfield at Sidi Rezegh, south of Tobruk, in late November. During a German-armored thrust that eventually failed to throw back the Allied advance, the Fifth South African Infantry Brigade was overwhelmed with 3,000 men killed, wounded, or captured. This outcome represented the worst single loss in the history of the Union Defence Force and caused considerable anxiety in South Africa where Afrikaner nationalists put an ultimately unsuccessful motion to quit the British Empire before parliament. In December the newly arrived and poorly equipped Second South African Division, commanded by South African Police Commissioner Major General I. P. de Villiers and with two infantry battalions of South African Police, made a number of unsuccessful assaults on the besieged Axis border strongholds of Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya. These operations had been hampered by Eighth Army desires to limit South Africa casualties because of political issues and problems with acquiring replacements. Supported by the heaviest Allied bombardment of the campaign up to that time, South African infantry and British tanks penetrated the Bardia defenses on New Year’s Eve 1941, and after intense fighting the Axis garrison, which outnumbered the attackers, surrendered on January 2, 1942. South African casualties amounted to 132 killed and 270 wounded, and 7,775 German and Italian soldiers were captured. Later in January the Second Division took Sollum and Halfaya in order to secure Allied supply lines. The capture of Bardia and Sollum liberated 1,246 Allied captives, and in all three operations a total of 13,842 Axis prisoners were taken.

During January 1942 Axis forces retook the initiative and the Allies, in early February, pulled back to the Gazala Line, a series of widely spaced strong points just west of Tobruk. The First South African Division was assigned the extreme northern section of the line, and the Second Division was held in reserve at Tobruk in anticipation of a renewed Allied advance. At this time the Fourth and Sixth South African Armoured Car regiments were attached to the British Seventh Armoured Division and 50th Division, respectively, and deployed as reconnaissance ahead of the Gazala Line. At the end of May 1942 an Axis offensive began with a feint on the First Division, under newly promoted Major General Pienaar, that quickly hooked around the southern portion of the Allied line resulting in the First Division joining a general Allied retreat. The Second Division commander, Major General Hendrik Balzaser Klopper, was placed in command of the entire Tobruk garrison, and as the other Allied forces moved east he was instructed to hold out against an Axis siege. Klopper had a week to oversee the reconstruction of the deteriorated Tobruk defenses. Antitank ditches and trenches had filled with sand, many of the position’s mines had been removed for use elsewhere, and a third of his men were logistical troops working in the harbor. Klopper lacked operational command experience as did the members of his staff who bickered among themselves. The result was a poorly prepared defensive perimeter in which one of three infantry brigades was uselessly placed along the coast, artillery was positioned too far from the front line, and transport vehicles were not camouflaged. The garrison gained false confident when, in its first engagement with the enemy, the Transvaal Scottish killed 80 Italians and took 200 prisoner. The Germans, under Erwin Rommel, initially appeared as if they were going to bypass Tobruk in pursuit of the fleeing Eighth Army. However, on the night of June 19, Rommel quickly repositioned his forces and launched a surprise armored and infantry assault that pierced the defenses and reached the port. German air support came in from all over North Africa and Crete, whereas the Allies did not have a plane in the sky. The majority of the South African soldiers, defending the western, southern, or coastal sections of the perimeter, did not fire a shot. Although Klopper sent a message to his western units that there would be a breakout, reports that German tanks were gathering for an attack on one of the South African brigades changed his mind. On June 21, 33,000 Allied soldiers of the Tobruk garrison, including 12,722 South Africans of the Second Division, surrendered. When the Germans allowed Klopper to address the Allied prisoners, they booed and heckled him for having sold out to the enemy. After the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, the loss of Tobruk represented the second largest British capitulation of the Second World War. Having famously been the only incident of the war to make Churchill wince, the surrender of Tobruk cast doubt on South Africa’s military prowess and loyalty to the Allied cause.

When some white South African officers demanded they be housed in separate prisoner compounds from black South Africans, Rommel refused and pointed out that they all wore the same uniform and would be kept in the same facilities. Among the South Africans taken prisoner was Lance Corporal Job Maseko, a delivery man from Springs who had joined the NMC. In late July Maseko and some fellow prisoners, while being forced to work at Tobruk harbor, sunk a moored German naval vessel by concealing an improvised explosive among petrol drums. He later received the Military Medal.

South-African Forces in North Africa II

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Maj-Gen Dan Pienaar. Assumed command of the 1st Division on 10 March 1942

By the end of June 1942 the Eighth Army, with Axis forces not far behind, had regrouped along the ‘‘Alamein Line,’’ a chain of prepared defensive positions called boxes extending from the coast south to the Qattara Depression. What became known as the First Battle of Alamein would constitute the Allies’ last attempt to halt the Germans and Italians before they reached Cairo. With the First Division assigned the most northern section of the line, Pienaar positioned his Third Infantry Brigade with considerable artillery support inside the ‘‘Alamein Box’’ and pulled the First and Second brigades back to the southeast from where they would be employed as quick reaction forces. Early in the morning of July 1, the German 90th Light Infantry Division advanced along the coast and was brought to a halt by South African defenses and intense artillery fire. A concentration of German armor attempted to break through just south of the 90th Division but was caught in a crossfire between all three South African brigades and pulled back. All along the front the Axis advance ground to a halt and on July 4 Rommel ordered his men to dig in. Attacks, counterattacks, and raids continued until mid-July. The First Division suffered 1,997 casualties in June and 527 in July. It was around this time that the division received six pounder antitank guns giving them better anti-armor capability.

On the night of October 23–24, South Africa soldiers participated in Operation Lightfoot, a massive infantry assault, supported by artillery and followed by engineers who would clear paths through minefields for tanks. This was the beginning of the Second Battle of Alamein. The Second and Third South African brigades would advance southwest along the Qattara Road with the intention of overcoming enemy strong points and seizing a 5-kilometer long section of Miteiriya Ridge. The First Brigade was positioned to the southeast to provide supporting mortar fire on the ridge and to open gaps in the enemy minefields as required. Held up by enemy artillery and machine-gun fire, the Second Brigade, consisting of the Cape Town Highlanders, Natal Mounted Rifles, and Field Force Battalion, took heavy casualties but eventually seized Axis defensive positions and reached its objective. Of the brigade’s 334 casualties that night, the Field Force Battalion suffered the worst with 41 dead and 148 wounded. Corporal Lucas Majozi, an NMC stretcher bearer who had sustained several wounds, refused medical treatment and continued to expose himself to machine-gun fire to carry injured men to safety. Receiving the Distinguished Conduct Medal he became the most highly decorated black South African soldier of the Second World War. During the attack the Third Brigade—the Rand Light Infantry, Royal Durban Light Infantry, and Imperial Light Horse—advanced more easily taking light casualties. A South African armoured car regiment was attached to the British First Armoured Division that advanced west through a corridor toward Kidney Ridge, was held up by an enemy strong point, and pushed through the next day. During October 24 and 25, the South African infantry dug in on Miteiriya Ridge and tanks, guns and transport moved up the Qattara Road. On the night of October 26–27 two companies, one from the Cape Town Highlanders and one from 2 Regiment Botha, seized an enemy strong point called the ‘‘Beehive’’ and at the same time First Brigade advanced 1,000 yards beyond the division’s original objective. In order to create a reserve for future offensive operations, the New Zealanders were pulled back from the line, and by October 28, the South Africa Division had moved right to replace them. Within the division’s new area, the First Brigade took the right, the Third Brigade took the left, and the Second remained in reserve. On the night of October 30–31, Axis positions in front of the South African Division were bombarded by South African artillery to divert attention from a northward thrust by the Australians closer to the coast.

During the first few days of November two South African armored car regiments participated in Operation Supercharge, the Allied offensive that broke through enemy lines sending Axis forces in a final westward retreat. Racing forward, South African armored cars operated behind enemy lines destroying transport and supplies. By November 8, the Four/Six Regiment had accounted for 5,000 enemy prisoners, 150 guns, and 350 vehicles, and on November 12, it was the first Allied unit to enter Tobruk, abandoned by the Axis, liberating a large number of NMC prisoners. As British and New Zealand infantry advanced as part of Supercharge, units of the South African Division took their place in the defensive line from where they mounted fighting patrols and were harassed by Axis shelling. In mid-November, after the general Axis withdrawal from Alamein, the First South African Division was pulled back to Quassasin. In December 1942 and January 1943 the division was transported to South Africa for conversion as an armored formation. On December 19 the plane carrying Major General Pienaar, who historian Neil Orpen has described as one of South Africa’s ‘‘most colourful and ablest military commanders,’’ and some of his staff back to South Africa crashed in Lake Victoria with no survivors. After the seizure of Tobruk, the Four/Six South African Armoured Car Regiment continued to lead the Allied advance as part of a British light armor brigade all the way to Benghazi that was taken on November 20, 1942. The Four/Six Armoured Car Regiment was then sent back to South Africa where it was disbanded, as was its parent formation the South African Tank Corps, in order to create the new armored division. It is also important to note that South African engineers, who took part in the Eighth Army’s pursuit of Axis forces after Alamein, breached minefields; repaired roads, railway, and harbor facilities; and secured water supplies. On May 12, 1943, South African warplanes dropped the last bombs of the North African campaign in which South Africa had lost 2,104 men killed, 3,928 wounded, and 14,247 captured.
Western Desert (as at 17 October 1942: Second Battle of El Alemain)
1^st Division Commander: Major General Daniel Hermanus ("Dan") Pienaar CB, DSO & Bar
    1st South African Infantry Brigade Brig. E.P. Hartshorn
        1st Duke of Edinburgh's Own Rifles SA Infantry Corps
        1st Royal Natal Carabineers SA Infantry Corps
        1st Transvaal Scottish SA Infantry Corps
        One Sqn 3rd SA Armoured Car Regt SA Tank Corps
        3rd and 4th Anti-Tank Batteries SA Artillery Corps
        1st Light Anti-Aircraft Battery SA Artillery Corps
        1st Field Company SA Engineering Corps
        11th and 15th Field Batteries of 4th Field Regt SA Artillery Corps
        7th, 19th and 20th Field Batteries of 7th Field Regt SA Artillery Corps
    2nd South African Infantry Brigade Brig. W.H.E. Poole
        1st Cape Town Highlanders SA Infantry Corps
        1st Natal Mounted Rifles SA Infantry Corps
        1st Field Force Battalion SA Infantry Corps
        2nd Field Force Battalion SA Infantry Corps
        B Company (Machine Gun), Die Middelandse Regiment SA Infantry Corps
      4th Company (Machine Gun), Regiment President Steyn SA Infantry Corps
        1st and 2nd Anti-Tank Batteries SA Artillery Corps
        3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery (less two Troops) SA Artillery Corps
        1st, 3rd and 14th Field Batteries of 1st Field Regt SA Artillery Corps
    3rd South African Infantry Brigade Brig. R.J. (Bobby) Palmer
        1st Imperial Light Horse SA Infantry Corps
        1st Rand Light Infantry SA Infantry Corps
        1st Royal Durban Light Infantry SA Infantry Corps
        One Troop 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery SA Artillery Corps
        2nd Field Company SA Engineering Corps
    Division Troops
        2nd Regt. Botha, SA Infantry Corps
        Regt. President Steyn (less one Coy), SA Infantry Corps
        3rd SA Armoured Car Regt (less one Sqn), SA Tank Corps
        8th Royal Tank Regiment, (part of 23rd Armoured Brigade Group)[116] equipped with Valentine tanks
Attached formations
Not reflected in the above order of battle due to date discrepancies:
    21st East African Infantry Brigade from 27 February 1941 to 6 April 1941
    Polish Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade from 3 February 1942 to 18 March 1942
    Free French Brigade from 3 February 1942 to 10 February 1942
    6th South African Infantry Brigade from 18 March 1942 to 20 April 1942

Battle of Alam Halfa, (31 August–7 September 1942)

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Montgomery had fought his first battle as commander of Eighth Army with great skill. Rommel now had no choice but to go on the defensive.
Commencing on August 31, 1942, a month after the German Panzerarmee Afrika was checked at the Battles of El Alamein, Alam el Halfa was Erwin Rommel’s final attempt to break through to the Nile valley in continuation of his frustrated drive across Cyrenaica and western Egypt. Leading the British Eighth Army, Gen. Sir Bernard Law Montgomery deployed his forces near Alam el Halfa, an east-west ridge astride Rommel’s path of advance. On the first day of battle, three German armored divisions defeated British forces, turning the Eighth Army’s southern flank. However, Montgomery rallied an extraordinary defense—considered by military historians a textbook example of the modern repulse—and, coordinating armor and infantry with air and artillery support, stopped Rommel at the ridge. By the fourth day of the battle, Rommel had been forced into retreat, redeploying his armor in a defensive line running north and south. The battle was over by September 7, by which time Rommel, checked again, had lost significantly more than the 1,750 casualties (killed and wounded) suffered by the Eighth Army.
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North African battle between German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps and British Lieutenant General Bernard Law Montgomery’s Eighth Army. Fearful that he would permanently lose the initiative to the Eighth Army after his advance was halted at the First Battle of El Alamein in July 1942, Rommel reorganized with the intention of resuming his advance toward Suez. Meanwhile, Montgomery assumed command of the British Eighth Army on 13 August and began planning for the offensive, all the while expecting Rommel to attack first.

Late on the evening of 30 August, Rommel attempted, as at Gazala, to get around Eighth Army’s left flank although his force was weak in armor. With diversionary attacks designed to hold British forces along the coast, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps east and south of Alam Halfa Ridge with the aim of swinging north to the Mediterranean coast behind Montgomery and enveloping the Eighth Army.

The Eighth Army had established a defense in depth, including strong positions on the Alam Halfa and Ruweisat Ridges, and Montgomery rejected any withdrawal. The 10th Armored Division, 22nd Armored Brigade, and 44th Division defended Alam Halfa, while the 7th Armored Division was south of the ridge. Montgomery ordered his armored units to defend from their current positions rather than advancing to meet Rommel’s panzers.

Slowed by British minefields and fuel shortages, Rommel’s tanks did not reach Alam Halfa until the evening of 31 August. Daylight brought vicious Desert Air Force attacks against the Axis advance, and the 7th Armored Division’s placement forced Rommel to swing north prematurely, into the teeth of a tank brigade on Alam Halfa Ridge. Fuel shortages prevented the Afrika Korps from outflanking Alam Halfa to the east, forcing Rommel onto the defensive there.

On 1 September, after a flank assault on the 22nd Armored Brigade failed and having suffered severe losses, Rommel ordered his forces to retire to their original positions. The withdrawal, which began the next day, exposed the Afrika Korps to further devastating British aerial attacks. Rommel repulsed a counterattack by the 2nd New Zealand Division on the evening of 3 September, and Montgomery believed that he lacked the resources to force a general Axis withdrawal, so he decided not to press his advantage for the time being. Certainly Rommel’s past successes made Montgomery wary of pushing too far forward.

Montgomery had fought his first battle as commander of Eighth Army with great skill. Rommel now had no choice but to go on the defensive. He established positions between the Mediterranean and the Qattara Depression as both sides prepared for the Eighth Army’s upcoming offensive: the Second Battle of El Alamein.

Historically, the victory here is significant as an outstanding instance of ground-air coordination and the exploitation of intelligence. British breakthroughs in the decryption of the enemy’s coded communication proved crucial to the triumph at Alam el Halfa. On August 15, 1942, Rommel, using the Enigma cipher, transmitted his plan of action—to effect a breakthrough to Cairo and the Nile—to Adolf Hitler. Within 48 hours, Montgomery had a decrypted translation of this message. Learning that Rommel intended to move south around the end of the British line, then strike the British flank to cut off the Eighth Army from its base and supplies, Montgomery was able to deploy his forces at the Alam el Halfa ridge and check the German advance.

Further reading: Hinsley, F. H., and Alan Stripp, eds. Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; McCarthy, Peter, and Mike Syron. Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler’s Tank Divisions. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002. Stewart, Adrian. Eighth Army’s Greatest Victories: Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942–1943. London: Leo Cooper, 1999; Stewart, Adrian. North African Victory: The 8th Army from Alam Halfa to Tunis, 1942–43. London: Penguin UK, 2002.

FRIEDRICH VON KOENEN, (1916–1944).

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The commander of a North African Abwehr unit during World War II, Friedrich von Koenen was born in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) on 28 June 1916. Raised in German South West Africa (now Namibia) he joined the Abwehr’s emerging Brandenburg Division in 1941 and assumed command of the Tropenkompanie (Tropical Company; later named Tropenabteilung Koenen, or Tropical Division Koenen) in North Africa. Its members were handpicked, fluent in other languages, and used equipment acquired from Allied forces (such as a British Spitfire aircraft). Deployed on numerous commando and reconnaissance missions, the Tropenkompanie served as an advance unit for Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. One particular success occurred in February 1943, when Koenen conducted a raid against American troops at the village of Sidi-Bou-Zid, Tunisia, and captured 27 tanks and armored troop carriers along with large supplies of guns and munitions. A Knight’s Cross was awarded to him later that year. Transferred to Yugoslavia, Koenen was killed in action on 22 August 1944 near Visegrad, Croatia.

Tropen-Abteilung "von Koenen"
Five companies, based on the former Afrika-Kompanie and led by Fritz von Koenen. 5th Co. was a coastal raider unit (1.-5.).

Beginning in mid-1941, the 13th Company of the 800th Special Purpose Construction Training Regiment Brandenburg was readied in Brandenburg as a "catch basin" for the formation of a tropical company. On 28 October 1941 the first half-company under Oberleutnant Wilhelm von Koenen departed Brandenburg for Tripoli via Naples. It was to be employed as a supply company.

The first live action by the Brandenburgers in North Africa took place during Panzer Group Africa's eastward advance which began on 22 January 1942.

As this move into Africa had been so quickly conceived and executed, Canaris had had no time to prepare for the employment of his agents there. Within Brandenburg were men who had lived or worked in tropical lands. Most of them were from families that had colonised the former German possessions of East and South West Africa. There were also Palestinian Germans and others from South Africa. Volunteers were called for and these former émigrés came forward in such numbers that within weeks more than sixty had been sifted, interviewed, selected and accepted. To the number of those chosen for the 'Afrika Kompanie' were added communication experts. Command of the Company was given to Oberleutnant von Koenen, a man of wide experience with a great knowledge of Africa. He divided the Company into two half-Companies and sent them to Tripoli where the first half-Company arrived in October 1941. The second detachment sailed four months later. Most of the men in 'Africa Kompanie' not only spoke English more or less fluently, but also had command of Arabic and Swahili as main languages, backed up by several of the African dialects.

It was intended that the Brandenburg detachments be used for reconnaissance operations: to penetrate a short distance into the British lines and glean information about the conditions awaiting the Panzer Army. This idea of short, sharp missions was changed during June 1942, when it seemed as if Rommel had defeated the British Eighth Army and was about to drive on to the Nile.

In May 1943 the unit managed to escape to Italy. After North Africa was in in action with unit in Greece and Yugoslavia in 1944.

Tanks and the Eighth Army

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By nearly every standard the British army was much better equipped than the German army from the beginning to the end of the war. Even more surprising given the relentless impressions to the contrary is the fact that the British army had more tanks per soldier than the German army and the US forces in Europe. There was even a period when the much smaller British army had an absolutely greater number of tanks. In the latter part of the war, most of the tanks used by British forces came from the USA, but Britain’s own tanks, and adaptations of the standard US tank, were probably superior to US tanks. Some of these British tanks had the edge on German tanks too. Even if the Germans did achieve a certain qualitative superiority in some respects, they never achieved both qualitative and quantitative superiority.

Richard Stokes was a relentless critic of the quality of British tanks. Oliver Lyttelton recalled that the chief parliamentary troubles of the Ministry of Production concerned tanks, and that Dick Stokes was his principal opponent. As Stokes put it in a debate on production in July 1942:

I should not feel comfortable if I were sitting in a British tank with a 2-pounder gun with an effective range of 600 yards, or an even bigger tank with a 6-pounder gun which has an effective range of 1,200 yards, taking on a German tank with a 13 or 14-pounder gun with an effective range of 2,000 yards. A Minister who has no better to tell us than that, stands condemned, and the Government stand condemned, and the sooner those responsible get out the better. I want to know who was responsible for nothing being done from the period September, 1939, to July, 1940, and who has been responsible for apparently doing nothing from June, 1940, to the present time to bring out something equivalent to the German Mark IV tank.

Stokes was a supporter of 80-ton tanks designed from 1939 by a committee headed by the Great War tank design veterans. The actual design was by Sir William Tritton and his firm William Foster of Lincoln, the man and firm who had designed the first British tank of the previous war. The group were labelled ‘The Old Gang’ and the prototypes therefore labelled TOG 1 and TOG 2. In response Lyttelton accused Stokes of supporting a tank that the army did not want, which was too slow and unreliable. Stokes continued to attack on the issue of tanks right through the war. Such was the continuing pressure that the government conceded a Secret Session debate on the subject in March 1944, and after the war a parliamentary report was produced. These attacks were very influential in creating the general perception, which endures to this day, that there was a serious problem with British tanks.

Sir John Wardlaw-Milne complained that British tanks in Libya were no match for the Panzer IV. British tanks were armed with the 40mm 2-pounder gun while the Panzer IV had a 75mm gun.

Although it was widely believed from 1941–2 that British tanks in North Africa were inferior to German in quantity and quality, this view was shown to be incorrect by an official history published in the 1950s, by Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s history of the Royal Tank Regiment published in 1959, and in his later work. Throughout the North African campaign between 1940 and early 1943, British forces had a two- to threefold tank advantage in medium and heavy tanks over the German forces, a figure which would be reduced somewhat by including Italian tanks, but was still overwhelming. For the November 1941 offensive (Operation Crusader) British and imperial forces in North Africa had over 300 cruisers (mostly Crusaders) and 200 infantry tanks (Matildas and Valentines), together with large numbers of light tanks, and large reserves of all types. By contrast the Germans had fewer than 174 of the comparable Panzer IIIs and IVs, and the Italians 146 13/40s, with no reserves. Operation Crusader was a success.

Yet by early 1942 the Germans and Italians had counterattacked and were deep into Egypt. Their tank forces were still comparatively weak: at the end of August 1942 the Germans had only 166 Panzer IIIs and 37 Panzer IVs. On the eve of the Second Battle of El Alamein, which started the definitive rout of the Germans and Italians, they had 172 Panzer IIIs and 38 Panzer IVs fit for battle, as well as 278 Italian tanks. This compared with over 900 fit medium tanks with British forces, of which 488 were of British manufacture.

What the qualitative difference was between the tanks is very difficult indeed to establish, but the picture presented by critics in Parliament in 1942 in particular, and echoed ever since, is deeply flawed. That all British tanks in the Middle East had the 40mm 2-pounder gun until late 1942 is broadly correct, but the idea that many German tanks carried a much more powerful 75mm gun from around 1940 is misleading. The Panzer IV did have a 75mm gun, but it was a low-velocity gun firing high explosive. This turned out to be a very useful feature for a tank gun, which the British and Americans adopted by using a dual-purpose 75mm gun (as mounted in the Sherman and later in other tanks). But in regard to tank-mounted anti-tank guns the Panzers were no better equipped than British tanks. In North Africa up to May 1942 Panzer IIIs, which in contrast to the Panzer IVs did have anti-tank guns, had 50mm (short) anti-tank guns, which were no better than the 40mm 2-pounder. The other side of the equation was the armour. One study suggests that in 1941 all the main British tanks (Valentines, Matildas, Crusaders) and the US Grant were superior to any available German type in North Africa. Up-armoured Panzer IIIs capable of resisting British tank guns only started arriving in December 1941.

Where German forces had an early advantage was in the non-tank long 50mm anti-tank gun and in the very small numbers of 88mm anti-aircraft guns used as anti-tank weapons. Britain did not introduce a dual-purpose anti-tank/anti-aircraft gun of the 88mm sort but it had plenty of 94mm (3.7in) anti-aircraft guns. By May 1942 there were 100 6-pounder 57mm anti-tank guns with British forces in the Middle East. This was a successful anti-tank gun, which following its production in the United States became the standard anti-tank gun for US forces too.

Superior German tanks appeared in North Africa in the spring of 1942, but in small numbers. In May 1942 the new long-barrelled 50mm gun was first deployed on German tanks in Africa; and the long-barrelled 75mm gun in June 1942. In August 1942 there were 73 of the former on Panzer IIIs and 27 of the latter on the IVs. At the Second Battle of El Alamein there were 88 Panzer IIIs with the long 50mm and 30 Panzer IVs with the long 75mm. Improved British tanks were not far behind and arrived in quantity. In June 1942 the first 57mm 6-pounder Crusader arrived, of which 78 were fit in late October 1942. This gun was more effective as an anti-tank weapon than the US 75mm dual-purpose gun and, at least in later versions, as effective as the German long 75mm gun as well and would be used in tanks to the end of the war. The summer of 1942 also saw the arrival of very large numbers of Sherman tanks from the USA, armed with a 75mm long anti-tank/HE gun. Three hundred had been offered to Churchill in June 1942, and were put on seven ships in July, one of which was lost, but the tanks were replaced. By 11 September, 318 had arrived. In other words, if there was a German superiority in tank gun and armour quality it was very small and very short-lived indeed.

The old view espoused by Basil Liddell Hart that the British army was reluctant to embrace the tank has been decisively criticized by historians who now suggest the British army overemphasized the use of the tank, especially independently of infantry. British armoured divisions were, as of 1940, very tank-heavy, and based on the idea of fighting tanks with tanks equipped with anti-tank guns. Between April 1940 and May 1942 British armoured divisions had two armoured brigades, artillery and engineers, and very little infantry. Their medium tank strength was 300, three times that of a contemporary panzer division. From May 1942 until the end of the war one armoured brigade (150-plus medium tanks) was replaced with a whole infantry brigade, and the artillery increased. However, the armoured division was still thought of primarily as a weapon for fighting tank formations, with the infantry there to help the tanks. Only in 1942 and 1943, with experience from North Africa, was the role of the tank downgraded. This led to the recognition of the need to have tanks designed to attack things other than tanks, expressed in the introduction of the Sherman and its dual-purpose gun.

Of particular concern to some was the new heavy tank named after Churchill himself, which also had the 40mm 2-pounder gun. Oliver Lyttelton, in his poorly received speech, developed a defence which depended on the story of a profound weakness in British tank forces: ‘We started the war with no modern tanks, we lost all the armoured equipment which we had in France in June, 1940, although that equipment would by itself have had little value today.’ Lyttelton’s argument was that lots of tanks were needed quickly, and that had meant deciding to produce the Churchill tank with its 2-pounder even though the tank had not yet been made or tested. High levels of production and high quality did not go together.

Churchill, in a brilliant winding-up speech, also made great play of the weakness of British arms in 1940, especially tanks, attacking one of his antagonists in 1942, the Secretary for War responsible for tanks to early 1940, Leslie Hore-Belisha. He also insisted, as he had in earlier speeches, on the massive growth in British arms production since 1940, a point on which he was undoubtedly correct. He noted the huge amount of materiel which went to the Middle East: ‘from this country, from the Empire overseas and to a lesser extent from the United States, more than 950,000 men, 4,500 tanks, 6,000 aircraft, nearly 5,000 pieces of artillery, 50,000 machine guns and over 100,000 mechanical vehicles’. According to Churchill about 2,000 tanks had been sent to the Soviet Union. In his view the losses in the Middle East were not due to failures in production.

The critiques of early and mid-1942 were to cease with the reversal of British fortunes in the Middle East in the autumn. The 8th Army under Montgomery, supplied with huge quantities of equipment, including Sherman tanks and lorries from the USA, overwhelmed the weak German and Italian forces at the Second Battle of El Alamein. The imperial army marched west to meet up with US forces which had landed in Morocco, and the mostly British 1st Army, in Tunisia. In a great and conclusive victory in early 1943 North Africa was cleared with vast numbers of Germans captured, causing losses to Germany comparable to those of Stalingrad at a tiny fraction of the cost in lives. Churchill survived and prospered, never to be under such pressure again. Complaints about the quality of British tanks died away, though Stokes would take up the fight again in 1944.

SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN, (OCTOBER 23–NOVEMBER 4, 1942) “Operation SUPERCHARGE.”

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The British conducted an operational pause from October 28–29 in the face of an unexpected thickness of the minefields, but more to reorganize for a final breakthrough assault (“Operation SUPERCHARGE”). Most importantly, they did so without stopping heavy bombing and shelling of the now-ragged Axis HKL. The renewed assault was made overnight on November 1, when three armored divisions moved through the blasted German minefields in two massed columns, concealed on either flank by vast smokescreens . With the Afrika Korps down to just 30 tanks in the north, Rommel pulled the last armored and mobile divisions up to the coast from the south, including the fine Italian “Ariete” armored division. The “Panzerarmee Afrika,” now shorn of most of its tanks and organic transport and under constant lethal harassment by British fighters and bombers, turned to run. As it did so, Adolf Hitler sent a Haltebefehl order commanding Rommel to stand and fight where he was. He did, his career as ever foremost in mind even over the welfare of his men. That meant leaving his much reduced and exhausted Panzerarmee in place to be smashed by a British and Commonwealth armored onslaught on November 4. Four days later, Anglo-American forces landed in Morocco and Algeria and began moving toward Tunisia, in Rommel’s strategic rear. This time Hitler let Rommel save what he could: he abandoned the Italian infantry and retreated along the coast with all the armor and mechanized forces he had left.

El Alamein was the first major Western victory over the Wehrmacht. The great desert battle was also the greatest solo British and Commonwealth victory over Germans and Italians in World War II. It turned back the Axis threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal; cost Germany invaluable manpower and equipment (200,000 troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles); ended Benito Mussolini’s and the Italian military’s pretensions to imperial greatness and Mediterranean empire; and opened the path to total clearance of the Axis from North Africa: within months, all Axis forces on the continent would be crushed or captured by a Western Allied vice closing on Tunisia. El Alamein importantly bolstered flagging British morale, elevated Montgomery to premier British field commander, and was the essential prelude to clearance of North Africa and follow-on invasions of Sicily and Italy as the Western Allies knocked the first Axis nation out of the war in September 1943. Winston Churchill famously said of the victory at El Alamein: “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”

Suggested Reading: Robert Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht (2007 ); John Latimer, Alamein (2002); J. Strawson, El Alamein: Desert Victory (1981).

SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN, (OCTOBER 23–NOVEMBER 4, 1942) “Operation LIGHTFOOT.”

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Some histories refer to the earlier Battle of Alam el-Halfa (August 30–September 7, 1942) as “Second El Alamein.” The term is used in this work for the major battle fought from October to November, 1942. British 8th Army retreated from an earlier defeat along the Gazala line during the summer of 1942, pursued by the Afrika Korps and associated Italian forces led by newly promoted Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The retreat was one of several low points for the British in the desert campaign. Another rout was suffered at Mersa Matruh from June 26–28, after which 8th Army dug in along the El Alamein line. The British fought a holding action there in the first three days of July: the First Battle of El Alamein. There followed a series of limited but sharp engagements as the British hammered at Italian divisions in the line throughout July. General Bernard Law Montgomery assumed command in August, upon the accidental death of General William Gott. Rommel first faced Montgomery at Alam el-Halfa on August 30. With his encirclement maneuver blunted, Rommel settled in for the Stellungskrieg to come. Behind the El Alamein line humbled 8th Army regrouped and rearmed, notably with freshly arrived emergency deliveries of American motor transport, better anti-tank guns, and superior Grant and Sherman tanks. Montgomery oversaw the build-up, refusing to attack Rommel as soon as Winston Churchill wanted. He preferred to first ensure overwhelming superiority—particularly in the air—and thus more certain success. That allowed fresh British and Indian divisions and one veteran Australian division to arrive and take up position in the line. Most importantly, Montgomery unquestionably and significantly raised the morale of British and Commonwealth forces and began the recovery that made British 8th Army one of the great Western Allied armies of the war.

Montgomery had access to ULTRA intelligence on Axis strength even as he built up his own. The British also conducted a highly successful deception operation, code named BERTRAM, to hide their concentrations. It began with open movement of 10th Corps to one flank, followed by a secret move back over four nights that was covered by use of elaborate dummy facilities: the British left behind 2,400 canvas vehicles, a phantom force linked by elaborate fake HQs and signals traffic. On the eve of battle, Rommel was absent on sick leave. His temporary replacement was General Georg Stumme. Too much has been made of Rommel’s absence: far more important was the paucity and imbalance of Axis supplies and their vulnerability to air interdiction along a 1,200-mile-long supply route back to Tunisia. Manpower was another concern. The newly renamed “Panzerarmee Afrika” comprised just 82,000 Germans and 42,000 Italians. Many were sick; others were disheartened. The infantry was put in the frontline behind vast desert minefields containing over 500,000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Some tanks and most of the artillery was kept in immediate support of the infantry for some semblance of defense-in-depth, but the German and Italian mobile and armored divisions were in reserve on either flank. British experience in fighting Germans in two world wars dictated battle doctrine that was slow and methodical, an approach reinforced by Montgomery’s personal command style and well-suited to the El Alamein terrain. The main battle thus opened with a massive artillery barrage that began timed to the BBC signal late on October 23, and rained down on the enemy through six hours of night terror. The artillery barrage was reinforced with heavy aerial bombardment by waves of Wellingtons bombing deeper gun positions. The barrage was partly intended to cut a path through the Axis Minenkästen. It went unanswered by return fire due to shortages of ammunition on the Axis side and a consequent but controversial decision by Stumme to hold back his artillery from counter-bombardment.

As Allied artillery fire moved over intermediate Axis positions, four infantry divisions and then two armored divisions attacked along a concentrated Schwerpunkt of just six miles of the Axis line, or Hauptkampflinie ( HKL ). By early morning on the 24th, parts of the northern section of the HKL were overrun by Australian and Scots troops in heavy, bloody, close-in infantry fighting that maximized blunt force and numbers, and sheer guts, over command skill or schemes of maneuver. A counterattack by 15th Panzer Division and the Italian “Littorio” armored division was repulsed with heavy loss of Axis tanks: about 40 percent of the total available. General Stumme was killed by enemy strafing of his scout car. That meant temporary command fell to General Wilhelm von Thoma. In a desperate move to block a British breakthrough along the coast, Rommel—who had hurried back to North Africa—and Thoma ordered 21st Panzer Division holding on the southern flank to race northward. One historian has called this an order for a “Tottenrit” (“death ride”), in a situation the generals already deemed hopeless.

The Allied Advance Into Northern Tunisia - May 1943

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Major Lueder, commander of sPz.Abt. 501 (right), confers with his intelligence officer. The 501 was an independent Tiger unit.

The Allied forces in the north had reached Cape Serrat and taken it by 1 April. At Heidous, the Free French and Moroccan forces, coupled with elements of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, achieved a penetration in the sector of Manteuffel’s ad hoc division. Hasso von Manteuffel personally led his reserves in a successful effort to seal off the penetration.

On 7 April, the 78th Infantry Division attempted to take “Longstop Hill,” which was being held by the mountain troops of the 334. Infanterie-Division. The Germans were forced to pull back, step-by-step, but they were able to continue controlling the hill.

The fighting in the Tunisian Bridgehead approached the end. From 14 to 16 April, the newly arrived British 4th Infantry Division attacked Kampfgruppe Lang of the 334. Infanterie-Division, which was holding at Sidi Nsir.

During the night of 19/20 April, the 8th Army opened its offensive against the Enfidaville position. The city fell, and Montgomery shifted his attack’s main area to the coastal area, since he estimated that the Germanheld positions from Enfidaville to Zaghouan would cost too many casualties.

On 24 April, “Longstop Hill” finally fell to the 78th Infantry Division. That opened the gates to Tunis.

The final round of fighting started. Divisions from the Allied forces stormed from all sides. Nineteen large formations, including four armored divisions, were advancing on Tunis. The German formations, increasingly burned out, pulled back to Tunis and the Cape Bon Peninsula. Individual pockets of resistance held out until the beginning of May.

Oberst Irkens, in his role as Panzerführer Afrika, threw 70 tanks from all of the armored formations against the enemy. More than 1,000 tanks were rolling forward to break through to Tunis. When he finally disengaged from the enemy, he had 20 tanks left. His men had accounted for 90 of the Allies’ seemingly inexhaustible supply of armor.

During the night of 6/7 May, the remaining tanks of Heeresgruppe Afrika rolled back to the El Aila airfield, west of Tunis. There was a series of smaller engagements, until the last of the ammunition had been fired off and the fuel consumed. The remaining seven operational tanks were driven into a wadi.

The Allies continued their attacks on the morning of 7 May, with the artillery hammering into the ever-shrinking bridgehead. Allied airpower smashed pockets of resistance. They were able to do that without any aerial opposition, since the last Luftwaffe formations had left the continent.

At 1740 hours on that day, the first Allied formations entered Tunis, splitting the forces of Heeresgruppe Afrika into two. By the next morning, all of the city was in the hands of the English.

It was not until 9 May, however, that the Allies were able to break through east of Bizerta Lake and take Fort Farina. The last order of the 5. Panzer-Armee was issued at 1524 hours: “Destroy documents and equipment—Good-bye —Long live Germany!” The next day, the British 6th Armoured Division broke through at Hammanlif. It was followed by the Indian 4th Infantry Division, which then turned in the direction of Cape Bon. By the evening of 12 May, it had completely occupied that northernmost peninsula of Tunisia.

The divisions of the Germans’ “Middle Group” sent their last radio transmissions during the morning of 12 May to Heeresgruppe Afrika. The field-army group’s last command post was at Ste. Marie du Zit. General der Panzertruppe Cramer had been able to get there before the capitulation with the last two armored vehicles of the DAK. Around 1100 hours on that day, von Arnim sent a message to Rome indicating that his command post was surrounded on two sides. Immediately thereafter, he made a surrender offer to the Allies. It was General der Panzertruppe Cramer who sent the final message, however:

To: German Armed Forces High Command
Ammunition expended. Weapons and materiel destroyed. The Deutsches Afrika-Korps has fought to the point where it is no longer capable of fighting.”
Early on the morning of 13 May, General Alexander sent a message to the Prime Minister in London:
Sir, it is my duty to inform you that the Tunisian Campaign is over. All enemy resistance has ceased. All of Africa is ours!

The end in Africa was just as catastrophic as that in Stalingrad. In addition to 130,000 German personnel, some 180,000 Italian personnel were taken captive. What was even more serious: the fighting morale of the Italians had been broken. They had lost the fight for their colonial possessions and were then in fear for their homeland, since the writing was on the wall that the Allies would soon kick open the door to “Fortress Europe.”

In all, one hundred thousand soldiers of all nations lost their lives in the fighting for North Africa.

General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme

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General of Panzer Troops Georg Stumme, born in 1886, commanded the 2nd Light Division at Gera as Lieutenant-General in 1939. In Russia in 1941 he commanded XL Panzer Corps in the assault on Moscow, in which his tanks were halted more by the mud than by the enemy. He got to within fifty miles of Moscow on the highway, but was continually counter-attacked by T.34s which could manoeuvre in the mud. It was during this advance that Stumme made the memorable remark to Major-General Fischer, G.O.C. 10th Panzer Division, 'Good, God, this is no more than a reinforced reconnaissance patrol!'

Stumme was short, very energetic, always wore an eyeglass, and suffered from high blood pressure which gave him a permanent flush. He was nicknamed 'Fireball' by his troops. In the Velikije Luki battk of 1941 his Corps took 30,000 prisoners.

Carell has described Stumme thus: 'Stumme was no scholarly General Staff officer, but a practical man with a genuine flair for spotting and grasping tactical opportunities. He was one of the best German tank commanders, clever in planning operations and resolute in executing them. He was a front-line officer, idolized by his soldiers, whose welfare was his constant concern. But he was also respected by his officers, who admired his energy and operational instinct....'

Stumme lost his command in the same way General Felmy lost his—the chief of operations of 23rd Panzer Division, carrying plans for an impending attack, had been shot down in an aircraft by the Russians, into whose hands the plans fell. Stumme was held responsible, and given five years' fortress detention by the Reich Military Court. Because of his excellent record the sentence was remitted, and instead Stumme was sent to Africa.

He arrived at Rommel's headquarters on 19 September 1942 and on 22 September took over command of the Afrika Army. Kesselring wrote, 'Being a man of a more even and genial temperament than Rommel, he did much to relax the tension among officers and men, besides managing to create tolerable relations with the Italian Command.' But he was not quite physically fit. Rommel doubted whether a man with his blood pressure should ever have been sent to the desert. In the event, Stumme inherited Rommel's plan for the defence at El Alamein, and spared no effort to improve the defences despite (in Rommel's words) 'the full extent of the supply deficiencies, on which the whole Africa problem turned'. On 24 October, while driving at the front, Stumme's car was fired on by British troops and one of his N.C.Os was killed. The car turned round and drove off at high speed, with Stumme clinging to the side of it, but he dropped off and was later found to be dead, presumably from a heart attack. As Rommel wrote of Stumme, 'He had spared no pains to command the Army well and had been day and night at the front'.

Lieutenant-General Ernst Baade.

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Every army throws up its share of colourful eccentrics, even in the ranks of the generals, and there can have been few more idiosyncratic personalities during the last war than Lieutenant-General Ernst Baade. The son of a Brandenburg landowner, he farmed his own estate in Holstein where he bred horses. Before the war he and his wife were well-known international show-jumpers. In 1939 he was a squadron leader in Cavalry Regiment No. 3, which von Senger commanded. Senger found him 'an original character', and his disregard for pomp and circumstance would have found common cause with far more British officers than German ones. He fought in Poland, France, Russia, North Africa, and Italy.

As a colonel in 1942 he commanded the Combat Group of the Afrika Korps which forced a way into Bir Hakeim; and in 1943 he commanded the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division in Sardinia and Italy, under von Senger. Before becoming a general he had been known to lead patrols in Africa wearing a kilt, and to have signalled the end of a night raid by telling the British over their own radio network, 'Stop firing. On my way back. Baade'. At Cassino, where he was a general, it was rumoured that he had accepted an invitation to dine with the enemy at Christmas, and O.K.W. demanded in some agitation of von Senger if this was true. Von Senger denied it, but forebore to admit that Baade had signalled New Year Greetings to the enemy in English!

Baade gave Major-General Ryder's 34th U.S. Division a very bloody nose above Cassino in February 1944. His defence of Cassino and of the Hitler Line earned him a high reputation, and the 10th Army Commander, Colonel-General von Vietinghoff, thought Baade and Heidrich 'in a class by themselves' as divisional commanders. This very frontline General was promoted to command a Panzer Corps on the western front in 1945, but was to die from wounds received on the last day of the war in an air raid.

'Hermann Göring' in the Tunisia.

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In November 1942, in retaliation for the French garrison's failure to put up sustained resistance to the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria, Germany moved into the hitherto unoccupied areas of southern France. The bulk of the new division was located in the area around Mont-de-Mar-san, where it continued its training and working up. Those sub-units nearest to being fully formed were gradually moved down into Italy while the remainder stayed in the south of France.

Meanwhile, in November 1942, the paratroopers who were in the process of transferring from Fallschimjäger-Regiment5 were moved directly to North Africa and assigned to support 10. Panzer-Division in Tunisia. The bulk of the 'HG' Division, still not fully organised, was despatched piecemeal to Tunisia in February/March 1943 under command of Oberst Schmid, who was promoted to Generalmajor shortly thereafter. It 'was under the title Kampfgruppe Schmid that these elements, finally totalling something between 7,000 and 11,000 men, fought the British, US and French forces, with considerable elan; they quickly earned a reputation for aggression in the attack and reliability under fire, despite often being committed to battle dispersed and attached to various Army units. It was under the title of Division 'Hermann Göring' that, in April 1943, they were commended in official Wehrmacht communiques for their 'exemplary fighting spirit and intrepid valour'. Some 400 'Hermann Göring' soldiers were killed in the Tunisian battles; and when the German forces in North Africa were finally forced to surrender on 12 May, almost all of the remainder of the battle group, including its most experienced veterans, went into captivity.

Stukagruppen mit Afrika

2011-09-29T07:20:00.003+08:00

While the bulk of the Stukagruppen now massed for the forthcoming invasion of Russia, I/St.G 1, II/St.G 2 and I/St.G 3 remained in the Mediterranean theatre to support Rommel in North Africa. With little in the way of Allied defences to oppose them, the Stukas were able to operate freely during the desert offensives and counter-offensives. In December 1941, Luftflotte 2 arrived in the area with the Erganzungs (training and replacement) Gruppe of St.G 1; and in March 1942 I/St.G 1 and II/St.G 2 were redesignated II and III/St.G 3 respectively to bring the Geschwader up to full strength. On 21 March III Gruppe moved to Biscari-San Pietro in Sicily, where it converted to the Ju87D-1; during renewed attempts to neutralise Malta, when crews often made three sorties per day, formations of about twenty aircraft set out with an entire Gruppe of fighters as escort. Eventually, demands for air support from North Africa reduced the strength of units operating against Malta and although small raids by single sections of dive bombers continued, they lacked adequate defensive covering fire and became easy prey for the defending fighters.

At the end of May 1942, III/St.G 3 too was recalled to North Africa and in June and July, when operations in support of the Afrika Korps' advance to El Alamein called for intense efforts, they again flew as many as three sorties a day, attacking troops, transport and tank concentrations, artillery positions, airfields, stores and ammunition dumps. In early June the entire Geschwader made repeated attacks on the fortress of Bir Hacheim and, up until the time of its capture, many raids were directed against shipping and installations at Tobruk Harbour; but the long advance had exhausted German air and ground forces alike, and Rommel was halted at El Alamein. The now greatly reinforced Desert Air Force inflicted heavy losses, and in spite of close escort flown by the more experienced Luftwaffe fighter-pilots the Allied fighters invariably broke through the defensive screen. As in the Battle of Britain, the Stukas were too slow for the escort. One particularly notable success for the Desert Air Force occurred during the evening of 3 July when a formation of fifteen Stukas, heavily escorted by fighters, was intercepted over El Alamein. In the ensuing air battle the Allied fighters claimed all but two of the dive-bombers destroyed, some being chased back as far as their own airfield before being shot down. Final attacks against El Alamein extended the Luftwaffe to its limit with the result that sorties were considerably reduced due to natural attrition and combat losses.

Eastern Task Force - Algiers

2011-09-29T07:19:00.003+08:00

Eastern Task Force had dropped anchor off Algiers in the last hours of 7 November. Of the three TORCH task forces, Eastern included the largest British proportion. Not only were naval and air support British; so were 23,000 of the total 33,000 troops. The 10,000 U.S. Army troops landing at Algiers would consist of Col. Benjamin F. Caffey, Jr.’s 39th Regimental Combat Team from the 9th Infantry Division; and Col. John W. O’ Daniel’s 168th Regimental Combat Team and Lt. Col. Edwin T. Swenson’s 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, both from the 34th Infantry Division. These American units and all British Army units in the initial landing were under command of U.S. Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder. Naval support included a Royal Navy flotilla of 3 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers, I antiaircraft vessel, 7 destroyers, and 15 transports. Enemy strength was estimated at 15,000 troops with only obsolete tanks, 91 fighters and bombers at two airfields, 12 coastal batteries, and a few destroyers in the harbor.

Both the geography and concept of operations at Algiers closely resembled those of Oran. The city lay in an arc of beaches and bluffs gradually rising to low hills ten miles inland. Allied troops were to land at three points along a fifty-mile stretch of coast: Beaches APPLES and BEER lay west of the city, Beach CHARLIE east. After clearing the beaches, the troops would take all roads, villages, and two airfields; then converge behind Algiers; and move on the city from three sides.

Landings in the Algiers area met mixed success. The British 11th Infantry Brigade Group came across Beach APPLES on time and without mishap, the smoothest of all TORCH landings. By 0700 the unit had moved twelve miles inland and taken its objective, Blida airfield. But at Beach BEER a variety of problems—high surf, boat crew inexperience, absent beach guides, engine failures—scattered the 168th Team over fifteen miles of coastline and delayed the British 6th Commando over five hours. Fortunately, landings at APPLES and BEER were unopposed. At Beach CHARLIE, however, coastal batteries fired on transports as the landing craft neared shore. Naval gunfire responded, but then high surf scattered 39th Regimental Combat Team boats, smashing some against coastal rocks. Leaving the boats, most troops found, instead of gradually rising ground, a vertical bluff with stairs cut for sightseers. Overcoming all these difficulties, the troops of the 39th Team moved eight miles inland and took the airfield at Maison Blanche by 0830. But for the rest of the day a fierce battle raged with a French marine artillery battery. Royal Navy surface and air units eventually prevailed, though Axis bombers managed to damage a transport and destroyer.

As at Oran, the British insisted on an antisabotage mission into the heart of the objective area. Operation TERMINAL called for Colonel Swenson’s 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, to enter Algiers harbor on two Royal Navy destroyers, debark, and secure port facilities for future Allied operations. As the two ships moved toward the bay at 0140 on D-day, TERMINAL began to resemble the RESERVIST disaster at Oran. The first ship soon drew a searchlight beam, then hostile fire which drove it back to sea in flames with thirty-five casualties. Ignoring its sister ship’s fate, the other vessel ran through the intense fire, tied up along a breakwater, and debarked Swenson and half of his battalion. By 0800 the troops had secured several objectives and seemed on the verge of success when the ship, waiting for their return, came under fire. A few men made it aboard as the ship pushed off, but the rest of the unit was surrounded. When Swenson was forced to surrender his force seven hours after entering the city, TERMINAL ended in failure, though with fewer casualties than RESERVIST at Oran.

Algiers presented the Allies with more than military objectives. As headquarters for French forces in all of North Africa, the city incorporated a political character which Allied commanders did not find at other landing sites. Since the fall of France this political aspect had become especially tangled, with the French military deeply fragmented and local commanders promoting various responses to TORCH. For Allied commanders on the ground Algiers was a political maze in which a turn toward one French unit might result in a champagne reception while a turn in a different direction might land one in a deadly firelight. This confusion manifested with frustrating clarity for the 168th Regimental Combat Team on its seven-mile advance from Beach BEER to Algiers. On the morning of D-day Colonel O’ Daniel’s men were met by French troops openly assisting the advance. But around noon the pro-American French commander was replaced by a pro-Nazi officer, and the 168th found itself receiving intense fire from soldiers of the same French units.

Amid confused action in the field, negotiations for a cease-fire continued. On D-day a representative of President Roosevelt had delivered a message to Marshal Petain in Vichy requesting cooperation with all Allied landings. Under close Nazi supervision, Petain had to refuse but authorized Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, commander of all French forces, to act as he saw fit. Darlan let the invasion continue until further resistance was hopeless, then allowed his deputy at Algiers to meet General Ryder. Algiers was the first of the three TORCH objectives to put a cease-fire into effect, at 2000 on 8 November. Unfortunately, the agreement there did not apply to other areas. French headquarters in Oran agreed to a separate cease-fire only at 1215 on 10 November. At Casablanca, however, the French did not send out a cease-fire order until 1910 on the 10th, and sniper fire continued for days after. The successful end to TORCH brought much relief to Washington and London but left American and British commanders suspicious about the potential of the French as battlefield allies.

Western Task Force - Safi

2011-09-09T21:49:00.003+08:00

After studying maps and intelligence reports, General Patton and TORCH planners formulated a concept of operations for Western Task Force. Rather than assaulting Casablanca directly, where an estimated fifty thousand French troops might resist, Patton decided to come ashore at three detached sites. Preceded by several battalion landing teams (BLTs, task-organized mixtures of infantry and armor), Patton’s armored force would land at Safi, 140 miles south of the city and the best port for tank-bearing boats. Other landing teams would come ashore at Mehdia, 80 miles north of Casablanca, their principal mission the capture of two airfields in the area. Most of Patton’s infantry would land at Fedala, 12 miles north of Casablanca. Moving inland, the troops would swing around to the east side of Casablanca and, in conjunction with the armored force from the south, air support from the north, and naval gunfire offshore, advance westward on the city.

To accomplish its mission, Western Task Force would have 2 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 2 separate tank battalions, and sufficient support units to maintain the total force of 34,871 officers and enlisted men. Naval support would come from an American task force of 1 aircraft carrier, 4 escort carriers, 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, and 38 destroyers, in addition to troop and cargo transports and auxiliaries, under Rear Adm. H. Kent Hewitt. The Navy would also provide air support during the landing phase until fields ashore could be secured for Twelfth Air Force squadrons.

To take Safi, Patton selected Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, commanding general of 2d Armored Division. Harmon’s Sub-Task Force BLACKSTONE consisted of the 47th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division; two reinforced battalions of the 67th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division; elements of the 70th Tank Battalion (Separate); and several artillery batteries. With support units, BLACKSTONE totaled 6,428 officers and men.

The naval convoy bringing BLACKSTONE to Safi halted eight miles offshore half an hour before midnight on 7 November 1942. Debarkation of troops and equipment continued in silence, for the landing was not preceded by a softening-up bombardment. General Eisenhower had decided that if French forces were going to oppose TORCH they would have to fire the first shot. As the boats turned toward shore, the French made known their intentions by firing on the transports. U.S. Navy ships immediately returned fire.

The first waves of landing craft plowed through dark swells toward beaches code-named from north to south RED, BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW. As naval gunfire pounded French batteries, the first American troops to land in French Morocco—Company K, 47th Infantry—came ashore at 0445 at GREEN Beach. Forty-five minutes later over 600 men from all beaches returned sniper and machinegun fire and began capturing French and Moroccan troops and key points. By daylight, American troops controlled all port facilities, the post office, telecommunications station, petroleum storage tanks, all roads leading into town, and the civil police force. Reinforced by continuing waves of landing craft, American troops extended their beachhead inland against little more than sniper fire. Sunrise made possible more accurate naval gunfire, and by 1045 all French batteries were out of action. Most resistance to BLACKSTONE infantry advancing through town came from a walled barracks, headquarters to the garrison of fewer than 1,000 men. American troops surrounded and isolated the barracks, then moved on to clear the rest of the town. As artillery was off-loaded, it too was trained on the barracks. But because Eisenhower and Patton hoped to gain without a costly battle the surrender of troops who could later fight Axis armies, they issued no attack order.

Offshore, debarkation of heavy equipment and tanks fell behind schedule. Darkness and heavy seas caused accidents and delays. In the worst incident, a gasoline fire broke out in a lighter while a truck was being lowered into it, forcing sailors and soldiers to turn to fire fighting and illuminating the transport and nearby ships for hostile gunners ashore. Many vehicles reaching the beach had drowned engines and faulty batteries. Not until the town was secured could a deep-draft vehicle transport, called a seatrain, tie up at the dock and off-load tanks faster and in start-up condition.

The landing of troops did not go much better. Although all battalion landing teams were to be ashore before sunrise, only about half the troops met that schedule, and the last off the transports did not hit the beach until noon. Despite the problems experienced by the Americans, the French garrison commander understood clearly that he was outnumbered and outgunned. At 1530 he surrendered. Eleven hours after stepping onto French Morocco, the Americans controlled Safi.

The next morning French leaders made clear that the surrender at Safi did not apply to other areas. At dawn several French planes flew through a thick fog over the town and landing area. However, only one managed to drop a bomb which landed unintentionally on an ammunition storage building. That afternoon U.S. Navy planes raided the airfield at Marrakech, destroying on the ground over forty planes and strafing two convoys of French troops bound for Safi. Moving east of town, American tanks and artillery overran a machine-gun position and took a bridge while losing one tank to mines. On the morning of 10 November, after an artillery duel, Harmon decided the French could be held in position by a small force. He formed most of his tanks and artillery on the road, and at 0900 the armored column raced north to join the ring closing around Casablanca.

Western Task Force - Mehdia-Port-Lyautey

2011-09-09T21:48:00.000+08:00

Two hundred twenty miles up the Moroccan coast another Navy convoy debarked three landing teams to take Mehdia-Port-Lyautey and secure the northern flank of the Western Task Force. Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott’s Sub-Task Force GOALPOST consisted of the 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division; the 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division; elements of the 70th Tank Battalion (Separate); and seven coast artillery batteries. With support units, GOALPOST totaled 9,079 officers and men. Its main objectives were airfields at Port- Lyautey and at Sale, 25 miles south, near Rabat. To reach them the troops would first have to take the coastal village of Mehdia and the town of Port-Lyautey five miles inland on the Sebou River.

The GOALPOST operational plan was more complex than that for BLACKSTONE because of local geographic peculiarities. While the coastline was smooth, the Sebou River meandered sharply in an “S” shape to form two peninsulas. The Port-Lyautey airfield lay in the larger peninsula. An advance straight inland from Mehdia was the most direct route to the airfield, but the troops would have to move through a narrow marsh between the river and a lagoon, and under the guns of a fortress. From bluffs between the towns artillery dominated all points. General Truscott thus decided to land his troops at five beaches along ten miles of shoreline. Two battalion landing teams, going ashore south of the river, would advance on separate axes to the airfield, while a third would move from the north down the other peninsula toward Port-Lyautey. If all went as planned, the airfield and towns would be under American control by sundown on D-day.

Even before H-hour, set for 0400, 8 November 1942, a long succession of problems began. Approaching the coast the previous night, Navy transports lost formation. H-hour was then delayed to allow boat crews to improvise assault waves. Heavy seas further slowed debarkation. As at Sari, all landing teams were to go ashore in darkness, but only the first three waves of the 2d Battalion Landing Team had landed before dawn. Later waves were not only late but off course. The 1st and 3d Battalion Landing Teams missed their assigned beaches by 2,800 yards and 5 miles, respectively.

French opposition, much stronger than at Safi, caused more confusion and delays. At dawn French planes strafed the beaches and bombed transports. A strong coast artillery concentration at a fortress near Mehdia rained a heavy volume of fire on transports offshore. To the south the 1st Battalion Landing Team struggled in the sand for over five hours to regain its beach, to round the lagoon, and to start toward the airfield only to be pinned down by machine-gun fire the rest of the day. To the rear French reinforcements from Rabat were firing on landing team outposts. In the middle the 2d Battalion Landing Team stopped to await naval gunfire support, was then hit hard by a French counterattack, and was pushed back almost to the beach with heavy losses. While the Navy was firing on the Mehdia fortress, troops ashore did not yet have enough artillery to quiet the French batteries, whose fire kept tank lighters from landing and forced transports to move out of range, thus lengthening the route to shore. By nightfall on D-day the Americans occupied precarious positions miles from the airfield they so desperately needed.

The second day’s action brought both success and frustration to the men of GOALPOST. On the south the 1st Battalion Landing Team and several light tanks twice blocked larger French infantry-armor columns. While naval gunfire dispersed the enemy, the troops made good progress toward the airfield. But tragedy stopped the advance: unidentified artillery and U.S. naval aircraft dropped ordnance on the 1st Team. In the middle the 2d Team could do no more than hold position only a mile inland against a French unit reinforced the previous night. To the north the 3d Battalion Landing Team succeeded in placing troops and artillery north and east of the airfield but stalled under fire from Port-Lyautey.

Port-Lyautey airdrome, shielded by the meandering Sebou River.

On the night of 9–10 November a tactical innovation involving the Navy raised American spirits. On the Sebou River the destroyer-transport Dallas pushed aside a barricade and sneaked upstream with a raider detachment to spearhead the assault on the airfield. As the night wore on, some colonial units gave up the fight, but Foreign Legion units continued to resist. Several companies of the 1st and 3d Battalion Landing Teams made progress, though slow, toward the airfield.

In bypassing a French machine-gun position, three companies of the 1st Team became disoriented and unintentionally provided some comic relief to a difficult night. At 0430 the companies reached a building they thought housed the airfield garrison. Intent on maintaining surprise, the troops crept up to doors and windows, weapons at the ready. Bursting in, the embarrassed Americans discovered they had captured a French cafe. Some 75 patrons put down wine glasses and surrendered. Patrols rounded up about 100 more prisoners in the area.

At daylight on 10 November the 1st Team mounted a new drive, this time with tanks, and by 1045 reached the west side of the airfield. On the river the Dallas passed a gauntlet of artillery fire and debarked the raiders on the east side of the airfield. American troops now occupied three sides of their objective.

Serious opposition still came from the Mehdia fortress. Although naval gunfire had silenced the larger batteries earlier, machine-gun and rifle fire continued. Navy dive bombers were called in, and after only one bombing run the garrison quit. After claiming the fort and gathering prisoners, the 2d Battalion Landing Team moved on to close the ring around the airport. By nightfall the American victory was assured, and the local French commander requested a parlay with General Truscott. At 0400 on 11 November a cease-fire went into effect, the terms of which brought all GOALPOST objectives under American control.

Mediterranean theater I

2011-09-09T21:46:00.003+08:00

Even before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army had been planning to defeat Hitler by invading France. A war with Japan, should it take place, was to be a holding action until Hitler was defeated. General George C. Marshall, the army’s chief of staff, wanted that invasion to take place in 1943. In the meantime, troops and munitions would be assembled in Britain until the invasion date. The code name for this planned attack was Operation Roundup.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, on the other hand, wanted to concentrate on the Mediterranean. Because the Axis powers controlled the Mediterranean’s western approaches, British ships could not use the Suez Canal and thus had to go the long way to India around South Africa. Furthermore, campaigns in the Mediterranean would support Britain’s Eighth Army, which had been fighting Rommel in the western deserts of Egypt for months. Churchill always represented the Mediterranean as a place of wonderful opportunities for the Allies, but the Americans were skeptical.

Many believed that Churchill’s enthusiasm derived from the belief that Britain would not sustain huge casualties in the Mediterranean. This relative safety made it preferable to western Europe, which the Germans would fight hard to retain and where big losses could be expected.

However, waging a series of small campaigns in the Mediterranean while Soviet Russia did most of the fighting against Hitler’s legions in Europe did not seem like a good idea to General Marshall. Further, the U.S. Army’s heritage was one of directly engaging the enemy with maximum force and battering it into submission, not gradually wearing it down. It had done this in the Civil War and World War I and planned to do so again in this one.

The strategic decision was up to Roosevelt, who came down on Churchill’s side, ordering that North Africa be invaded in 1942. This campaign would be known as Operation Torch. Roosevelt did not deny Marshall’s point that making war on the margins of his empire would do little to weaken Hitler. But President Roosevelt had serious political problems. He had promised Stalin to open a second front in Europe in 1942, which the Soviets desperately wanted, and there was no possibility of invading France that year.

Furthermore, if no U.S. troops went into action against Germany until 1943, there would be great pressure on Roosevelt to send additional men and munitions to the Pacific. Americans hated the Japanese even more than the Nazis, and American planners always had to struggle to keep the Pacific war from overwhelming the strategically much more important struggle with Germany. An invasion of French North Africa would be easy, at least if Germany did not come in. Such a drive could be represented, however feebly, as a second front, and would justify a military buildup that could later be used to invade France.

The polls bore out Roosevelt. In February 1943, after U.S. troops had been mauled in Tunisia and the Allies were facing some 250,000 Axis troops there, 53 percent of Americans still thought Japan was the United States’s “chief enemy,” with only 34 percent nominating the Germans. Thus, if the North African operations were mainly political, they remained essential for just that reason.

On the larger issue of 1943, Marshall cannot be faulted. The victories in North Africa and the Mediterranean added the equivalent of 2 million tons of shipping when the Suez Canal finally became accessible as a result of them, but they otherwise did little to defeat Hitler. It was clear that Germany had to be beaten in Europe. The more time that was spent on campaigns at the edges of western Europe, the longer the war would last. Hence the importance of Roundup and the danger posed by Torch.

In its final form, Torch, under the command of Marshall’s favorite, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, became larger than Marshall desired but was a more cautious affair than if Britain had gotten its way. The plan was for three task forces of 35,000 to 40,000 men each to land simultaneously at widely separated points. A western task force would sail directly from the United States to land near Casablanca, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. A central task force, also consisting entirely of U.S. troops, would sail from Britain to Oran, on the Mediterranean coast. And a joint Anglo-American eastern task force would seize Algiers.

The great flaw in this plan, as the British had maintained from the start and Eisenhower soon realized, was that taking Casablanca offered no important benefits. Tunisia, only 100 miles from Sicily and the best place for a German buildup, was the real strategic prize. If the Allies could arrive there first, Hitler would lose General Erwin Rommel’s army and with it North Africa. But Marshall was firm about not pursuing this course, thinking Tunisia too much of a risk, so the best chance of making Torch pay off was lost before it started.

Everyone hoped that the French forces in North Africa would welcome the Allies as liberators. The problem was that these forces were under the command of the Vichy occupation government, which collaborated with the Nazis. Complex negotiations designed to win over the Vichyites in North Africa preceded Operation Torch. Admiral Jean Darlan, the head of France’s armed forces, which still had a powerful fleet in Toulon, France, that the Allies wanted, was also approached by the Allies. But the Allies, justifiably afraid of leaks, did not entrust their French contacts with the date. Therefore, on November 8, 1942, when the landings commenced, what the French would do was still uncertain.

Admiral Darlan, who by accident was in Algiers on November 8, initially ordered his forces to resist, then that evening announced a cease-fire in Algiers and two days later extended it throughout North Africa. However, Marshal Pétain in Vichy promptly canceled these instructions. Amid the resulting confusion in Oran and Morocco, fighting—some of it heavy—continued for days. The Moroccan operation turned out to be a shambles, thanks to poor military intelligence and inexperience, although its commander, Major General George S. Patton, Jr., would soon prove himself to be one of the war’s outstanding combat leaders. Even so, luck was with the Americans. Along the treacherous Moroccan coast, the landing conditions were ideal, with the seas calmer than usual. The Vichy French could not bring their superiority in manpower to bear because of the lack of transportation and general confusion. Spain, which had 100,000 troops in its part of Morocco, chose not to enter the war. U.S. divisional commanders displayed initiative after failing to make contact with Patton, and American forces quickly gained control of the sea and air. The French defense collapsed after three days.

Mediterranean theater II

2011-09-09T21:45:00.000+08:00

At this point the Germans immediately occupied the rest of France, ending the pretense that the Vichy government represented an independent country. But they did not secure the French fleet, which was scuttled in Toulon by French admirals. The Allies had hoped it would sail to join them, but destruction was the next best thing and one the Allies could live with.

General Eisenhower put Admiral Darlan in charge of French North Africa. He alone, the theory went, could guarantee an orderly transfer of authority and, most important of all, induce the Vichy troops in Tunisia, where there had been no Allied landings, to cooperate. The chances of this happening were fading fast on November 11 when Eisenhower made the Darlan appointment, but considering the stakes, a slim chance was better than none at all.

The French in Tunisia, however, decided to let German forces land, thus dooming the Allies to a long and bitter campaign instead of the walkover they had hoped for and needed. Had the French in Tunisia responded to Darlan’s call, enabling the Allies to arrive there first, the infamous agreement would have been easier to take. Bad as it was in other respects, the worst thing about the “Darlan deal” was that it yielded few benefits. Democratic principles had been sacrificed in vain.

Luckily for the Allied cause, Darlan was soon assassinated by a French civilian. But because FDR hated Charles de Gaulle, the logical choice for leader of the Free French forces, General Henri Giraud was put in Darlan’s place instead. Giraud was unacceptable to most of the French in North Africa, however, so de Gaulle brushed him aside and assumed power himself. Then, on November 9, 1943, de Gaulle created a government in exile, which in time would become the real government of France.

While all this intrigue progressed, the war continued. Only a few days before Operation Torch began, Britain’s Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery and his Eighth Army administered a severe defeat to General Rommel at El Alamein in the western desert of Egypt. El Alamein became the farthest point of Germany’s advance in North Africa, and Britain’s victory there ensured the safety of Egypt and the vital Suez lifeline.

Although it was slow off the mark, the Eighth Army eventually began pursuing Rommel while, from the opposite direction, Allied units advanced to within 12 miles of Tunis. Then the rainy season and stronger German defenses put the offensive on hold and gave Hitler time to send in more troops.

Hitler seems to have reinforced Tunisia because he could not bear to admit defeat or tolerate losses of territory. By doing so, he prolonged the fighting there for up to five additional months. During that time and partly because of the Tunisian campaign, the Allies abandoned their plan to invade France in 1943, thus enabling the Nazi regime to survive for an additional year. From this standpoint, Hitler’s refusal to leave Africa proved to be a tactical mistake that, in one of war’s cruel ironies, nevertheless brought him strategic benefits.

On May 11, 1943, the last Axis army in Tunisia surrendered, costing Hitler another 250,000 men, in addition to many more killed or evacuated because of wounds. The North Africa campaign had been messy, and long. During it the U.S. Army experienced what would turn out to be its only defeats by the German Army—losing at Sidi bon-Zid and at the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February.

Yet Operation Torch had paid for itself in many ways. By committing so many resources to it, Hitler made Africa a significant front that eased the pressure on Russia. And in addition to ending in victory for the Allies, it was a valuable learning experience for U.S. commanders. Politically essential in any case, it might have been strategically important as well had it not led the Allies to invade Sicily and then the Italian mainland.

After Tunisia fell, General Marshall wished to move most of the Allied troops in Africa to Britain. From there they would be positioned to invade France some time in the summer of 1943. Doing so would have been feasible, for France was weakly defended at the time and the Allies already controlled the English Channel and much of the air over France. But U.S. leaders were uncertain about this course, whereas the British were united on the need to take Sicily, which would strengthen the Allied grip on the entire Mediterranean. FDR therefore gave his consent to the invasion, code named Operation Husky.

It might have been possible to have both Husky and Overlord in the same year—if the Allies had moved at top speed. During the months before Tunisia fell, General Patton had been training troops in Morocco. These forces could have been used to take Sicily in May or early June, when it was undefended. Instead, the Allied high command scheduled Husky for July 10, by which time Germany had moved three divisions to the island.

The Sicilian campaign was poorly run. It took 43 days to defeat the Germans, most of whom then escaped to the Italian mainland. As Operation Roundup was now out of the question, the Allies invaded Italy next, partly because the British wanted it but partly through sheer momentum.

This series of bad decisions meant that the war would last for two more years, whereas if Roundup had succeeded in 1943, it might have been over in one. Italy, which was supposed to have been an easy win, became a horror for the Allies. Some of the worst fighting of the war occurred there and it became a strategic liability, as some Americans had predicted it would. The Italian campaign used up divisions that would have been more useful in France. And, because the Italians under Allied control had to be supplied with food and fuel to stay alive, much of the shipping freed up by Operation Torch went to serve civilian instead of military purposes. The Mediterranean, a sea of dreams for Britain, thus became a nightmare for General Marshall and the U.S. War Department.

FURTHER READING Blumenson, Martin. Kasserine Pass. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Carver, Michael. Dilemmas of the Desert War: A New Look at the Libyan Campaign, 1940–42. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. Grigg, John. 1943: The Victory That Never Was. New York: Hill & Wang, 1980. Howard, Michael. Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. New York: Praeger, 1968. Lucas, James. War in the Desert: The Eighth Army at El Alamein. New York: Beaufort, 1983. Sainsbury, Keith. The North African Landings, 1942. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1976

Desert Spitfire - USAAF

2011-08-31T23:28:00.002+08:00

To counter the prevalent dusty conditions, the Spitfires were fitted with a large Vokes air filter under the nose, which lowered the performance of the aircraft through increased drag. The Vb and Vc(trop) (fitted with large Vokes anti-sand air filters) would also equip units of the Desert Air Force during the North African campaign by August 1942.

Here, the Mk Vcs were also used as tactical fighter-bombers, being equipped with a maximum load of 500 lb of bombs. Mark Vbs equipped the 4th, 31st and 52nd Fighter Groups of the USAAF in the summer of 1942, and the latter two groups continued flying them until succeeded by Mk VIIIs in mid-1943. By this time, Spitfire Mk Vcs with stronger wings and extra ammunition began to carry four 20 mm cannon. Many Mk Vs also had the new, smaller and much more efficient "Aboukir" filter instead of the ram air effect nullifying Vokes filter. The new filter was named as such due to its creation in Aboukir, Egypt by RAF mechanics.

The Spitfire V and, later, much-improved, longer-range Spitfire VIIIs also soon became available in the North African theatre and, henceforth, featured heavily with the RAF, South African Air Force and USAAF during the campaigns in Sicily and Italy.

In the Mediterranean theatre and in Italy, the Mk VIII also fought with the United States Army Air Force. The 31st and 52nd Fighter Groups operated the fighter for some time until, in March 1944, their aircraft were replaced by the P-51B/C Mustang, a change which didn't thrill most of the pilots according to many 31st FG members. However, the American fighter was adopted because of its long-range escort capability. Over 300 kills were claimed by the two fighter groups while flying Spitfires.

American Spitfires - Africa

2011-08-31T23:27:00.003+08:00

During the summer of 1942, the 307th and 308th Fighter Squadrons of the 31st Fighter Group went to Biggin Hill and Kenley respectively for temporary attachment to RAF fighter wings where they could receive an introduction to combat. The 309th FS went to Westhampnett, and by August 5, all three units were operational.

Their baptism of fire came on August 19, when they flew air support for the Dieppe Raid, losing eight Spitfires and seven damaged, with one pilot killed and another made prisoner; two Fw-190s were claimed destroyed, with three probables and two damaged. With this, the 31st was considered blooded, and was reunited as a group at Westhampnett, while the 2nd and 4th Fighter Squadrons of the 52nd Fighter Group took their places at Biggin Hill and Kenley.

Before either group could have more effect, they were transferred to the XII Air Force that September, as the North African invasion loomed; by late September, both units had left England to enter combat in the Mediterranean.

During the opening day of Operation Torch, Major Harrison Thyng, CO of the 308th FS, shot down two Vichy D.520s to open the unit’s score in the Mediterranean Theatre. In December and January, the 52nd Fighter Group entered combat in defence of the port of Bone. On January 13, 1943, 1st Lt. Norman Bolle shot down 114-victory experte Leutnant Wilhelm Crinius of II/JG-2.

On February 4th, their luck was reversed when 12 Spitfires of the 4th FS escorting ground-strafing P-39s were hit by Kurt Buhligen and Erich Rudorffer of II/JG2, the two experten taking down 3 of the Spitfires for no losses. Throughout this period the Americans found themselves frequently outclassed by the experten of JG2 and JG77, sent to counter the North African invasion.

By March 21, the Americans had adopted the more aggressive tactics of the RAF’s Western Desert Air Force, and 36 Spitfires of the 31st FG ran across 17 Ju-87D-3s of III/St.G.3, escorted by Bf-109s and Fw-190s of JG77 and JG2. While the 307th FS held off the fighters, the 309th shot down 4 Stukas and claimed another 4 as probables, for one loss; the following day the 52nd FG claimed 5 Bf-109s, 2 Fw-190s and 2 Ju-88s for one loss – a crash-landing due to flak damage. The two Spitfire units had come into their own.

During April 1943, Captains Norman MacDonald and Arthur Vinson of the 52nd FG became the first USAAF Spitfire aces, though Vinson was lost immediately after shooting down his 7th victim.

By the time of the Axis surrender in Africa on May 13, the 52nd FG claimed 86 victories and had added a third ace – Lt. Sylvan Field – while the 31st FG claimed 61, and two aces, Lt Col. Thyng and Major Frank Hill. Hill would become the top US Spitfire ace of the war with 7 victories.

The Desert Stuka

2011-08-31T23:27:00.000+08:00

When World War II commenced, only 500 Ju 87s were in the Luftwaffe inventory, but they wielded a tactical and psychological impact far greater than mere numbers suggested.

The screaming, precision-bombing Stukas epitomized blitzkrieg warfare as they blasted a path for oncoming German tanks and infantry. Their effect upon unarmed civilians was terrifying, for Stukas emitted a loud, high-pitched howl as they nosed over, giving the impression of giant birds of prey. The Ju 87s functioned brilliantly until the Battle of Britain in 1940, where effective fighter opposition caused heavy losses. Thereafter, Stukas were assigned to secondary theaters like the Aegean and Mediterranean with good results.

The Ju 87B-2 which followed had a number of detailed improvements and was built in several variants including ski-quipped versions and, at the other extreme, with tropical operation kit as the Ju 87B2/ frop. Italy received a number of Ju 87B-2s and named the type PicchiateIlo, while others went to Axis countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. A long-range anti-shipping version of the J u 87B series appeared as the Ju 87R type, variants from Ju 87R-1 to Ju 87R-4 all having detail differences but a common armament (one 551-lb/250-kg bomb) and provision for underwing drop tanks.

Although the Stukas had suffered mightily at the hands of the RAF, the Luftwaffe had no immediate replacement available and development continued, the next production model being the Ju 87D-1 with the new 1,41O-hp (1051-kW) Jumo 211J-1 engine. Considerable changes were made in the aircraft's appearance and armour was increased, probably the most popular improvement! Production of this version began in 1941 and deliveries during that year totalled 476, with 917 in 1942. The type was deployed extensively in the Middle East and on the Eastern Front, and in the former area was even used as a glider tug under the designation J u 87D-2. The Ju 87D-3 had extra armour protection for the ground-attack role.

Wespe - Not SP-Artillery

2011-08-17T14:23:00.003+08:00

The original 'Wespe' emblem was designed by Lt. Richard Marchfelder. So the Wespe emblem had the following course: II./ZG 1 - III./ZG 76 - II./SKG 210 - II./ZG 1. The three small wasps were used to III./ZG 76 in 1941, but I am unsure of when the single large Wasp was first used.

The Wasp insignia had its origins when the II/ZG 1 was known as III/ZG 76 in Norway. It was supposedly design to compete with the Sharkmouth of the II/ZG 76 unit. The group retained the insignia even when they later became III/ZG 76 and then part of E.Gr. 210 and in 1941 when they took part in the invasion of Russia as II/SKG 210. In 1942 the unit came full circle and was once again known as II/ZG 1 “Wespen” and sent to Italy. The unit flew Zerstorer missions until early summer 1943 when it returned to Germany to take part in the defense of the Reich. The Allies found the aircraft S9+FM intact and abandoned on Montecorvino Airfield near the Salerno beachhead.

LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP (LRDG)

2011-08-17T14:21:00.003+08:00

Vehicles took a terrible pounding in the desert, especially during deep penetration missions by the Long-Range Desert Group. Simple, robust trucks such as these Canadian Chevrolets were essential, as breakdowns could mean death.

The go-anywhere ability of the Jeep was much appreciated during the desert campaign. Here members of the newly-formed SAS set out in their Vickers- and Browning-armed Jeeps.
The Jeep was used by all arms for OP, Provost, wireless, recovery and cargo-carrying roles, Both the US and British armies used armed reconnaissance versions, and of particular interest were the special heavily-armed. Vehicles used by the SAS (Special Air Service) and LRDG (Long-Range Desert Group). These vehicles were stripped of ail unnecessary equipment to allow for the attachment of special equipment, armament, fuel, water-cans, etc, The LRDG in particular carried out daring exploits in North Africa against the supply columns replenishing the Afrika Korps, and played a significant part in reducing its capability through reduction in supplies (particularly fuel) Both LRDG and SAS vehicles usually bristled with machine-guns, usually a combination of Browning and Vickers K guns. The fuel tanks were enlarged to allow for increased range (the fuel capacity was usually about 136 litre/30 Imp gal).

A British Army Special Forces unit set up in mid-1940 to operate in the western desert against the Italian Army. It contained a high proportion of New Zealand troops to start, then more British and other Commonwealth forces. Its principal function was long-range espionage, but sabotage missions were also carried out using vehicles adapted for the desert. The LRDG supported British 8th Army from its advance westward following Second El Alamein to the Mareth Line campaign. It shipped out in 1943 to fight in the Dodecanese campaign and the Italian campaign (1943–1945). Elements of the former desert force also fought in Greece and Yugoslavia.

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Desert conditions (Allied)
In general, British, Commonwealth and US vehicles used in the desert campaigns were very good. The effect of standardization really showed up here because vehicles were operating under the logistical condition of almost total self-containment. As a result of standardization, vehicles that had been destroyed or that had broken down could be cannibalized for spare parts, and groups of vehicles, like the LRDG (Long-Range Desert Group) and convoys, could keep moving. The main disadvantage of standardization, however, soon came to the fore. Restriction to a minimum number of types meant that 'all the eggs were in one basket', so if a vehicle type turned out to be unreliable then there was no alternative to take its place. Fortunately for the Allies, when this did occur it usually was not a major task to rectify the problem. During the early days the British had trouble with the containerization of POL (petrol, oil and lubricants) and water, but with the capture of German equipment they became acquainted with the standard German liquid container which they copied and nicknamed the 'Jerry Can'.

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British 150th Brigade at Gazala

2011-08-17T14:20:00.002+08:00

During the early hours of 30 June 1942, the Afrika Korps continued its westwards withdrawal defended by able rearguards to keep the British at bay. At around 0200hrs it met an acute problem. Near Sidi Muftah it bumped into the British troops manning the box created by 150th Brigade of the 50th Division, reinforced by 30 infantry tanks from 1st Army Tank Brigade. The position dominated the two minefield gaps opened by the Italians and totally disrupted Rommel's plans. He knew it would have to be eliminated and quickly.

The first attack by 15.Panzer Division was halted on the edge of the minefield surrounding the box and then turned back by a screen of British anti-tank guns. While a second assault was being prepared things went from bad to worse for Rommel. At 1l00hrs news came in that the British 1st Tank Brigade was attacking 90.1eichte Division at Bir Harmat, the 2nd Armoured Brigade was advancing along Trig Capuzzo, 201st Guards Brigade was making a sortie out of the Knightsbridge position to join in the attack and the 21.Panzer Division was being hard pressed by a very heavy bombardment by the guns of the Gazala Line. To make matters worse, the RAF in the shape of the Desert Air Force was up in strength attacking every German column its aircraft could find.

Thus in a short space of time, it seemed that the advantage had swung back in favour of Eighth Army. Victory was within Ritchie's grasp if all these attacks were pressed home together. It seemed that the British commander had Rommel's forces constricted within a relatively small area, bounded by Trig Bir Hacheim, Trig Capuzzo and Trig el Abd, with their backs against the British minefields. The area eventually acquired the nickname of the 'Cauldron', The 150th Brigade's box dominated the Italian minefield gaps with its artillery, forcing German re-supply to be confined to the night. Rommel's plan to hold the British in the east while consolidating in the west would be impossible as long as the 150th Brigade position held out in his rear.

For a while it seemed so promising for the British, but the ever-confident Rommel was certain of his forces and completely unfazed by the situation. He still thought that he could out-general the British commanders. On the other hand, if things turned really bad for him, he had an escape route to the west through the minefield gaps. Leaving the artillery and anti-tank screen to deal with Eighth Army's attacks, he turned his attention westwards to the problem of 150th Brigade and the Sidi Muftah Box. His confidence was not misplaced for the attacks by the 2nd and 22nd armoured brigades were crushed by his guns and turned back once again with heavy losses, as was that of the 201st Guards Brigade. The British were still not concentrating their armour to an effective degree to enable them to apply the killer blow. During the night supply trucks got through the gaps to the Afrika Korps and both Panzer divisions were refuelled and re-supplied ready once again for concentrated action the next morning. Events had once again swung back in Rommel's favour.

THE CAULDRON
The commander of 150th Brigade, Brig. Haydon, had been expecting the German attack for a few days, ever since Rommel's forces had arrived in his rear to the south of Knightsbridge. The gaps above and below his positions effectively meant that his brigade was cut off from the rest of 50th Division and from Eighth Army. Haydon was also hampered in dealing with the Italian gaps by supply difficulties, which had reduced his guns to a ration of just 25 rounds per gun per day. He should have been able to interdict passage through these gaps with his artillery, but he had to conserve shells for the attack from the east that he knew was bound to come. There was no help on hand from the remainder of 50th Division, for the corps commander, Lt. Gen. Gott, had ordered the division's commander, Maj. Gen. Ramsden, not to move out of his positions in the Gazala Line.

Brigadier Haydon knew that the gravest danger was to the rear of his area. It was here that Rommel would strike, so he withdrew a battalion from the south of his positions where it was harassing the 101a Divisione Motorizzate 'Trieste' and set its men to work digging new trenches and gun pits on the eastern side. Into these new positions the brigadier moved the bulk of his one regiment of 25-pdr guns, the 72nd Field Regiment RA, and a battery of the new 6-pdr anti-tank weapons. Behind these positions was the contingent of tanks from 1st Army Tank Brigade, the 30 Matildas of 44th RTR.

Everyone in the brigade, and indeed elsewhere, knew that this single infantry formation could not hold out for long against armoured opposition, especially when that opposition was the Afrika Korps and its main defensive minefield was to its rear rather than to its front. Rommel had to be engaged in his flanks and rear in order to dilute the strength he could commit against 150th Brigade. At XXX Corps and Eighth Army HQs there was still a good deal of optimism that Rommel had been cornered and could be reduced by shellfire and swept aside by armour. Major-General Lumsden sent an encouraging message to Haydon saying that Eighth Army 'had Rommel boiled'. If an all-round series of continuous and concentrated attacks could be put in then 150th Brigade could be relieved and the battle won.

On 30 May Rommel continued with his attacks against Haydon's isolated brigade box. These were preceded by German engineers moving forwards under covering fire to lift the few mines that had been sown on the eastern side of the position. Motorized infantry then moved forwards and began to penetrate the British position only to be turned back by British infantry supported by the Matildas. Ground was won and lost by successive attacks and counterattacks, and by the end of the day very little new ground had been gained or lost.

Ritchie sent a message to Haydon congratulating him on keeping the enemy at bay: 'Well done!' he signalled. As for positive action to aid the beleaguered brigade, Lumsden organized two diversionary armoured attacks during the daylight hours each of battalion strength, neither of which gave Rommel much cause for concern for they were beaten back by a screen of 90 anti-tank guns along a front much shortened by the Afrika Korps' withdrawal the previous day. The remainder of XXX Corps' armour did very little else that day, although 4th Armoured Brigade made a sortie southwards in search of a reported 30 Panzers and a repair workshop near Bir Hacheim, but found nothing.

The losses to Lumsden's armour led him to complain to Norrie that the only real way to tackle Rommel's force was to have the infantry attack and clear the German anti-tank screens, then for the engineers to lift the defensive minefields to allow the armour to go through. Both Norrie and Ritchie agreed that this was the best course of action and an attack was ordered for the following night, 31 May, with 50th Division's 69th Brigade attacking from the north and one of Eighth Army's reserve formations, 10th Indian Brigade, attacking from the east. In the meantime, 150th Brigade was to hold off the Afrika Korps on its own as best it could, although later that evening a column of one company of infantry, two troops of anti-tank guns and a battery of artillery, set out from Knightsbridge along the Trig Capuzzo to harass the Afrika Korps. They ran into the guns of the 21.Panzer Division, lost five 25-pdrs, seven valuable 6-pdr anti-tank guns and 157 men, and then returned to Knightsbridge. The column achieved nothing save for perhaps the sound of battle giving some comfort to the besieged men of 150th Brigade that at least something was being done to help them.

The next day, 31 May, Rommel issued a formal request for Brig. Haydon to surrender his brigade. The request was rejected without comment by the brigadier. This signalled an intensive artillery bombardment behind which the infantry of the 90.leichte Division crept forwards to the edge of the box. Both sides now became embroiled in close quarter and small arms action. After several hours the Germans withdrew having gained little but having taken a large number of casualties. An hour later the attack was resumed, this time the infantry were backed by tanks. The shock of the assault allowed the British line to be penetrated, but each time a break was opened up it was contained by the determined efforts of the defenders. As the day wore on the fighting became more and more intense until both sides became exhausted and drew back in the failing light of the end of the day.

The area of the box had shrunk to half its size as each successive line of defence had been overwhelmed. Trench systems had been overcome, guns captured or destroyed and isolated resistance posts eliminated. Those weapons that remained intact were very low on ammunition. The time bought by this heroic defence was ill used by the rest of Eighth Army. The infantry attack planned for that night to break into the Cauldron had been postponed by 24 hours - the corps commanders felt that sufficient time had not been available to organize the attack. Ritchie did not send a message to Haydon and his isolated brigade that evening, nor were any diversionary attacks sent in to help them. The 150th Brigade was on its own, left to contain the strength of the four Axis divisions in the Cauldron with whatever means it could.

That night Rommel's forces were re-supplied along the two tracks through the Gazala Line. The next day, 1 June, the army commander decided to put a stop to the stubbornness of Brig. Haydon and his brigade. He ordered an assault of massive proportions to eliminate what had become a tiresome diversion to his plans. The heaviest possible aerial attack would be mounted on the Sidi Muftah Box by the Luftwaffe to be followed by a massed tank and infantry assault on its defences. He intended that brute force would overwhelm the British in a blatant show of might.

As expected, this demonstration of the Axis power won through that day. The defensive box was crushed mercilessly, but only after a long and bitter struggle An enemy report written after the battle talked of the stubborn resistance and hand-to-hand fighting that was met at each bunker and defence position in turn, with the British suffering extraordinarily heavy, bloody losses At one point during the height of the action, Rommel himself took personal command of one of the leading platoons. As a later historian pointed out, this was possibly the first time a unit of such small size was commanded in action by so high-ranking an officer. Soon every British position had been surrounded or destroyed; ammunition stocks dwindled to nothing; the fight was knocked out of the beleaguered defenders. Finally an end was called and the fighting ceased. The 150th Brigade capitulated to the victors and 3,000 British survivors filed into captivity. Rommel rushed forwards to the brigade's headquarters to congratulate Haydon upon the courage and skill of his men, but to his sincere sorrow he found that the brigadier had been killed by shellfire earlier in the day.

Italian Army at Derna 1941

2011-08-17T14:19:00.002+08:00

The Italian Supreme Command moved quickly to organize the "Special Armoured Brigade" (Brigata Corazzato Speciale, or BCS) consisting of fifty-five M13/40 tanks, artillery pieces, and supported by infantry formations specializing in the anti-tank role and sappers equipped with anti-tank mines. In hardly more than a month, the Italians dispatched this volunteer force under General Valentino Babini to North Africa. The M13s in the BCS were a vast improvement to the M11s. They had a better turret-mounted 47 mm tank gun which was more than able to pierce the armour of the British light and cruiser tanks. However, other than command vehicles, Italian tanks were not equipped with radios. Communicating for most Italian tankers required the use of signal flags.

Bambini's tank force included the 3rd Battalion and the 5th Battalion from the 131st "Centauro" Armoured Division and should have amounted to at least one-hundred-and-twenty M13s. But eighty-two tanks had just arrived at Benghazi and required ten days of "acclimatization" prior to operation.
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Following the fall of Tobruk, HQ British Troops Egypt was removed from the existing unwieldy line of command so that O'Connor reported directly to Wavell at Middle East Command. O'Connor continued the advance towards Derna with the Australian 6th Division while sending 7th Armoured Division south of the Jebel Akhdar Mountains towards Mechili. On 24 January the 4th Armoured Brigade engaged armoured elements of BCS on the Derna - Mechili track. While the British managed to destroy nine Italian tanks in the battle, they themselves lost one cruiser and six light tanks. The 2/11th Battalion first made contact with infantry of the BCS at the Derna airfield on 25 January and progress was difficult against particularly determined resistance. In the Derna-Giovanni Berta area, held by the 60th "Sabratha" Infantry Division and infantry elements of the BCS, there were fierce exchanges with Italian counterattacks taking place around Wadi Derna. On 27 January, an Australian battalion beat off a strong daylight attack from a force of at least a thousand Italians. That same day, concealed soldiers of the BCS ambushed a column of armoured vehicles of the 6th Cavalry Regiment and took three of the survivors prisoner. The advance of other units further to the south of the Wadi Derna eventually threatened the BCS with encirclement and it disengaged on the night of 28 January. Derna, a town of 10,000 residents itself was captured on 26 January. Precise casualty figures for the fighting for Derna and Giovanni Berta have not been compiled but at least 15 Australians were killed fighting the BCS and "Sabratha" Division. The Italians lost a good part of the 60th "Sabratha" Infantry Division in the fighting.

Italian OOB at Derna January 1941
Italian defenders consisted of the 60th Bersaglieri Motorcycle Battalion and the 21st Light Tank Battalion, both part of the 60th Sabratha Division.
Raggruppamento Maletti
The Maletti Group (Raggruppamento Maletti) was an ad hoc "mechanized" unit formed by the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) in Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or ASI) during the initial stages of the Western Desert Campaign of World War II. The group was formed in June 1940 and was destroyed in December of the same year.

The Maletti Group was commanded by General Pietro Maletti and was part of the Libyan Corps, also known as the "Royal Corps of Libyan Colonial Troops" (Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali della Libia). The group itself was composed of six battalions of Libyan infantry and of two battalions of armor. The 2,500 Libyans were "mechanized" in that they were transported in trucks. One armor battalion had thirty-five L3/33 and/or L3/35 tankettes. The other had thirty-five M11/39 medium tanks.

During the very early stages of the North African Campaign, the Maletti Group took part offensively in the Italian invasion of Egypt and defensively during the British counterattack known as Operation Compass. In September 1940, the group acted as a flank guard and led the Italian advance from Libya into Egypt. By December, the group was in defensive positions at the Nibiewa Camp near Sidi Barrani. Many of the armored vehicles were "dug in" and acted as stationary pillboxes.

The Maletti group was considered the 3rd Libyan Division in the initial Italian attack to Egypt, together with the 1st Libyan Division Sibelle and the 2 Libyan Division Pescatori.

The Maletti Group was earmarked for early destruction by the British. During the initial attack, Matilda infantry tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment exploited a hole in the Italian defensive positions and attacked the Nibiewa camp from the rear. The Maletti Group was destroyed and General Pietro Maletti was killed in action while trying to stop the sudden attack:

The initial British assault would fall on Nibeiwa Camp, where the only available Italian armoured unit was based, and it achieved complete surprise. Raggruppamento Maletti, or Maletti Group, under General Maletti, was an ad hoc formation consisting of 2,500 Libyan soldiers and 2 Armoured Battalion, with thirty-five M11/39 medium tanks and thirty-five L3/35 light tanks. It was earmarked for early destruction in the assault, which commenced at 05:00hr with what appeared to be no more than another raid on the eastern side of the camp. At 07:00, however, forty-eight Matilda tanks suddenly appeared from the opposite side of the camp. They struck twenty-three unmanned M11/39 tanks of the Maletti Group, which had been deployed to guard the unmined entrance to the camp. The Italians were caught completely off guard and many did not even reach their tanks, including General Maletti, who was killed emerging from his dugout. They were slaughtered and their vehicles destroyed by the British in less than ten minutes. The Italian artillery fought on valiantly, firing on the Matildas and recording many hits, some at point-blank range - but none penetrated their 70 mm of armour. The remaining Italian tanks were captured intact, and the Libyan infantry, left practically defenceless, quickly surrendered. The British had captured Nibeiwa and destroyed the only front-line Italian armoured unit in less than five hours.

The Operation Compass attack on Maletti Group was supported by 25 pounder artillery and Blenheim bombers and was centred on the advance of Mk.II Matilda tanks. Within an hour of the onset of combat Italian General Pietro Maletti was dead and 4,000 Italian soldiers (most of them Libyan colonial troops) had surrendered. Within three days, the attacking forces then moved west along the Via della Vittoria, through the Halfaya Pass and captured Fort Capuzzo, Libya.

Brigata Corazzata Speciale
The Special Armored Brigade (Brigata Corazzata Speciale, or BCS, or Babini Group, or Raggruppamento Babini) was an ad hoc armored unit formed by the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito Italia) in Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or ASI) during the initial stages of the Western Desert Campaign of World War II. The group was formed in late 1940 and was destroyed in February 1941.

In late 1940, the Italian Supreme Command (Commando Supremo) moved quickly to organize the Brigata Corazzata Speciale (BCS). In hardly more than a month, the Italians dispatched this volunteer force to North Africa under the command of General Valentino Babini. The BCS included Italy's most up-to-date medium tanks, the M13/40.

The M13s were a vast improvement over the M11/39s used as part of the Maletti Group (Raggruppamento Maletti). As opposed to the M11s, the M13s had a superior turret-mounted 47 mm tank gun. This gun was more than able to pierce the armor of the British light and cruiser tanks.

The BCS included M13 tanks supported by three Bersaglieri battalions, one motorcycle battalion, one artillery regiment, two anti-tank gun companies, one engineering company, and several logistics units. Unfortunately, other than command vehicles, the M13s of the BCS were not equipped with radios. Communicating for most Italian tankers required the use of signal flags.

At Derna and Mechili, the BCS included fifty-five M13/40 tanks of the 3rd Battalion and the 5th Battalion from the 131st "Centauro" Armored Division. This should have amounted to at least one-hundred-and-twenty M13s. But eighty-two tanks had just arrived at Benghazi and required ten days of "acclimazation" prior to operation.

At Benghazi and Beda Fomm, the BCS included almost one-hundred M13/40s.

GAZALA LINE

2011-07-20T15:00:00.003+08:00

British desert defense position about 30 miles west of Tobruk. It was formed by loosely connected “boxes” of infantry and minefields supported by dispersed armor. After stopping General Erwin Rommel’s initial assault on Tobruk the British dug in along the Gazala Line in February 1942. The box defense around Gazala was broken by the Germans in May, after which British 8th Army fell back to Mersa Matruh.
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Battle of Gazala, (26 May–13 June 1942)
Key North African battle between Axis and Allied forces. The Battle of Gazala of 26 May–13 June 1942 sprang from Operation VENEZIA. In the operation, Adolf Hitler sought to tie down as many Allied troops as possible in North Africa while German forces fought the decisive battle in the Soviet Union. Hitler also wanted to capture Allied forward airfields so that Axis forces might render Malta harmless. Axis forces for VENEZIA, formed into Panzerarmee Afrika or Armata Corazzata Africa, consisted of two Italian infantry corps, one Italian armor corps, and the German Afrika Korps. The Afrika Korps had recently received reinforcements and new equipment.

Italy had sent some of its best units and equipment to North Africa. It had retrained its units and altered some of their structures to replicate German tactics. An Italian infantry division now numbered only 7,000 men, but it had a heavier artillery component. Although its tanks were still of limited value, Italy sent some self-propelled artillery armed with 75 mm guns, and some Italian divisions boasted both 90 mm and German 88 mm antitank guns.

German Afrika Korps commander General Erwin Rommel, nominally under General Ettore Bastico, head of Comando Superiore Forze Armate Africa Settentrionale (high command armed forces in North Africa), planned to attack the Allied forces entrenched with the protection of heavy minefields along the Gazala Line. He hoped to outflank the line from the south and then drive on and capture Tobruk, all within 10 days. Rommel could call on 332 German and 228 Italian tanks. Rommel also had the advantage in the air.

Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie commanded the British Eighth Army. Ritchie had an armored corps of two divisions and an infantry corps built around three divisions. Another division was in reserve, attached to army headquarters. All were numerically larger then the Axis divisions. The Eighth Army had recently received 242 U.S.-built Grant tanks as well as improved 6-pounder antitank guns. Ritchie could call on 839 Allied tanks, with a further 145 moving up. Both sides added tanks during the battle. Each side also had a small amphibious element, but neither was deployed in that capacity during the battle.

Ritchie had hoped to mount an attack to relieve Axis pressure on Malta, but Rommel struck first. On 26 May, while Axis infantry held the line, Axis motorized units poured around the southern Allied flank. Achieving some small successes, they stalled at the Free French fort of Bir Hacheim. Positioning themselves in the Allied rear, the Axis motorized units then took up defensive positions while also operating against Bir Hacheim, which fell on 11 June after a heroic French defense. Meanwhile, Eighth Army tanks mounted a series of assaults against Axis armor in the so-called Cauldron, but the British were repulsed with heavy losses from Axis antitank artillery guns.

The Axis forces having opened a supply line and the Eighth Army reeling from heavy tank losses, Rommel resumed the offensive on 12 June. At Knightsbridge, he ambushed British armor, destroying 120 tanks and forcing a general Allied retreat. In less than three weeks, the Axis offensive had forced the Allies to withdraw into Egypt. This paved the way for a third assault on the port of Tobruk. Ritchie was relieved of command, and General Claude Auchinleck took command of the withdrawal.

References Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. Rommel’s North Africa Campaign. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1994. Montanari, Mario. Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale. Vol. 3, El Alamein. Rome: Ufficio Storico, 1989. Playfair, I. S. O., et al. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. 3. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960.

DAK

2011-07-10T15:36:00.003+08:00

A DAK column moving across the streets of a Libyan town. The lorries, all sporting a neat 'palm with swastika' DAK insignia, appear to be still painted in the European dark-grey finish and only have a light coat of sand. The tactical insignia on the left mudguard is a divisional symbol.

The DAK was far from being an elite unit in early 1941. Though fully motorized, both divisions sent to North Africa had many drawbacks. The first unit sent, 5.leichte Division, was a hotchpotch of different units designed to serve in a defensive role. The unit that followed, 21.Panzer Division, was an armoured division at nearly full strength, but had only recently been transformed from an infantry division and lacked any real experience of armoured warfare. These drawbacks did not overly concern the German Army High Command, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), as it only sought to fight a delaying action in North Africa until the conclusion of Operation Barbarossa - the invasion of the Soviet Union. A limited attack aimed at regaining Cyrenaica was authorized, but only after 15.Panzer Division arrived and the German troops had been properly trained and acclimatized. A major assault against Egypt was not envisaged until after the war against the Soviet Union had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion, probably by the end of 1941.

Rommel's bold sweep across Cyrenaica thwarted these plans, but the OKH could not adjust to the new reality as the Eastern Front was in desperate need of motor transport in general and mechanized troops in particular. Thus, in summer 1941 the DAK was stuck in a stalemate and, unsurprisingly, allowed the bare number of reinforcements by the OKH. The situation did not change much in 1942 despite Rommel's second drive into Cyrenaica, as both Hitler and the OKH were still gravely concerned about the difficult situation on the Eastern Front. As a consequence the Mediterranean remained a sideshow, although there was an overall strategic plan. This involved an assault aimed at the seizure of the port of Tobruk, which was to be followed by an invasion of Malta with the aim of bringing the supply problems to an end.

However, this plan did not take into account Rommel's new advance, this time into Egypt. Although there were no significant reinforcements available for the OAK, the OKH did try to improve the quality of its weaponry. For the first time the German Army sought to make good its shortcomings using improved weaponry and better balanced combat units - the 'fewer men, more weapons' solution. However, Rommel's unexpected successes at Gazala and Tobruk compelled Hitler to authorize a premature advance into Egypt. The result was that, by the end of July, for the first time a strained DAK faced a severe crisis and was in real danger of breaking down. As a consequence new reinforcements were brought in, although it was too little too late: having failed to break through the British defences at El Alamein, the DAK had no other choice but to stand on the defensive and wait for the enemy offensive to be unleashed.

Always under strength and plagued by a perennial lack of weapons, vehicles and supplies, the DAK was nevertheless in better shape than many other units of the German Army. In many cases its equipment included modern weapons that were not available in large quantities. Though lacking in numbers, in early 1941 its tank inventory did not include any of the obsolete Czech tanks that were used on a large scale against the Soviet Union. Also, in 1942 it was supplied with some of the most modern weapons available. All in all, the DAK often fielded more and better weapons, vehicles and equipment than many of the motorized units on the Eastern Front. Such an odd state of affairs was remarked on by the OKH which pointed out how DAK's allocation of motor transport was 1/10th of that available for Barbarossa, while its actual strength was only 1/78th of the force committed to the invasion of the Soviet Union. A remarkable point that clearly shows how the DAK, in spite of its many shortcomings, established itself as an effective fighting force and a perfect prototype for fully motorized units.

Rommel’s Legacy I

2011-07-10T15:35:00.000+08:00

On February 12, 1941, Erwin Rommel was appointed commander in chief of German troops in Libya. It was a fancy title for a force composing only one of the new panzer divisions, the still-organizing 15th, a scratch brigade grandiloquently titled 5th Light Division (later upgraded as the 21st Panzer Division), and another mixed bag that became the 90th Light Division. Renamed the German Africa Corps (Deutsches Afrika Korps) it would make two years of history.

Hitler seems initially to have made his choice of commander as much on grounds of Rommel’s availability as from any intuitive sense that he was giving a wider stage to a budding genius. German intervention in North Africa was originally intended as a minimum-scale holding operation. No senior panzer general suggested Rommel might be more useful against Russia; no one requested him as a corps commander in a mobile force needing a half dozen new ones. Instead he was dispatched to a sideshow that he would move to history’s center stage by a spectacular succession of battlefield victories—the first of them enabled by the drawdown of British forces in the desert in favor of the campaign in Greece.

There are fashions in generalship as there are in clothing. For a quarter century after World War II, Rommel was considered a paragon of mobile war at the tactical and operational levels. In the next quarter century, military historians and professional soldiers have judged him with a sharper pencil. Nevertheless there remains an Erwin Rommel for every military writer’s taste. There is the muddy-boots general leading from the front, inspiring his men by sharing their hardships as he led them to victory. There is the brilliant opportunist, master of forcing mistakes and exploiting them, dancing rings around British generals with courage and character but no imagination. There is the master of war on a shoestring, using Germany’s military leftovers to frustrate and challenge the major land effort of a global empire. There is the soldier, making war by the rules, upholding the army’s honor albeit serving a criminal regime. And there is the maverick, defying his superiors, his allies, and the Führer himself to fight and win his way.

In Britain these images ameliorate two years of humiliation. In the United States they play into idealized concepts of what a real general should be. There is, however, another side to the scale. That one depicts a general whose leadership style generated as much confusion as success. It presents a commander consistently overreaching his operational capacities, and correspondingly indifferent to issues of logistics and sustainability. It highlights an extensive, long-term network of connections between Rommel and Hitler—not least a publicity machine that critics describe as creating a myth from lucky breaks and obliging enemies. What emerges is a good corps commander, challenged beyond his talent by the problems of war-making at higher levels.

The desert war’s principal contribution to the panzer mystique is its status, affirmed alike by Rommel’s critics and supporters, as a “clean” war. Explanations include the absence of civilians and the relative absence of Nazis; the nature of the environment, which conveyed a “moral simplicity and transparency”; and command exercised on both sides by prewar professionals, encouraging a British tendency to depict war in the imagery of a game and a corresponding German pattern of seeing it as a test of skill and a proof of virtue.

The nature of the fighting also diminished the close-quarter actions that are primary nurturers of mutual bitterness. Last stands, as opposed to stubborn defenses, were uncommon. Usually a successful German attack ended with a compound breakthrough. With tanks seeming to appear everywhere on the position, with no effective means of close defense, capitulation was an acceptable option. The large numbers of troops usually involved also inhibited both on-the-spot killings and post-action massacres. Hard war did not necessarily mean cold murder. Surrender offered and accepted correspondingly became part of the common law of the desert.

Creating preconditions for surrender was another problem. The two-year seesaw conflict across North Africa has been so often described in so much detail that it is easy to exaggerate its actual impact on Hitler’s panzers. The campaign involved only three mobile divisions and never more than around 300 tanks at any one time. Technically the Germans maintained a consistent, though not overwhelming, superiority—reflecting as much the flaws in British tank design as the qualities of the German vehicles. The Panzer III, especially the L version with the 50mm/62-caliber gun, was the backbone of Rommel’s armor, admirably complemented by the Panzer IV, whose 75mm shells were highly effective against both unarmored “soft-skinned” vehicles and unsupported infantry, even when dug in.

Not until the arrival in autumn 1942 of the US M3 medium did the balance begin to shift. With a 37mm high-velocity gun in its turret and a sponson-mounted 75mm, the M3 was a poor man’s Char B without the armor of its French counterpart, with a high silhouette that made it difficult to conceal, and with a gasoline engine that caught fire easily. But there were a lot of them, and their reinforcement in time for El Alamein by more than 300 Shermans definitively tipped the armor balance in Allied favor. The Sherman’s mid-velocity 75mm gun, able to fire both armor piercing and high-explosive rounds, made it the best tank in North Africa—except possibly for the later marks of Panzer IV, who brought their even higher velocity 75mm gun on line in numbers too small—never more than three dozen—to make a difference.

Nor was the Afrika Korps a chosen force, the best of the best. Its medical preparation consisted of cholera and typhus inoculations. Its equipment was Wehrmacht standard, with the addition of a few hundred sun helmets—most of them soon discarded in favor of field caps—and a few thousand gallons of camouflage paint in varying shades of brown. But the Germans had confidence in themselves and their officers, in their training and in their doctrine. Their divisions were teams of specialist experts trained to fight together, combining and recombining as the situation changed. Assembling them was like working with a child’s set of Legos: individual pieces, once fastened together, would hold even if the construction seemed awkward.

That flexibility proved vital. German doctrine based on avoiding tank-on-tank combat meant that when it occurred it was likely to be a close-quarters melee. German gunnery training after the 1940 campaign stressed snap shooting and rapid fire—not least because of the limited effect of single hits on French armor plate. The British for their part during much of the campaign remained committed to destroying German armor by direct action, and their tanks were usually fast enough to counter the tactical maneuvering effective in 1940.

Rommel and his subordinates in consequence recast the section of the panzer-war handbook that addressed antitank operations. In their developed and ideal form, German positions were structured by interlocking antitank-gun positions supported by infantry, the panzers deployed behind them. Contrary to belief at the time, which eventually acquired the status of myth, the 88mm gun was not a standard element of German antitank defense in the desert. Its high silhouette made it vulnerable; its limited numbers made it an emergency alternative. The backbone of German defenses was the 50mm gun, able to knock out any British tank that could move well enough to survive in desert conditions. By 1942 these were being supplemented and replaced in turn by 75mm pieces, heavy and difficult to move but effective even against the new American Grants and Shermans. Eventually the 90th Light Division would be configured as a virtual antitank formation, with 75mm Pak 40s assigned at rifle company level.

British tanks repeatedly and obligingly impaled themselves on the German guns. Robert Crisp, a South African-born officer serving with the Royal Tank Regiment, observed that British tank design and British tactical doctrines reflected a mentality that wanted to make a tank that was as much like a horse as possible, then use it as horses had been used in the Charge of the Light Brigade. As Rommel once asked a captured British officer, “What does it matter if you have two tanks to my one, when you spread them out and let me smash them in detail?”

British armor enmeshed and worn down by the antitank guns was disproportionately vulnerable to counterattacks from flank and rear by panzer forces numerically inferior but with the advantage of surprise—an advantage enhanced by the ubiquitous clouds of dust obscuring desert battlefields as powder smoke had done in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. Superior numbers were unnecessary. Properly timed, a single hard tap could shatter an already-confused British armored brigade like glass. Success depended on timing, and for that the excellent German radios were important. But even more important were situational awareness, initiative, and mutual confidence—the infantrymen and antitank crews knowing they were not being sacrificed; the artillery concentrated to provide fire support; the tankers confident the screening forces would hold while they moved into position. Time and again, from Operation Battleaxe in 1941 through Operation Crusader in November 1941 to the Battle of Gazala in May-June 1942, the technique worked—and set up the attacks that became Rommel’s signature.

The panzers’ offensive tactics in the desert followed and extended patterns established in Europe. Speed, shock, and flexibility repeatedly proved devastating against a British opponent whose reaction times were sluggish, whose tactics were uninspired, and whose coordination was so limited that desert humor described it as existing only when the commanding officers involved had slept with each others’ wives before the war—a significant handicap, one might think, to multiunit operations.

Encirclement was, however, likely to prove chimerical. There were no obvious terrain features or cultural sites with deep meaning to encourage last stands. Even Cairo was not Verdun. The wide-open terrain and the Germans’ always limited “desert sense” facilitated breakouts, the most familiar examples being the French at Bir Hacheim and 201 Guards Brigade at Knightsbridge. The British were even more completely motorized than the Germans, and correspondingly able to outrun them. The “Gazala gallop” of May 1942 may not have been heroic, but it did preserve much of 8th Army to fight again at El Alamein.

British defense systems were also far more formidable than anything encountered even in France during Case Red. The often-derided “boxes” developed as fixed position at mid-campaign usually featured elaborate minefields to disable vehicles, complex barbed wire systems to frustrate infantry, and defenders ready to fight to the limit, like 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh and 150th Brigade’s stand in the Cauldron during Gazala. Losses in both men and vehicles incurred while overrunning these positions were likely to be high and, given the theater’s low priority for replacements, permanent.
If the Afrika Korps did not want to conquer itself to death, an alternate approach must be developed.

Rommel would respond by taking flexible movement to the operational level. His first major offensive, in April 1941, was undertaken despite a direct order to the contrary. Once the vulnerability of the thinly manned British positions was exposed, the battle became an exercise in deep penetration on a level not seen even in France. Columns became lost in broken, poorly mapped terrain, or were deceived by mirages. Engines overheated in 120-degree temperatures. Sandstorms slowed rates of march. But the German tanks, artillery, antitank guns, and motorized infantry wove tactical tapestries that baffled their counterparts.

Rommel seemed to appear everywhere he was needed, driving and inspiring. Benghazi fell on April 3. With the British reeling backward and the fortress of Tobruk besieged, Rommel set the next objective as the Suez Canal. His spearheads reached the Egyptian frontier. When the massive counterattack of Operation Crusader rolled the Germans back in turn, Rommel checked the drive, and then swung completely behind the British. This “dash to the wire” overextended his forces so badly that his own staff called it off while Rommel was out of touch at the front.

This time the pendulum swung all the way back to Rommel’s original starting point around El Agheila. Two weeks later he counterattacked, taking the British by surprise and forcing them back 350 miles to the partially prepared Gazala line. Both sides reinforced as best they could, but again it was Rommel who struck first. On May 26, 1942 his last great offensive began. A month later the port of Tobruk and its 30,000 man garrison were in German hands. Eighth Army, what was left of it, had retreated to the El Alamein line. In Cairo, rear-echelon commandos were burning documents. In London, Churchill faced—albeit briefly—a vote of no confidence on the House of Commons.

Gazala was by any standards a striking victory. But by most standards the Axis troops were fought out. Men and equipment were worn to breaking points, depending on captured fuel and supplies for momentum. Down to fifty tanks at the sharp end, Luftwaffe support left behind in the wake of the ground advance, Rommel was nevertheless convinced that only by attacking could his force sustain the initiative. To halt was to be attacked by massively superior forces, and another backward swing of the desert pendulum might well be the final one. Better to try ending the process altogether: roll the dice, take the British off balance, and regroup in Cairo.

Rommel’s Legacy II

2011-07-10T15:34:00.000+08:00

“Attack” had worked for Rommel in North Africa as it had in France. It had been the armored force’s mantra since the beginning. It was a keystone of the German approach to war-making. This time under a new commander, Bernard Law Montgomery, 8th Army held. At Ruweisat Ridge on July 1, the panzers broke in. For the first time in the desert, they failed to break through. An end run was stopped cold at Alam Halfa by a mixture the Germans had patented: combined-arms tactics in a context of air supremacy. By this time Rommel’s health had declined sufficiently that he returned to Germany, partly to recover and partly to lobby for more of everything. Rommel informed his doctor, “Either the army in Russia succeeds in getting through . . . and we in Africa manage to reach the Suez Canal, or . . .” He accompanied his unfinished sentence with a dismissive gesture suggesting defeat.

The stalemate at El Alamein is frequently described as the final, fatal consequence of either Rommel’s fundamental ignorance of logistics or his culpable carelessness in supervising them. He thus epitomizes a senior officer corps whose tactical and operational proficiency manifested tunnel vision, with caste pride, misunderstood professionalism, or exaggerated vitalism relegating administration to those unsuited to command troops in combat.

When Halder asked Rommel what he would need to conquer Egypt and the Suez Canal, Rommel replied that another two panzer corps should do. When Halder asked how Rommel proposed to supply that force, Rommel replied that was Halder’s problem. Rommel was being neither arrogant nor insouciant. He was expressing the mentality of the German army as reorganized after 1933. Even Halder declared after the war that quartermasters must never hamper the operational concept. Rapid expansion encouraged a more pragmatic, hands-on ethic than had been the case prior to the Great War. The pace Hitler demanded encouraged focusing on the operational level of war. Planning in turn revolved more than ever around operational considerations; the logisti cians were called in afterward.

Rommel saw as well as anyone on either side of the war that victory in the desert depended on supply. He also understood that he had relatively little control of his logistics. Germany was a guest in the Mediterranean, depending on Italian goodwill and Italian abilities to sustain a small expeditionary force. From his arrival, Rommel successfully cultivated Italian senior officers and gained the confidence of Italian fighting formations. The Ariete Armored Division was close enough in effectiveness to its German stablemates to be virtually the Afrika Korps’ third panzer division for much of the campaign. Italian infantry, artillery, and engineers time and again were the fulcrum on which the lever of Rommel’s mobile operations depended.

The Italian army was not as retrograde in its understanding of mobile war in tactical and operational contexts as is frequently assumed. By 1940, Italian theorists had studied German successes in Poland and France and developed a doctrine of guerra di rapido corso (fast-moving war). Strategically, however, their generals considered Rommel’s focus on Cairo and the Suez Canal as culpable overextension. The Wehrmacht High Command understood the Mediterranean theater’s strategic function was to cover the German southern flank during the decisive struggle in Russia. North Africa was an outpost, best secured by a flexible defense.

On the other hand, Hitler had been reappraising Germany’s strategic prospects ever since Pearl Harbor. The German navy was calling for systematic cooperation with Japan in a campaign designed to produce a junction in the Indian Ocean that would bring about the final collapse of the British Empire. For Hitler, the war’s globalization only confirmed his decision for a 1942 campaign against the Caucasian oil fields. Hitler saw the Japanese conquests in Asia as weakening Britain’s imperial position sufficiently that the presence of Axis troops in the southern foothills of the Caucasus would convince Britain to negotiate, and leave Russia to be finished off before the industrial potential of the United States, which Hitler admitted he had no idea how to defeat, could be developed and deployed.
If America’s entry into the war threatened the Reich with grand-strategic encirclement, the military situation provided a window of opportunity—six to eight months, perhaps—for consolidating Germany’s position in a continental redoubt of the kind depicted by geopoliticians like Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer. Mastery of what they called the “Heartland”—the Eurasian landmass—would set the stage for eventual mastery of the world.

Rommel had a complementary strategic vision. He believed, especially given the growing imbalance in material resources between Germany and its opponents, the best approach in North Africa involved maintaining the offensive at operational levels, taking advantage of German leadership and fighting power to demoralize the British, keep them off balance, and eventually create the opportunity for a decisive blow. That was a common mind-set among Germany’s panzer generals as the war reached its middle stages. Rommel, though anything but an “educated soldier” in the traditions of the German General Staff, took the concept one level higher. He realized British strength would continue to be renewed as long as North Africa remained the primary theater where Britain could deploy modern ground forces. Yet he was also convinced that through operational art he could conquer Egypt and eventually move northeast toward the Caucasus, providing the southern pincer of a strategic double envelopment that would secure the oil fields of south Russia and drive across Iraq and Persia, breaking permanently Britain’s power in the Middle East.

The prospect of Rommel at the head of a full-blooded Axis drive into the Middle East continues to engage counterfactual historians. It is a staple chapter in the alternative histories that show Germany winning World War II. But a crucial prerequisite for large-scale offensive operations in the Middle East was Axis maritime superiority in the Mediterranean. The Germans could make no significant contributions. The Italian navy had suffered heavy losses that its construction and repair facilities could not replace. Air power was no less vital, and here too the burden would have fallen on an Italian air force whose effectiveness was steadily declining. Obsolescent aircraft, lack of fuel, and indifference at senior levels proved a fatal trifecta. As for the Luftwaffe, those human and material resources not deployed to Russia were increasingly being reassigned to home defense.

Any Middle East offensive mounted from the Mediterranean would require a port. Alexandria, even if captured relatively undamaged, would be no more than the starting point for an increasingly long line of communication over terrain even more formidable, and less developed, than Russia. The survivability of German and Italian trucks in the mountains of Syria and the deserts of Iraq was likely to be less than on the Rollbahns of the Soviet Union. The Middle East lacked anything like a comprehensive, developed railway network. The problem of securing a thousand miles and more of natural guerilla/bandit country would have daunted the most brutal Nazi specialists in genocide.

The final damping factor of a Middle East campaign was its dependence on a successful drive through southern Russia to the Caucasus. Should Rommel’s panzer strength be doubled, without regard for the demands of the Russian front, or for how the additional tanks and trucks would be supplied, the offensive through Egypt would nevertheless remain a secondary operation. If German tanks did not appear in the southern passages of the Caucasus by early winter, any successes Rommel might achieve were likely to prove all too ephemeral. And yet the question remains: What might Rommel have achieved with a couple of additional panzer divisions, a little more gasoline . . . ?

Italian Convoy Effort I

2011-06-20T21:40:00.002+08:00

The submarine IT Atropo of the Italian Navy.

The Italian submarines Atropo and Zoea took fuel from Taranto to Derna in two operations. A single torpedo would have turned those boats into a flaming hell.

On 1 May 1941, the steamers Larissa, Arcturus, and Leverkusen were lost. The first ship mentioned ran into a mine, while the remaining two were sunk by British submarines.

Vessels carrying Italian forces were also lost. During a troop transport to Tripoli lasting from 22 to 25 May, which was conducted by four large freighters, which were escorted by two destroyers and three motor-torpedo boats, it was intended to bring 8,500 Italian soldiers to Africa.

Two cruisers and three destroyers were responsible for the long-range screening of the convoy. Despite that, the submarines form Malta were able to infiltrate. The Upholder of Lieutenant Commander Wanklyn sank the 17,879 registered ton Conte Rosso. Of the 2,500 soldiers on board, 820 went down with the ship.

A few days previously, the Italian freighter Birminia had reached Tripoli safely. In the bowels of the10,000-ton ship was ammunition for the DAK, including a number of 10-kilogram bombs, which were crated in bundles of 10. During the offloading, one of the crates was dropped and it went off. As a result of sympathetic explosions, all of the remaining ammunition went up, ripping off the deck of the ship.

Korvettenkapitän1 Meixner, the German harbor commander, and Hauptmann Otto, who would later become the senior logistics officer for Africa, raced to the pier. The Italian auxiliary cruiser Citti di Bari, which had been loaded with fuel, had also gone up. There were some 70 killed and 88 wounded in all.

Meixner then discovered that another two ships at sea that were inbound and due to arrive in the next 24 hours were carrying the same deadly cargo. He had them anchor in the roads. The anchors were not allowed to be dropped. Instead, they had to be lowered by hand into the water to avoid any shaking of the cargo. The Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe was asked what should be done. Göring replied that the ships should be taken out to sea and sunk. Of course, that was easy for him to say when the bombs were desperately needed at the front.

Meixner did not have the ships blown up. Instead, he put out a call for volunteers, who carefully opened the ammo crates on board the ships and checked to make sure the safety switches were properly mounted. Those that were properly mounted could be offloaded into the lighters and taken ashore. The first three crates had no problems. The fourth crate, however, had dislodged its safety devices. Captain Reinen, a captain who had been stranded in Tripoli when his ship had been sunk, volunteered to go aboard the ship with an explosives expert to attempt to disarm the bombs. On the first day, they succeeded in defusing six of them, one of which would have been enough to blow up the entire ship because of all the other munitions on board.

In five days, 22 bombs were defused. Reinen and his assistant remained in the bowels of the ship by themselves. Eventually, both of the ships were saved.

Kapitän Reinen became the first merchant marine captain to receive the Iron Cross, First Class. Oberleutnant Krüger, who replaced the explosives expert when he was called away, also received the same decoration.

Italian Convoy Effort II

2011-06-20T21:39:00.001+08:00

HMS P.33 - U-class Submarine sister-boat HM S/M Unrivalled

Another of the unnamed submarines completed in May 1941 and deployed in the Mediterranean where she arrived to join the10th Submarine Flotilla in June 1941.

In an early patrol she sank the Italianmercantile BARBIAGO off Pantellaria which waspart of a five ship convoy escorted by three destroyers and three torpedo boats. Although under heavy depth charge attacks bythe escort, the submarine was able to escape. Later on 12th August she was deployed to join HM Submarines P32 and UNIQUE to intercept an Italian troop convoy on passage to Tripoli. Whilst patrolling west of Tripoli she came under attack byanti-submarine vessels after which no contact could be made. Depth-charged and sunk by Italian torpedo boat Partenope off Pantelleria 18th August 1941.

On 3 June 1941, two Italian convoy ships were sunk by British bombers. The Italian submarines Zoea, Corridoni, and Atropo brought additional fuel to Bardia. The journeys by those submarines must be considered among the most dangerous of the entire war.

Of the two convoys that set out for Africa in the middle of July, a ship was sunk in the first convoy by the P 33 of Lieutenant Whiteway-Wilkinson. The attack by the submarine Unbeaten on a ship of the second convoy missed by a hair.

On 22 July, the Preußen was sunk south of Pantelleria by British air attacks. Two hundred Germans went down with the ship. In addition, 6,000 tons of munitions, 1,000 tons of fuel, 1,000 tons of rations, 320 vehicles of all types, and 3,000 mailbags were lost.

The bombers that flew those attacks were based on Malta. The submarines of the British 10th Flotilla were based in Malta’s harbor. They would lie in wait at the forced crossing points. Malta was a thorn in the flesh of the Axis forces in Africa.

Despite all those losses, around 25,000 tons of munitions, 32,000 tons of fuel and 18,000 tons of rations were offloaded in Bengasi alone from April to December 1941.

From June to the end of October, 40 ships were lost at sea. After the arrival of the 15. Panzer-Division in July, the monthly supply requirements for the Army rose to 30,000 tons, with a further requirement for 20,000 tons in reserve. In addition, the Luftwaffe needed 8,000 tons. For the offensive planned in November, it was estimated that 24,000 tons would be needed in Tripoli and 35,000 tons in Bengasi. The situation at sea continued to worsen, however. The negative trend ran from October through December. The lack of supplies for the DAK took on menacing dimensions. In October, around 50,000 ton of supplies were sent to Africa. Of that amount, approximately 63% was sunk. Of the 37,000 tons that were loaded on ships in November, only 23% reached their ports of call. All the rest was sunk from the air or by submarines.

Despite the almost superhuman efforts of the German and Italian sailors and the coastal waterway traffic, the needs of the DAK for its attack on Tobruk were only 40% met.

Logistical Problems of the Deutsches Afrika Korps

2011-06-20T21:38:00.001+08:00

HMS Mohawk as completed

Frederick Baker was on board HMS Mohawk on 15th April:
Whilst in the area of Malta our Flotilla was given another task and this was to try and stop the supply ships of the enemy reaching North Africa, which was now becoming the scene for the important battles between Montgomery [original account - Montgomery did not arrive until 1942] and Rommel. As you can imagine it was very dangerous for our ships to be caught at sea during daylight because of the superiority of the enemy planes, so we would leave Malta at dusk, do a wide sweeping search and rush back to Malta before dawn. On one of these occasions just as we were turning for home one of our ships sighted the enemy. We instantly engaged them in battle and after a short while we had successfully sunk the complete convoy of five troop or supply ships together with the three Escorts.

Unfortunately for me, my ship the Mohawk was hit by a torpedo which immobilised us causing considerable damage in the engine room and causing us to stop. We then became a sitting target and in a few moments we were hit again. This time we started to sink rapidly, so we had to abandon ship. After swimming away as fast as possible for a period, which seemed like hours, although in fact was only a few moments, I turned and saw the outline of the stern of the ship disappear under the water. I now became very frightened seeing many men in the water trying to cling to any debris they could find. I saw fairly close by one of our life rafts and struck out to reach it. I was recognised by some of my ship mates and was hauled on board. We then were miraculously spotted by one of our ships which was looking for survivors and I finished up on board HMS Nubian which coincidentally was the ship my elder brother [Charlie] was on, so it became a happy reunion for me.

Supplying the DAK with its constant need for rations, fuel, weapons, and ammunition proved to be extraordinarily difficult and constantly insufficient from the very beginning. A sea dominated by the enemy lay between the sailing ports of the transports and their destination harbors. The enemy employed three submarine flotillas in the Mediterranean, and their effectiveness was enormous.

There were approximately 80 ships available in North African, Mediterranean, and Italian ports to meet the supply needs of the DAK at the start of the German engagement in Africa. Most of the ships were in the latter ports. Initially, they had to supply “only” two divisions and a few special-purpose formations. They needed to transport the supplies, personnel, and equipment to the port of Tripoli and unload them there. They then had to be loaded onto trucks and transported to the front. As the German and Italian forces advanced to the east, the distance to the front became longer on an almost daily basis.

The senior quartermaster officer for Africa was Oberstleutnant Graf Klinkowström. He organized his logistics support forces into three supply columns, each with a lift capacity of 360 tons. There were also a few Italian truck elements available to transship the materiel from Tripoli to the supply depots around the city. The logistics officers of the 5. leichte Division and the 15. Panzer-Division had their columns pick up the supplies from there and take them to a depot that was established nearer to the front at the Arco dei Fileni. The light division needed 320 tons daily just for its needs.

Above and beyond that, there were the needs for water, which had to be brought forward in tanker trucks. In order to get the monthly 9,000 tons needed for the light division from Tripoli, some 670 kilometers away, it would have required a far greater capacity than ever existed. Every column that made the round trip to the Arco dei Fileni required 6 days in all for the journey. That meant that the one column of vehicles that was available to the light division was only able to bring forward 1,600 tons of the 9,000 required.

For that reason, coastal water traffic, consisting of vessels of all sizes and capacities, was quickly organized and employed. That helped somewhat.

With the shift of the front to the area around Tobruk and then Bardia, the distances to the front from the main port of supply climbed to 1,500 kilometers and beyond. The quartermaster had most of his lift capacity organized to go to Bengasi, where it would then be loaded onto coastal craft for the continued trip to Derna.

The coastal waterway traffic was constantly disturbed by submarine and RAF activity, however. It was only the Italian submarines, which set course for Africa from lower Italy that made it without a problem. They would bring 80 tons of tank main-gun ammunition or 140 tons of fuel.

The first two convoys made it through with personnel unscathed, but next one saw a German steamer with 5,608 registered tonnage lost. From January to May 1941, 11 German supply ships with a total freight capacity of 42,000 registered tons were lost.

The first really heavy blow to the German supply effort was delivered by Force “K”—four destroyers—on the evening of 16 April. Near the island of Kerkennah, the British force encountered an Axis supply convoy consisting of the freighters Adana, Aegina, Arta and Iserlohn. The Axis force was escorted by three Italian motor-torpedo boats. All four freighters were sunk and more than 3,000 DAK soldiers swam in the waters of the Mediterranean for their lives. The Italian vessels fought in an exemplary fashion under Commander Cristofaro and were able to sink the British destroyer Mohawk. The Italian boats spent the rest of the night fishing shipwrecked German soldiers from the waters and calling for help. In all, some seven motor-torpedo boats, two hospital ships and a few amphibious aircraft were involved in the rescue operations.

The rescue effort was able to pick up 1,248 German soldiers. The rest were claimed by the sea. It was a heavy blow to the DAK.

Fiat G.50 Freccia

2011-06-19T04:03:00.002+08:00

Design of the Fiat G.50 cantilever low wing monoplane was begun by Guiseppe Gabrielli in April 1935. After extensive modifications, many ordered by the Italian authorities, the first (MM 334) of two prototypes flew for the first time a Marina di Pisa on 26 February 1937. Test pilot Giovanni de Briganti reported a tendency to spin and this problem continued even after series production had begun.

The G.50 was an all metal aircraft, only the movable control surfaces being fabric covered, with wide track inward retracting main landing gear units and a fixed tailwheel. The latter was provided with a streamlined fairing but this was often discarded in service use.

The prototypes and first pre-production batch of 45 G.50 aircraft had a pilot's enclosed cockpit with a rearward sliding canopy, but later production machines had either an open or partially enclosed cockpit. Apart from the two prototypes, a total of 778 machines were built, 350 being produced by Fiat, which did not start building the type until November 1940, and the balance of 428 by Costruzioni Meccaniche Aeronatiche SA (CMASA), which was a Fiat subsidiary. The initial series-built G.50s were characterised by modified flaps, reshaped vertical tail surfaces and an open cockpit, built by CMASA (206) and Fiat (6), and 45 of the total were exported to Croatia (10) and Finland (35).

Twelve pre-production G.50s formed the Gruppo Sperimentale de Caccia, which operated in Spain with the Italian Aviazione Legionaria for a few weeks before the Republican surrender to General Franco in 1939. When Italy entered World War II, 97 G.50s were in service. They took part in the fighting in southern France in June 1940 and then flew with the Corpo Aereo Italiano (C.A.I.) in Belgium for operations against the UK between September 1940 and January 1941. However the very limited range of the G.50 reduced it to an almost non-existent role with the Corpo Aereo Italiano. Subsequently the G.50 equipped 24th and 154st Gruppo moved to Albania for operations against Greece.

The G.50bis, the first example of which was tested on 9 September 1940, incorporated increased fuel tankage to extend range, redesigned vertical tail surfaces, and the glazed cockpit side panels to protect the pilot from the slipstream. Production totalled 421, 77 of them built by CMASA. The type was used in Croatia, but most G.50bis fighters went to North Africa with the 2nd and 155th Gruppo, these aircraft being equipped with carburettor sand filters.

Some G.50s were converted as fighter bombers with underwing racks for bombs, including anti-personnel bombs, and this version equipped the 50th Stormo in North Africa. The final production variant was the G.50B, a two seat dual-control fighter trainer development which had an unusual long glazed canopy, the top section over the rear cockpit being open. The prototype was flown for the first time on 30 April 1740, and CMASA went onto build 100 examples during 1940-43. Single production prototypes which did not enter production included the G.50ter powered by a 1,000 hp (746 kw) Fiat A.76 engine which, flown in July 1941, demonstrated a maximum of 329 mph (530 km/h), but the G.50V powered by a Daimler Benz DB 601 engine and flown during the following month attained an astounding 360 mph (580 km/h) . The final prototype was the G.50bis A/N, a two seat fighter bomber intended for operation on the aircraft carriers Aquilla and Sparviero, conversions from merchant ships which were never completed. Test flown for the first time on 3 October 1942, production G.50bis A/N aircraft would have been armed with four 12.7 mm (0.50 in) machine guns and carried a 551 lbs (250 kg) bomb.

In early 1943 the G.50bis was in use with the 24th Gruppo in Sardinia, the 151st Gruppo in Greece, and the 154th Gruppo in the Aegean. After the September armistice between Italy and the Allies, only four G.50s remained in flying condition, used as trainers by the air arm of the Fascist republic still fighting beside Germany.

Apart from the 12 pre-production aircraft flown in Spain and the 10 G.50s supplied to the Croat government, the only aircraft of this type to be exported were 35 G.50s bought by Finland in 1939. They were received too late for the 1939-40 winter war, but flew with some distinction against the USSR during the Continuation War of 1941-44. Several survived the war, the example being grounded in 1947.

Variants
G.50
    First production version.
G.50 bis
    Development of the G.50 version with extended range, 421 built.
G.50ter
    More powerful version with a 746 kW (1,000 hp) Fiat A.76 engine, one built.
G.50V
    Liquid-cooled V12 variant with a Daimler-Benz DB 601 engine, one built.
G.50bis A/N
    Two-seat fighter-bomber prototype, one built.
G.50B
    Two-seat trainer version.

Specifications (G.50)
Data from Fiat G.50 Freccia (Arrow) Specifications
General characteristics
    * Crew: 1
    * Length: 7.79 m (25 ft 7 in)
    * Wingspan: 10.96 m (35 ft 11 in)
    * Height: 2.96 m (9 ft 9 in)
    * Wing area: 18.2 m² (196 ft²)
    * Empty weight: 1,975 kg (4,354 lb)
    * Loaded weight: 2,706 kg (5,965 lb)
    * Max takeoff weight: 2,415 kg (5,324 lb)
    * Powerplant: 1× Fiat A.74 RC38 radial engine, 625 kW (838 hp)
Performance
    * Maximum speed: 484 km/h (301 mph) at 5,000 m[51]
    * Range: 670 km (418 miles)
    * Service ceiling: 9,835 m (32,258 ft)
    * Rate of climb: 13.7 m/s (2,694 ft/min)
    * Wing loading: 12.31 kg/m² (27.16 lb/ft²)
    * Power/mass: 230 W/kg (0.30 hp/lb)
Armament
    * Guns: 2 × 12.7 mm (0.50 in) Breda-SAFAT machine guns

Meridionali Ro.37bis

2011-06-19T04:01:00.002+08:00

Meridionali, then named Officine Ferroviarie Meridionali, first became involved in the Italian aircraft industry in 1923, beginning manufacturing activities two years later by licence-construction of Fokker designs. Subsequently, after two years under the name Romeo, the title Industrie Meccaniche e Aeronautiche Meridionali (IMAM) was adopted in 1936.

In 1934 the company had started design and production of a two-seat fighter/reconnaissance biplane under the designation Romeo Ro.37. This was an unequal-span single-bay biplane of mixed wood and metal construction. Its design included fixed tailwheel landing gear, all three wheels being provided with speed fairings; a braced tail unit incorporating a variable-incidence tailplane; and accommodation for two in tandem .enclosed cockpits. Power was provided by a 700-hp (522-kW) Fiat A.30RA Vee engine. An improved Ro.37bis was developed subsequently, and this introduced an optional radial powerplant comprising either the Piaggio P.IX or P.X supercharged engine. Both models proved popular for their day, with production of the Ro.37 and Ro.37bis exceeding 160 and 475 respectively, and export orders were received from Afghanistan, Hungary and from countries in Central and South America.

Ro.37 and Ro.37bis aircraft were involved in the Spanish Civil War from October 1936 and were used extensively by the Regia Aeronautica during Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia between October 1935 and May 1936 and during the Italian occupation of that country until 1941. Some 275 Ro.37bis aircraft were in service with the Regia Aeronautica when Italy became involved in World War II, and these saw first-line service in the East and North African campaigns and in the Balkans. After withdrawal from first-line service they found a variety of uses, but all had been retired before Italy's armistice with the Allies on 8 September 1943.

Variants
Ro.37 - Reconnaissance biplane.
Ro 37bis - Improved version.

Specifications (Meridionali Ro.37)
General characteristics
    * Crew: 2
    * Length: 28 ft 1 in (8.56 m)
    * Wingspan: 36 ft 4 in (11.08 m)
    * Height: 10 ft 4 in (3.15 m)
    * Wing area: 337.46 sq ft (31.35 m²)
    * Empty weight: 3,494 lb (1,585 kg)
    * Max takeoff weight: 5,335 lb (2,420 kg)
    * Powerplant: 1× Piaggio P.IX RC.40, 9-cylinder, air-cooled, radial, piston engine, 560 hp (418 kW)
Performance
    * Maximum speed: 205 mph (330 km/h)
    * Cruise speed: 155 mph (250 km/h)
    * Range: 696 miles (1,120 km)
    * Service ceiling: 23,620 ft (7,200 m)
Armament
    * Two 7.7mm (0.303in) fixed forward firing Breda-SAFAT machine guns
    * One 7.7mm (0.303in) flexible mount machine gun in rear cockpit
    * 397 lb (180kg) of bombs on under-fuselage racks

THE 5. PANZER-ARMEE IN TUNISIA

2011-06-17T23:01:00.001+08:00

An armored spearhead of 5. Panzer-Armee,including Panzer III and Tigers, advances.

The request of the Commander-in-Chief South to the GermanArmy High Command to create a field-army headquarters for Northwest Africa wasgranted. Generaloberst von Arnim arrived at the Führer Headquarters inRastenburg on 3 December, where Hitler personally briefed him on the situation.In a conversation with Generalfeldmarschall Keitel that followed, the latterpromised von Arnim three armored divisions and three motorized rifle divisionsin short order.

On 6 December, when Generalmajor Gause and Oberst vonManteuffel arrived in Bizerta, they informed Nehring that they had brought anultimatum from Hitler with them for Admiral Dérrien, the French commander inTunisia, to lay down his arms, surrender his forts, and discharge his soldiers.If the French commander turned down that demand, Gause was authorized to useforce to make it happen.

Nehring was surprised. Up to that point, the French in theircoastal fortifications had done nothing against the German forces alreadythere. But, he had to admit, they could turn against the Germans in a crisissituation, in which all of Tunisia and the German forces there would be lost.

Generalmajor Gause brought another bit of news. He informedNehring that von Arnim would soon be taking over command in Tunisia and that hewould be arriving in Tunis around 8 December. In fact, von Arnim did arrive on8 December.

Nehring had continued his preparations for a continuation ofthe attack on 9 December. While that attack was launched, Nehring announced tohis forces that he was taking his leave of them as Commanding General of theXC. Armee-Korps. That same morning, the special operations against the Frenchforces in Bizerta were conducted. Gause succeeded in convincing Dérrien thatthe spilling of any blood would be senseless. Dérrien and his forces wereallowed to keep their weapons until 1700 hours and strike their flags with fullmilitary honors.

Events unfolded at other French bastions similarly. TheFrench forces in Ferryville surrendered, as did their naval vessels at anchoroutside Ferryville and Bizerta.

The German attack on 9 December, spearheaded by the 10.Panzer- Division, rolled out as planned and was successful. The enemy armoredforces, which had advanced far forward, were thrown back. The situation in thebridgehead stabilized further. The German armored forces initially reached thearea around Toum, southwest of Tebourba. By that evening, lead elements werethree kilometers northeast of Medjez el Bab. The paratroopers of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment5 went forward and established defensive positions in the area north of thesalt lake at Sebchet el Kouriza at a farm. It was later referred to as the“Christmas Farm.” A German 5-centimeter and two Italian antitank guns wereestablished along the road to Goubellat.

The 10. Panzer-Division and the Superga Division moved tothe left wing of the Axis positions in Tunisia, establishing themselves on aline running along Pont du Fahs–bottleneck north of the DjebelSaidar–bottleneck southwest of the Djebel Garce (15 kilometers west ofEnfidaville)–southwest edge of the lake south of Enfidaville.

The various attacks by the Allies on 23 and 24 December wereturned back by Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 5.

Kampfgruppe Bürker, named after Oberstleutnant i.G. Bürker,the operations officer of the 10. Panzer-Division, successfully launched anattack against “Christmas Mountain” on 24 December in unbelievably toughfighting against the trench lines of the British 78th Infantry Division. Thenext morning—- Christmas Day—General Evelegh committed his Guards Brigadeagainst the hill, which the British referred to as “Longstop Hill,” which thenagain changed hands.

At the same time, tanks of the British 6th Armoured Divisionadvanced on Massicault on the right flank and took it. The Northants Infantryreached the Tebourba Plateau. It looked like the Allies would launch anotherraid against Tunis.

At the moment, the weather intervened in favor of theGermans. A winter rain started and, two hours later, all of the vehicles werestuck in the seemingly bottomless mud. On 26 December, Oberstleutnant Bürkertried to take back “Christmas Hill.” His battle group took the first threehilltops in quick succession. The remaining three hilltops had to be taken inhard hand-to-hand combat against the dug-in enemy, however. After the dramaticfighting, 500 English surrendered. The hills, which secured the TunisBridgehead to the west, were again in German hands.

On the Allied side, 24 December had been earmarked for anattack. When General Eisenhower arrived at Souk el Khemis, the headquarters ofthe British V Corps, the Commanding General reported that the preparatoryattacks were underway as well as a feint on Goubellat. He added that the rainwas making things difficult, however.

Eisenhower, not quite convinced of Allfrey’s optimisticreport, headed for the front in the pouring rain. He quickly became convincedthat no attack could be conducted in the mud porridge that he was trying tonavigate through. He had the U.S. II Corps, which was still in the greater Oranarea to move forward to the area around Tebessa. Major General Fredendall wasto have the 1st Armored, the 1st Infantry, the 9th Infantry, and the 34thInfantry Divisions—all U.S. formations placed under his command. As soon as theU.S. corps had staged in the south, it was to advance in the direction of Sfaxand Gabes in order to block the retreat route of Panzer-Armee Afrika.

On the German side, the bridgehead of Tunisia had beendivided into four defensive sectors at the end of December: A (area aroundMateur under Gruppe von Broich); B (area around Medjez el Bab under the 10.Panzer- Division); C (area to the south of Tunis under the Superga Division);and D (area around Sfax and Gabes under General Imperiali’s “Brigade L”).

The Luftwaffe had destroyed the bridge over the Medjerda atMedjez el Bab. That held up the Allied supply columns considerably.

On 31 December 1942, the situation had stabilized for theGermans somewhat. The recently formed 5. Panzer-Armee had 103 Panzer III’s andIV’s and 11 Tigers at its disposal. In addition, Panzer-Abteilung 190 hadanother 53 tanks, and it was making its way to Kairouan. In the meantime,nearly the entire 334. Infanterie-Division had been transported to Africa.

The heavy rainfalls in January barely allowed any troopmovements, with the result that the front lines became solidified. It was onlyin the south in the sector of the Superga Division that there were anyoperations. The French XIX Corps of General Koeltz with its three divisions anda brigade attacked from the area around Tebessa. Without anyone initiallyopposing it, the French corps was able to advance as far as the valley outletsto the east. But its offensive never really went anywhere.

On the German side, an attack was launched from the areaaround Pont du Fahs with the Codename “Courier I.” The attack was launched inthe middle of January towards the southwest and placed under the overallcommand of Generalmajor Weber, the commander of the 334. Infanterie- Division.In addition to his division, Weber had elements of the 10. Panzer- Division,schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501, two batteries of additional artillery, andPionier-Bataillon 49. The main formation from the 334. Infanterie-Division wasGebirgsjäger-Regiment 756.

A supporting attack was also launched to the south byInfanterie-Regiment 47, which also had Italian formations in support.

The attack started on the morning of 18 January. A FrenchForeign Legion Regiment at the Djebel Solbia was defeated. Kampfgruppe Weberthen advanced against the Djebel Mansour, which could not be taken in the firstassault. The French, who had been reinforced with tanks from the U.S. 1stArmored Division and additional artillery, slowed down the German advance.There was bitter fighting south of the Djebel Chirich, which the Germans wereable to decide in their favor. Djebel Mansour was taken, but the BritishGuards, who were inserted into the line, retook the position.

The mountain troopers of the 334. Infanterie-Division underOberst Lang counterattacked and retook the hill. It was then held againstseveral enemy attacks.

The German advance then continued in the direction ofPinchon. Infanterie-Regiment 47 of Oberst Buhse attacked into the village andtook it. The German forces were soon forced back, however, when the enemyattacked with superior forces. The German infantry pulled back to the highground east of the village.

After 48 hours of bitter fighting, the main effort ofWeber’s forces reached Ousseltia. The French forces were scattered. More than2,000 soldiers of the Oran and Constantine Divisions were taken prisoner.

Sturzkampf in the Desert

2011-06-14T20:32:00.001+08:00

Most of the Western Desert was ideal tank country—flat and with few obstacles. Unless supply dumps or road convoys could be identified, there were few opportunities for the Stukas to strike, and even fewer for the level bombers. Tanks, especially moving tanks, made poor targets, while the dust thrown up by their movement, made worse by the smoke of battle, exacerbated the problem of identification. There was, however, one notable exception—Bir Hacheim.

Occupied by the Free French under General Koenig, this was the southernmost of a line of fortified positions linked by minefields. On 3 June 1942 Walter Sigel's StG 3 commenced the air bombardment. Little damage was done: most bombs buried themselves in the soft sand, which smothered their explosions. British fighters joined the fray, and StG 3 lost fourteen aircraft in seven days. In all, more than 1,000 sorties were flown against Bir Hacheim, but even this was not enough. Two Gruppen of LG 1 were ordered to assist. The next attack failed because smoke and dust obscured visibility, but finally, with Rommel's troops closing in, the fortress fell. The myth of Stuka invincibility had crumbled a little more.

Under desert conditions the Jabo was rather more useful. Spraying an area of desert with cannon and machine-gun fire was potentially far more effective against diffuse targets such as deployed infantry than dropping bombs on them, although bombs were routinely carried. Another advantage was that they could attack at high speed and low level, which improved the chances not only of surprise but also of survivability. Fast, low-flying aircraft were difficult to see from above by fighters, while they presented fleeting targets to anti-aircraft gunners.

Two Jabostaffeln were quickly on the scene in 1942, one each from JG 53 and JG 27 and both with Bf 109s. Their primary targets were Allied airfields. Also available in this role were the Bf 110s of III/ZG 26 and the 'solid nose' Ju 88C heavy fighters of 12/LG 1.

In October the two Bf 109 Staffeln and aircraft of a third unit combined in Sicily to form a Schlachtgruppe—I/SG 1, equipped with the FW 190. This latter was a far more robust aircraft than the Bf 109 and better suited to the attack mission. I/SG I went to North Africa in November. Meanwhile III/ZG 1 started to re-equip with the Bf 210. A tricky aircraft to handle, the 210 was not a success and served with only a handful of units.

The only other new type to see service in North Africa was the Henschel Hs 129. Designed exclusively for the close air support mission, this aircraft had a heavily armoured cockpit with a pathetic view 'out of the window'. It was underpowered, not very manoeuvrable, and unreliable. The type served with a modest amount of success on the Eastern Front, but in North Africa it served only with 4 and 8(Panzer)/SG 2 and achieved little, mainly because of unserviceability.

Following the Battle of El Alamein, and Operation 'Torch', the Allied landing in Algeria, the North African campaign inexorably drew to a close. The Luftwaffe strike forces were very heavily outnumbered in the air, and most were withdrawn in spring 1943.

Panzerkampfwagen III (Pz Kw III) and its Variants II

2011-06-08T15:19:00.003+08:00

The inadequacy of this armament was only fully realised in 1941after the appearance of the T -34 on the Russian front. This veryadvanced Russian tank had a shock effect on the leaders of theGerman Army. While it was still calculated on 17th July 1941 thatthe raising of a proposed 36 tank divisions would require 7992 PzKw IIIs a note dated 29th November 1941 after the introduction ofthe Russian T-34 shows a complete reversal. At this period doubtswere already being expressed as to the efficacy of armoured forcesand Hitler had personally described the Pz Kw III as anunsuccessful design. It must however be made clear that forits time this vehicle was extremely advanced and that if Guderian'soriginal demand for a 5 cm long-barrel gun had been met at theoutbreak of war the Pz Kw III could have been, in 1940 and 1941,the best fighting tank of all the belligerent powers.

A memorandum dated 21st July 1941 and issued by the InspectorGeneral for Transport stated that additional capacity andmanufacturing areas would be made available to extend tankproduction and that these would include, among others, aDaimler-Benz factory, the Krupp vehicle works, Fross-Bussing inVienna, Tatra in Kolin, Framo in Hainichen as well as parts of MAN,Henschel, Hanomag, Auto-Union and NSU.

It was thus not until 1941 that the order was given for theintroduction of the 5 cm gun (KwK 39) L/60 calibre (barrel length300 mm) for Pz Kw III. Using the "Panzergranate 40" this weaponproduced a muzzle velocity of 1180 mps. Production Pz Kw IIIs soequipped were designated J (Sd Kfz 141/1), type description 8/ZW.In addition all Pz Kw IIIs returned to Germany for general overhaulafter April 1941 were refitted with this weapon. In contrast to the99 rounds which could be carried for the 5 cm gun L/42 only 78rounds could be stowed for the L/60. Small technical differencesdistinguished the J version from its predecessors. The reverse gearchange, which was secured by a spring-loaded pedal, had been workedby a button with a wire pull, but from the Model J onwards a handlever was used. The internal expanding brakes too for this and forsubsequent models were activated concentrically, whereas formerlyan eccentric disc, which fitted under the upper brake shoes, hadbeen used. Levers were introduced to replace the steering pedalswhich had operated the brakes in earlier models. The total weightof Model J was 21.5 tons and the overall length was increased to556 mm. On 1st July 1941 a total of 327 Pz Kw IIIs with the 3.7 cmtank gun and 1174 with the 5 cm tank gun were available to theGerman Army. By 1st April 1942 the number of the 3.7 cm vehicleshad fallen to 131, but a total of 1893 machines with the 5 cm gunwas now available. The estimated monthly production for January1942 was scheduled to be 190 machines, but because of deliveryproblems with the guns and the armoured housings only 159 were infact built.

This model L (type 9/ZW) was introduced at the end of 1941 andhad increased frontal armour on the turret and 20 mm "spacedarmour" plates on the mantlet and superstructure front. Byincreasing the front and the turret front armour to 70 mm, thecombat weight was raised to 22.3 tons. The MG ammunition stowagewas increased from 2000 to 4950 rounds.

Panzerkampfwagen III (Pz Kw III) and its Variants I

2011-06-08T15:18:00.003+08:00

Uparmoured versions
On 4th January 1939 the Weapons Department received a contractto develop further the Pz Kw III and to arm it with a 5 cm tankgun. Once again Daimler-Benz was made responsible for the chassisand superstructure, and Krupp for the design of the turret. It wasproposed to install the 5 cm tank gun L/42 which had a muzzlevelocity of 450 to 685 metres per second. The first vehiclesequipped with the 5 cm armament were not ready by the 10th May 1940for the offensive in France and Flanders but were issued during thecourse of this campaign. The designation of this version was "Pz KwIII (5 cm) Ausf F (type 5/ZW)".

In this model the Maybach HL 120 TRM was installed, which had anoutput of 300 hp at 3000 rpm and a sustained output of 265 hp at2600 rpm. This power unit was constructed under licence byNorddeutsche Motorenbau (Nordbau). The weight of the vehicle wasnot appreciably altered, but the somewhat lower cupola was adistinctive feature. An equipment box was now fitted at the rear ofthe turret. From this version on the drive and idler wheel patternswere altered, the new idler being spoked. Four hundred and fiftymachines of this type were produced.

On 1st November 1940 the production schedule for the Pz Kw IIIwas laid down as 108 vehicles per month, but only 96 vehicles werebuilt in the first month of the new schedule due to tooling up.This seventh version Pz Kw III (5 cm) Ausf G (type 6/ZW), firstproduced in October 1940, now formed numerically the backbone ofGerman tank regiments. For African service special tropicalequipment consisting of a larger radiator and air filter wasfitted. The latter was generally a felt bellows filter which,partly protected by armour, was carried over the exterior of theengine compartment. Despite these precautions the average life of apiston was only 2000 to 3000 km in desert conditions. Vehicles withthis sort of equipment received the designation "Tp" (Tropical).The Pz Kw III was the main type of German tank used during thefighting in Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941. Four hundred and fifty Gversion machines were built and altogether a total of 2143 chassisof the ZW type were produced during 1940-41.

During September and October 1940 volunteers of the 2nd TankRegiment in Putlos were formed into Tank Battalion A and trainedfor Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Great Britain. Two otherspecial formations, Tank Battalions Band C, were being raised atthe same time and the same place.

These units later formed the 18th Tank Regiment of the 18thPanzer Division and adapted the Pz Kw III and IV for submergedwading. The following measures were taken. All openings, visionslits, flaps, etc, were made watertight with sealing compounds andcable tar, the turret entry ports were bolted from the inside andair intake openings for the engine completely closed. A rubbercover sheet was fixed over the mantlet, the commander's cupola andthe bow machine gun. An ignition wire blew off the covering sheetupon surfacing and left the vehicle ready for action. Between thehull and the turret there was a rubber sealing ring which, wheninflated, prevented the water from entering. The fresh air supplywas maintained by a wire-bound rubber trunk with a diameter atabout 20 cm, 18 metres long. To one end of this tube was fitted abuoy with attached antennae. The exhaust pipes were fitted withhigh-pressure non-return relief valves. When travelling submergedsea water was used to cool the engine and seepage was removed by abilge pump. The maximum diving depth was 15 metres. Three metres ofthe air tube's 18 metre length was available as a safety measure.These submersible tanks were to be launched from barges orlighters. They slid into the water down an elongated ramp made ofchannel plates. Directing was achieved by radio orders from acommand vessel to the submerged vehicle. Underwater navigation wascarried out by means of a gyro compass and the crew was equippedwith escape apparatus. The submerged machines were relatively easyto steer as buoyancy lightened them. After Operation Sea Lion wasabandoned these vehicles were eventually used operationally duringthe Russian campaign in 1941 for the crossing of the River Bug.

An instruction from Field Marshal Keitel to the Army HighCommand dated 7th July 1941 says "The Führer considers it desirablethat all new production tanks be radically uparmoured by fittingspaced armour plates, in addition to the main armour, and toneutralise thereby the increased penetrating power of the Britishanti-tank weapons. The increase in weight and the loss of speedmust, in the Führer's opinion, be accepted." Effective thickness ofthe additional armour was in fact 30 mm.

The H version of the Pz Kw III (7/ZW reference D 652/62 of 1stNovember 1942), which appeared in 1940, had meanwhile featured astronger torsion bar suspension. It also became necessary toincrease the track width from 360 to 400 mm (track type Kgs61/400/120). The track gauge was therefore increased from 249 to251 mm. The chassis weight of this model was 15.8 tons and thecombat weight had risen to 2I.6 tons. The complicated MaybachVariorex drive was replaced by a normal six-speed Aphontransmission with ZF SSG 77 type synchromesh. The main clutch wasof the dry-plate multi-disc type. Although Hitler had demanded fromthe start that Pz Kw III be rearmed with the 5 cm long-barrel tankgun in fact only the 5 cm L/42 gun had been fitted on models F, Gand H. The total number of "ZW" (i.e. Pz Kw III) vehicles equippedwith the 5 cm L/42 was 1924.

Panzerkampfwagen III, Ausf. J

2011-06-08T15:12:00.004+08:00

After the 50mm KwK was introduced, two blue warning lights weremounted on the front wall of the bow armor in front of the tankdriver. They served to inform the driver if, while the tank wasunderway, the 50mm KwK barrel extended over the outside limits ofthe vehicle when the turret was turned. The warning lights wereswitched on by a switch that was screwed onto the top of the bowarmor in Ausf. E and F and built into the release-ring carrier ofAusf. G and subsequent types.

The introduction of 50 mm armor plate resulted in the use of aFahrersehklappe 50 (Driver's Visor Flap 50), consisting of ahousing screwed onto the front wall of the bow armor and covered bya sliding panel.

From the Ausf. J on, only the "KFF 2" driver's optics could beused. The "Kugelblende 50" ball mantelet was also used from Ausf. Jon.

The racks and containers for the engine and weapons equipmentand supplies carried in the upper part of the superstructure showeddifferences as to their location and the number of them used intypes E. F. G, Hand J.

Outside, screwed onto the back wall of the turret (andretro-fitted to all Panzerkampfwagen Ill's), was a box that heldthe crew's packs.

In the bow armor of the hull there were, through Ausf. H, twodivided, boltable entry hatches for the driver and radio-operator.Beginning with Ausf. J, there were only two one-piece servicinghatches. Through Ausf. H, there were two towing-hook attachmentswith bolts on each end of the tank's hull, to allow the vehicle tobe towed, but beginning with Ausf. J there were only two welded-oneyes. Delbag air filters were used through Ausf. H; they wereattached to the engine-compartment side of the bulkhead and linkedwith the carburetor by a forked tube. Beginning with Ausf. J, Mahlecentrifugal oil filters located in the engine compartment wereused; they were connected mechanically to the steering and supportbrakes, whereas through Ausf. K (Armored Command Vehicle) theconnection had been hydraulic.

According to a message from the authorizing General in charge ofmotor vehicles, dated July 21, 1941, additional capacities andproduction facilities for expanded tank production were being setup. Among them were a Daimler-Benz AG factory, the FahrzeugwerkeFriedrich Krupp AG, Fross-Bussing in Vienna, Tatra Wagenwerk inKolin, Framo in Hainichen, and branches of MAN, Henschel, Hanomag,Auto-Union and NSU.

In terms of quantities, there were 327 Panzer III tanks with the37mm KwK gun and 1174 with the 50mm KwK in service with the army inthe field as of July I, 1941. The number of tanks with the 37mm gunhas decreased to 131 by April I, 1942, while the number of tankswith the 50mm gun had risen to 1893. The monthly production of"Panzer III" tanks for January 1942 had been set at 190 units, butin fact, what with transport difficulties involving guns and armorplate, only 159 could be delivered.

At the end of 1941 the second series of Panzerkampfwagen III,Ausf. J, with chassis numbers from 72 001 to 74 100, was delivered.This series finally had the 50mm Kw K L/60 gun as standardequipment. A comparison of this weapon, supplied by both theKarges-Hammer firm in Braunschweig and that of Franz Gamy inFrankfurt am Main, shows the following improvements:

The ammunition supply for these vehicles, now referred to as"Sd.Kfz.141/1", was cut from 99 to 84 shells, while the supply of3750 machine-gun rounds remained unchanged. Until the installationof the long 50mm tank gun, all Panzer III tanks had a folding seatfor the loader attached to the bulkhead that separated the fightingand engine compartments. This seat was then eliminated. During thecourse of Ausf. J production too, the vision ports and their flapsbuilt into the right and left sidewalls of the turret, and the portflap to the right of the mantelet, were eliminated. Fortyproduction vehicles with the 50mm KwK L/60 were delivered by theend of 1941

The PzKpfw III: Lord of the Blitzkrieg

2011-06-08T15:10:00.002+08:00

Technically the PzKpfw III was, despite minor faults, a well-balanced basic design which left provision for up-gunning and up-armouring, but by 1942 it was incapable of further modification that would enable it to keep pace with the spiral of gun/armour race. During the high years of Blitzkrieg it was the only weapon in the German tank arsenal that really counted and thus, like Napoleon’s vieux moustaches, it did not merely witness history in the making-it made it, from Channel to the Volga and from the Arctic to the North African desert. This achievement has, perhaps, been overshadowed in recent years by the study of later and more dramatic German designs, but the fact remains that it was the PzKpfw III that brought Hitler closet to achieving his wildest dreams. - Brian Perrett

Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf. F2

2011-06-08T15:05:00.006+08:00

The differences between the Ausf F1 and F2 related to theintroduction of the new gun. Ammunition storage was modified tostow the larger rounds, the amount of ammunition carried wasincreased and the gunner's and commander's seats were changed toallow more room. The elevation mechanism was modified and anauxiliary hand traverse was installed for the loader. Because ofthe long barrel, a coil-spring counter-balance was installed forthe 7.5cm KwK40.

Panzer IV - the Workhorse

2011-06-08T15:02:00.002+08:00

The largest tank in the German Army’s pre–World War II arsenal was the PzKpfw IV. Developed in response to a 1934 request from the Weapons Department of the German Army for a medium infantry support tank, its hull was formed of welded plates with a bolted superstructure on top holding the turret ring. The turret was also welded and large enough to accommodate three crew members and permit mounting of larger guns.

Krupp-Gruson began production of the PzKpfw IV in October 1937 and by August 1939 had produced 211 in models Ausf. A through C. The PzKpfw IV was the backbone of Germany’s new panzer divisions. Weighing some 40,600 pounds in its Ausf. A version, it had a 250-hp engine, a speed of 24 mph, a crew of five men, and maximum 15mm armor protection. Subsequent models had a larger 300-hp engine and steadily thicker armor protection (up to 80mm). The PzKpfw IV mounted a short-barreled low-velocity 75mm (2.95-inch) cannon designed for close support, as well as two machine guns. Among the chief advantages of the PzKpfw IV was its 16-wheel suspension system, sprung by elliptic springs, which proved particularly reliable.

The PzKpfw IV offered nothing revolutionary or of special advantage. Its relatively thin armor offered little protection for the crew, and the gun was not especially powerful. Yet this tank more than held its own against all comers through 1941 because it had the right combination of speed, armor, and armament and because its crews understood how to exploit these to the best advantage.

Summary: Produced in response to a 1934 call for a medium infantry support tank, the PzKpfw IV formed the backbone of the German panzer divisions in the Soviet Union and was produced throughout the war. First produced by Krupp-Gruson, it appeared in 10 different models, Ausf. A-J.

Production dates: October 1937–March 1945

Number produced: 8,519 + variants Ausf. A, 35; Ausf. B, 42; Ausf. C, 134; Ausf. D, 229; Ausf. E, 223; Ausf. F, 462; Ausf. F, 175; Ausf. G, 1,687; Ausf. H, 3,774; Ausf. J, 1,758

Manufacturer: Krupp-Gruson, Vomag, Nibelungenwerke

Crew: 5

Armament: 75mm KwK37 L/24 main gun (Ausf. A); increased to 75mm KwK40 L/48 (Ausf. H and J); also 2 x 7.92mm MG34 machine guns (coaxial, bow)

Weight: 40,565 lbs. (Ausf. A); 55,100 lbs. (Ausf. H, J)

Length: 23’

Width: 10’10”

Height: 8’10”

Armor: maximum 15mm, minimum 5mm (Ausf. A); maximum 80mm, minimum 10mm (Ausf. H, J)

Ammunition storage and type: 87 x 75mm; 3,150 x 7.92mm (Ausf. H and J)

Power plant: Mayback HL108TR 12-cylinder, 250-hp gasoline engine (Ausf. A); Mayback HL120TRM112 12-cylinder 300-hp gasoline engine (Ausf. B and later)

Maximum speed: 24 mph

Range: 126 miles

Fording depth: 3’3”

Vertical obstacle: 2’

Trench crossing: 7’3”

Special characteristics (pos/neg): Despite its considerable increase in weight the PzKpfw IV had an effective power-to- weight ratio and thus good maneuverability. Special models: A wide variety, including submersible; assault gun; self-propelled guns; tank destroyers; self-propelled howitzers; self-propelled antiaircraft gun platforms; armored recovery vehicles; bridge-layers

Desert Dawn Part I

2011-06-02T02:21:00.002+08:00

Marshal Rodolfo Graziani

North AfricaBefore Rommel

By David H. Lippman

"It is not a question of aiming for Alexandria or even Sollum," the message read. "I am only asking you to attack the British forces facing you."
This pleading message from Italy's Benito Mussolini was addressed to his supreme commander in Libya, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, a firm-jawed officer with a reputation for reckless offensive spirit -- earned against rebellious Arab tribesmen.
Against the British Western Desert Force, Graziani was far less resolute this 17 July, 1940. He led the numbers game on the Libyan-Egyptian border. His army of 250,000 faced a British force of barely 30,000. Italy fielded 400 guns to the British 150, and 190 fighters to the British 48. 300 Italian tanks faced only 150 British. On paper, Britain had no chance.
Weakness
But behind the numbers and glittering Fascist regalia lurked serious weaknesses that Graziani himself knew. The Italian 10th and 5th Armies in Libya marched on foot, while the British rode in trucks. Two of his six divisions were Blackshirt militia outfits, clad in fancy black uniforms but poor soldiers. His army as a whole was badly trained. Officers strutted about like gigolos, neglecting their men. Italian troops had done badly in Spain against Republicans and badly in Ethiopia against tribesmen. Also, Italian divisions had been reduced from three regiments to two, a paperwork shuffle that created more Italian divisions but weakened their strength.

Too few trucks for the desert.

Just as importantly, the Italian forces had poor equipment. Armoured cars dated back to 1909. The L3 tank only mounted two machine guns. The underpowered and thinly-armoured M11 was little better -- its 37mm gun could not traverse. The heavyweight M13 packed a 47mm gun, but crawled along at nine miles per hour. None could match the British Matilda with its 50mm armour and 40mm gun.
Italian troops were short of antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, ammunition, and radio sets. Artillery was light and ancient.
Sold Off
To ease his balance of payment problems, Mussolini had sold off his newest aircraft and weapons to foreign buyers like Spain and Turkey while equipping his forces with field guns from 1918. The army had borrowed trucks from private firms just to hold peacetime parades of its motorized divisions.
The Beretta pistol and machine gun were outstanding weapons, but the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, 1881 model, suffered from low bullet velocity. Breda machine guns were clumsy to operate and jammed easily. The Model 35 "Red Devil" hand grenades had a cute trick of exploding in the hands of their users.
By comparison, the British troops used the reliable .303 caliber Lee Enfield rifle, the superb Bren and Vickers machine guns, the 25lbr. field artillery piece, and the safe and deadly Mills grenade.
Italian ration packs included pasta meals that had to be cooked in boiling water, which was a scarce commodity in the North African desert, requiring even more water trucks and panniers that Mussolini simply did not have.
Air Comparison
In the air, Graziani could sortie 84 modern bombers and 114 fighters, backed up by 113 obsolescent aircraft. The SavoiaMarchetti SM-79s looked useful. But while the Fiat CR.42 fighter was one of the most manoeuvrable biplane fighters around, it was completely outclassed by the British Hurricane.
Flying in the desert was tough enough, but while the RAF had great experience at "tropicalising" its aircraft to keep out sand particles, the Italians did not. Both sides' pilots lived in primitive bases that were dust and sand in summer and bog marsh in winter, made up of little shanties created from empty petrol cans and packing cases, suffering from water shortages and fly-infested bully beef. Aircraft often broke down after 30 hours' use. Aviation fuel vaporized in tanks, making it liable to burst in the joints and explode.
Nor would the Italian Navy help. They had no aircraft carriers, were short on fuel and manpower -- submarines were commanded by junior ensigns -- and the British had broken their codes.
But most importantly, Italy was hopelessly outclassed by her British opponents. The British army in Egypt had trained for years in the appalling desert climate. It consisted of crack regiments like the Coldstream Guards and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The British 7th Armoured Division was its model mobile force, and it was backed up by the 4th Indian Division and the 6'h Australian Division, the elite of both nation's armies.
Finally, both sides were preparing to fight a war in the most inhospitable climate imaginable, Egypt's "Western Desert." This sprawling expanse, occasionally pocked by mud huts or the odd well, was appallingly hot by day, freezing by night. The only paved road ran along the coast' and wasn't finished. Dusty trails crisscrossed the rest. Vehicles that traversed them left their tracks in these trails which are still visible to today's oil explorers.
Doesn't Matter
None of this mattered to the bombastic Mussolini, who so far had thoroughly embarrassed himself in an effort to gain glory for Italy. After declaring war on France, his troops had been soundly defeated in the Alps. Another army lay isolated in Ethiopia. ll Duce needed a victory. Graziani was to provide one.
Graziani's answer was to order General Berti's 10th Army, consisting of three corps, to be ready to attack on 27 August. Graziani proposed to send the ill-trained 21st Corps on the northern coast road to Sollum, across the border, while the Libyan Corps and motorized Maletti Group of seven tank battalions would attack on the south side of the escarpment that ran parallel to the sea. The offensive would be backed by 300 aircraft of the 5th Squadron.
Graziani sent these plans to Commando Supremo in Rome, and Mussolini was pleased. However, the Marshal was not actually intending to launch this impressive-sounding attack...it was merely a paper exercise to soothe Il Duce. Graziani lacked transport for the southern swing.
But as soon as Graziani sent his plea for a postponement, Mussolini ordered his vacillating marshal to attack on 9 September or be sacked. Mussolini's son-in-law and Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, wrote, "Never has a military operation been undertaken so much against the will of the commanders."
Faced with dismissal, Graziani shuffled his plans. The southern swing was abandoned, the Libyan Corps moved near the coast, and the 23rd Corps under General Annibale "Electric Whiskers" Bergonzoli, ordered into the primary attack. The 62nd Marmarican and 63rd Cyrene Divisions, joined by the 1st and 2nd Blackshirt Divisions, would lead the assault.

Artillery - argubly the Italian Army's best arm - moves forward.

From the start, the Italian offensive was a bungle. Vehicles' engines overheated. Maletti Group got lost. Radio Rome announced the impending offensive to the world and British intelligence. When Graziani's men finally moved on 10 September, the British 11th Hussars, screening the Italian move, had a good laugh watching Maletti Group try to figure out its location from compasses, speedometers, and maps.
The entire 1st Libyan Division -- including a regiment of paratroopers who gloried in the title, but had never dreamed to jump out of an aircraft -- attacked Sollum, held by a single platoon of Coldstream Guards. The British laid mines and withdrew, fuming the Italian drive into a laborious task of mine-clearing.
British Leadership
The British were led by two brilliant men, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard O'Connor, who commanded the Western Desert Force, and Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, supreme commander of Egypt. O'Connor, Anglo-Irish, was a former infantryman who saw the value in tanks and mobility. Wavell, laconic in speech but gifted with the pen, possessed a fluid understanding of desert warfare.
O'Connor, unsmiling, dour, and shabbily dressed, detested publicity of any sort, and was quiet and modest. He was also one of the great commanders of his time.
O'Connor's plan to face Graziani was simple...delaying actions and withdrawals, to drag the Italians beyond their supply line. Then he would counterattack.
Wavell thought the same. The day after Graziani moved, Wavell ordered O'Connor to prepare plans for a drive on Tobruk. Yet Wavell himself was under siege. The Middle Eastern theatre involved highly complex political relations with Arab leaders, a source of endless headaches. Wavell also had responsibility for East Africa, where Mussolini's troops were threatening the Sudan. Palestine had to be policed. Vichy French Syria had to be watched. Wavell's relations with Prime Minister Winston Churchill were cool, and England, bracing for invasion, had little with which to reinforce Wavell.
However, when Wavell promised London unspecified offensive action, the War Office sent him 154 tanks, which brought Wavell up to parity with the Italians, along with 48 anti-tank guns, 48 25-lbr. (86mm) field guns, and 500 Bren guns.
It took Graziani's men four days to reach Sidi Barrani, where they stopped, having outrun their supplies, exhausted their infantry, and worn down their vehicles. Graziani needed to extend the metalled road and water pipeline to his frontline units.
Italian casualties were 120 dead and 410 wounded. The British had lost only 40 men. Radio Rome broadcast that "all is quiet and the trams are again running in the town of Sidi Barrani," which was in fact only a collection of mud huts.

10th Italian Army defensive positions before Operation Compass.

Digging In
Graziani's men began digging in, creating a little string of fortified camps, none of them within range to support each other. Graziani further scattered his tanks among the camps, thus denying himself a mobile reserve.
That was as far as Graziani was prepared to advance. He fired off telegrams to Rome demanding more trucks to haul his supplies. When those were turned down, he sought more trucks than in the whole Italian inventory -- he demanded 600 mules.
On 26 October, Mussolini retorted, "40 days after the capture of Sidi Barrani, I ask myself the question, to whom has this long halt been any use -- to us or to the enemy? I do not hesitate to answer, it has been of use, indeed, more to the enemy...it is time to ask whether you feel you wish to continue in command."
Graziani wired back to say he would resume the offensive on 15 December.

Desert Dawn Part II

2011-06-02T02:20:00.002+08:00

North AfricaBefore Rommel

By David H. Lippman

Acceleration
Now events accelerated. On 28 October, Mussolini invaded Greece, hoping as ever for a quick victory. Instead his legions were defeated in the Albanian mountains. Britain had to support its new ally. On 11 November, Royal Navy Swordfish torpedo bombers attacked Taranto, sinking an Italian battleship and damaging two more. The Regia Marina fled to western Italy, taking it out of the North African game. Wavell could now look to the offensive.
O'Connor devised a simple and straightforward five-day raid, called Operation COMPASS, that would take advantage of the spread out Italian forces. Between the 63rd Division's camp at Rabia and Maletti Group at Nibeiwa was the 20-mile undefended Enba Gap. O'Connor planned to pour 4th Indian and 7th Armoured Divisions through it and drive to the sea, thus trapping four Italian divisions. British 16th Brigade, reinforced by a battalion of motorized Free French Marines, would be the anvil of this hammer. Wavell approved the plan without telling O'Connor that as soon as the raid was over, 4th Indian would be withdrawn to Sudan.
Planning was detailed. Thanks to RAF reconnaissance, O'Connor had precise photo-mosaics of Italian vehicle routes, so he knew how to avoid Graziani's mines. To maintain surprise, British leave was not stopped, troops were not given notice of the offensive, forward dumps were called precautionary, and even the medical teams were not advised to expect extra casualties.
Meanwhile, the Italians marked time. Graziani himself helped intrigue to remove the Chief of Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, who resigned on 26 November. A few days later, the 10th Army commander, Gen. Berti, went home to Italy on sick leave, leaving Gen. Gariboldi in field command. That caused command paralysis, as no replacement for Badoglio was assigned until 6 December, when Marshal Ugo Cavallero took over.
British Counterattack
The next day, O'Connor began his attack with air and naval bombardment of the Italian camps. British surprise was complete. On the morning of 9 December, the British moved forward, troops dragging extra grenades, wearing heavy underwear and woollen sweaters in the cold pre- dawn air.
The advance was almost an anticlimax. The Italians didn't know the British were upon them until they heard the rumble of Matilda tank treads and the plaintive skirl of Scottish bagpipes. 11th Indian Brigade charged into Maleni Group's Nibeiwa Camp, defended by 20 tanks, 12 field guns and 2,500 Libyans. The tanks were caught with their crews at breakfast, and quickly disabled.
"Frightened, dazed or desperate Italians erupted from tents and slit trenches, some to surrender supinely, other to leap gallantly into battle, hurling grenades or blazing machine-guns in futile belabour of the impregnable intruders," wrote G. R. Stevens in his history of 4th Indian Division. "Italian artillerymen gallantly swung their pieces on to the advancing monsters. They fought until return fire from the British tanks stretched them dead or wounded around their limbers. General Maletti, the Italian commander, sprang from his dugout, machine-gun in hand. He fell dead from an answering burst; his son beside him was struck down and captured." More than 2,000 PoWs and 35 tanks were captured...the Indians lost 56 officers and men.
5th Indian Brigade jumped the Tummar Camps from behind, hieing the mostly native 2nd Libyans. At Tummar, Italian artillerymen fought to the last, but their shells bounced off British tanks. Nearly 4,000 Italians were captured, along with considerable wine stocks.
Meanwhile, 7th Armoured's tanks roared up on Buq Buq, held by 64th Division. Soon a British officer radioed, "Up to second 'B' of 'Buq Buq.'" By the end of 10 December, 4th Blackshirt and 1st Libyan Divisions were surrounded, with the British taking Sidi Barrani at 4:40 p.m. The Arabs and paratroopers of 1st Libyans fought hard on the 10th amid a howling sandstorm, but on the 11th the division began to disintegrate. The Leicesters' official history wrote, "A formidable body of men emerging from their trenches...as if in mass attack; but they came stumbling, with their hands up, 2,000 Blackshirts had had enough. A rot had set in."
The disaster fell on the head of Gen. Gallina, who commanded 1st and 2nd Libyan Divisions. His water supply and communications had been cut. "Territory between Sidi Barrani and 2nd Libyan Division infested by mechanized army against which I have no adequate means," he radioed Graziani.
It fell on Mussolini in Rome, too. "News of the attack on Sidi Barani comes like a thunderbolt," wrote Ciano on the 10th."At first it doesn't seem serious, but subsequent telegrams from Graziani confirm that we have had a licking." Mussolini took the news calmly, talking of how it would affect Graziani's prestige.
On the 11th, 2nd Blackshirts and 64th Cantanzaro Division tried to flee, but ran smack into British tanks, and disintegrated.
PoWs
On the same day, O'Connor counted 20,000 PoWs, 180 captured guns, and 60 tanks, for a cost of 600 casualties. 250 of those came from 16th Indian Brigade. RAF Hurricanes had routed Italy's CR 42s, and the remaining Italian forces were in full flight. The obvious thing would be to follow up success.
But as O'Connor sketched his next moves, he received the telegram from Wavell ordering the detachment of 4th Indian to Sudan. 6th Australian Division would replace it, but not right away. That would leave O'Connor with only 16th British Brigade, 7th Armoured (whose tanks needed repair) and Selby Force with its French Marines. Not enough to guard PoWs, collect abandoned vehicles, or provide water for all.
The logical move was to halt the advance -- and Wavell was advising just that.
Instead, O'Connor -- an admirer of Stonewall Jackson and Ulysses S. Grant -- decided to maintain the pace of the offensive.
Pull Out
On the night of the 11th, the Italian 62nd and 63rd Divisions began pulling out under a sandstorm. Graziani finally took action. "Recognizing the impossibility of damming the enemy march on the desert flats, I thought it essential to put to full use the unique natural obstacle at Halfaya, while throwing strong reinforcements into Bardia and Tobruk," he signaled Mussolini. To defend the pass, the only gap in the long escarpment, Graziani threw in an armoured brigade and Bergonzoli, a Spanish Civil War veteran whose huge beard was reputed to give off sparks, hence the nickname "Electric Whiskers."
In Rome, Mussolini faced the loss of four divisions, two of them Blackshirts, with remarkable cool. Mussolini "maintains that the many painful days through which we are living must be inevitable in the changing fortunes of every war," Ciano wrote.
While Graziani cut orders from his 60-footdeep Cyrene bunker, O'Connor did the same from his staff car in the desert. 7th Armoured Division was to keep charging. The 3rd Hussars, in their light Mark VI tanks, tried to do so, but beyond Buq Buq they ran into do so, but beyond Buq Buq they ran into heavy Italian artillery and airpower.
O'Connor called for RAF Gloster Gladiators to intercept, but the biplane fighters were out of action after the exertions of the past few days. O'Connor used his superior 25-lbr. guns, and the offensive, despite the loss of a number of tanks, was on again. 7th Armoured Division rumbled forward, heading for Halfaya Pass and Fort Capuzzo, the white brick fort guarding the Libyan border.
The offensive so far was turning into a lark, with 14,000 PoWs in the bag, cheerfully organizing their journey back to Egyptian cages. The Coldstream Guards reported capturing "five acres of officers and 200 acres of other ranks." Despite losses of vehicles to gunfire and maintenance, O'Connor's force was riding the crest of a wave, boosting morale back in England.
Raid Extended
Now the aggressive O'Connor extended his five-day raid to grab the small Egyptian border port of Sollum, through which the Royal Navy could re-supply him. Then O'Connor could push on to Bardia. The problem was to move 38,000 PoWs and 4th Indian Division back and bring his supplies and 6th Australians up.
The pursuit went on. Western Desert Force was renamed 13th Corps. On the 12th, artillery slowed the British. Exhausted troops drove along in the dark under blackout conditions, wearied by noise, repairs, smoke, heat and cold. Next day, O'Connor stripped 7th Armoured's Support Group of vehicles, so that he had more trucks to keep his tanks topped up with gas.
In his bunker, Graziani showed more vigor with his signals pad than with his army. He wired Rome in a panic, to say that Cyrenaica was lost, recommending retreat to Tripoli, claiming the battle was "a flea against an elephant." Churchill later wrote that "the flea had devoured a large portion of the elephant."
Mussolini said, "Here is another man with whom I cannot get angry, because I despise him."
On 4 December, 7th and 4th Armoured Brigades came under heavy Italian air bombardment. SM 79s ranged unmolested -- Wavell had been forced to send some of his aircraft to Greece. Next day, the British offensive resumed.
In Cyrene, Graziani faced the inevitability of losing Sollum and Fort Capuzzo, and retreated the bulk of his force to Bardia. On the 16th, the British hit Sidi Omar, which was held by 62nd Division, amid minefields and a white stone Beau Geste fort. Lacking infantry,
The unorthodox manoeuvre worked. The lead tank roared into the center of the fort, where the tank commander traded pistol shots with stunned Italians. Before the defenders could overwhelm the Matilda, its squadron mates arrived, and the Italians collapsed.
By the 20th, 7th Armoured, despite exhausted crews and vehicles, had seized Capuzzo and Sollum, but Bergonzoli had been able to muster a considerable defense in Bardia: four divisions of 21st Corps plus fortress troops, border guards, an anti-tank ditch, concrete blockhouses, and remnants of fleeing units. Altogether Bergonzoli had 45,000 men and 400 guns, and a brigade of M13 tanks. He also had a message from Mussolini, exhorting him to fight to the last.
Against this O'Connor hurled RAF Wellington bombers, three battleships, and HMS Aphis, a gunboat that sank several coasters in Bardia harbour. He also cut loose Maj. Gen. Iven Mackay's 6th Australian Division, the first Diggers to see action in World War II. The division, a mixture of "old sweats" and new volunteers, rode trucks painted with the division's symbol, a leaping kangaroo, to the battle area. The Australians were eager to find out if it was true that Bergonzoli's beard gave offsparks.
The Australians were weighted down with 70 lbs. of kit per man and restricted to a half-gallon of water per day. A man could shave or wash, but not both. "The discomforts the desert imposed were greater than those inflicted by the enemy," the Australian official history noted.
McKay planned to assault Bardia with 16th and 17th Brigades, estimating the Italian defenses had only 20,000 men. The valuable armour would prevent the escape of the garrison and move on to Tobruk when Bardia fell. The infantry would drive a wedge through the center of the Italian line, cutting roads, and enabling his men to assault the Italian defenses from behind and annihilate them in detail.
Supplies were still short -- 11,500 sleeveless leather jerkins to keep the Diggers warm didn't arrive until New Year's Day, and 350 wire cutters didn't show up until the next, the night before the attack. 300 pairs of gloves to protect the hands of men cutting wire were handed out as the infantry moved into their assembly areas, but tape to mark attack routes never arrived. 3-inch mortars did, but without sights. A 17th Brigade officer hopped into a jeep and drove all the way to Cairo and back to pick the sights up.
"Tonight is the night," wrote 16 Brigade's official diarist. "By this time tomorrow (5 p.m.), the fate of Bardia should be sealed. Everyone is happy, expectant, eager. Old timers say the spirit is the same as in the last war. Each truckload was singing as we drove to the assembly point. The brigade major and party taped the start line -- historic, for it is the start-line of the Australian soldier in this war."

Desert Dawn Part III

2011-06-02T02:19:00.002+08:00

North AfricaBefore Rommel

By David H. Lippman

Attack
At 2:30 the Australian troops, looking enormous in jerking, greatcoats, and tin hats, lugging 150 rounds of ammo and three days of bully beef, drank a tot of rum, and moved forward behind a heavy barrage. Engineers led the way with wire cutters and Bangalore torpedoes to remove Italian wire. When the torpedoes went off, the Australians charged through the wire.
The intense artillery bombardment thoroughly frightened the 1st Blackshirt Division, whose only combat experience had been beating helpless civilian "enemies of the state" back in Calabria. Now the Fascist "goons" found themselves under heavy shelling, and facing enormous Australian infantrymen at point-blank range. So the Italians surrendered. Some thought the Aussies' leather jerkins were bulletproof.
Australian troops marched at ease through the positions, passing Italian troops waving white cloths. Sgt. Ian Mcintosh of New South Wales, a World War I veteran, led 24 men to capture 3 field guns, an anti-tank gun, 12 machine guns, and 104 PoWs. Lt. A.C. Murchison of Newcastle led a bayonet charge that caused the Italians facing him to surrender. As Murchison moved forward, the surrenders took on a chain reaction, and the Aussies were soon thumbing the Italians back, yelling, "Avant)." The company next to Murchison took 300 PoWs.
"It was now half an hour after midday. By this time an apparently endless column of Italian prisoners was streaming back though the gaps in the perimeter; the officers in ornate uniforms with batmen beside them carrying their suitcases; the men generally dejected and untidy, strangely small beside their captors," wrote the Australian official history. "When the 2/5th Battalion, marching into the perimeter, saw this column moving toward them, their first thought was that 16th Brigade was being driven back -- then came the realisation that the close-packed column, winding like a serpent over the flat country, was a sample of a defeated Italian army." By noon 6,000 PoWs were in the cage, and McKay had a rude shock when a PoW officer told him the enemy defenses were 40,000 men.
The battle raged on. Italian artillerymen fought hard, but the Australians had the advantage of mobility, and moved around the gunners, leading to more surrenders. The 2/5th, Australians found a line of L3 tanks, motors running. One quick Bren gun burst and 200 Italians surrendered their little tanks. Sgt. W. T. Morse fired a shot into a wadi's pit and out came 70 Italians, 25 of them officers, waving white flags. It was the headquarters of an artillery outfit. The Australians were stunned to find enameled baths, silk clothing, and cosmetics. Morse saw some heads behind a wall nearby, and found 200 more Italians ready to quit. Overall, the 2/5th took 3,000 PoWs in the wadi.
Now the Australians stormed the Italian outpost line, using machinegun fire and grenades to winkle out the defenders. At Post 22 an Italian leaped up from a pit and shot down Capt. D. L. Green, then dropped his rifle, and surrendered, smiling broadly. A furious Australian threw the Italian down into his post and emptied his Bren gun into him. Another Australian officer intervened to prevent a massacre of other surrendering Italians.
Post 25 was nearby, and the Italians there saw this action. They sent an emissary to surrender. With help of the emissary, Posts 23 and 20 fell in short order.
The 2/3rd ran into six Italian tanks, which opened fire at 30 yards. An Australian ran forward and fired into the turret of one tank with his pistol. The other five moved south and released 500 Italians held prisoner while calling on the Australian guards to give up. Outnumbered, the Australians handed their rifles to their captives. The tanks moved off to find other prey. Just then a nearby Australian Bren gun opened up, and the 500 Italians surrendered again. Fortunately, three British 2-lbr. antitank guns, mounted on trucks, turned up and destroyed the attackers. This was the most vigorous Italian counterattack of the whole battle.
Still, it wasn't all easy. 17th Brigade ran into determined Italian resistance. So did the French marines. By 4 January, the 17th Brigade was scattered, 16th Brigade exhausted. Mackay sent in his reserve, 19th Brigade, for the coup de grace.
Backed by tanks and the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Australians moved in on the town, taking hundreds of PoWs. Italian guns and British tanks traded salvos like battleships at sea, but British mobility defeated Il Duce's forts and posts.
A British tank unit rumbled up to an Italian fort, and charged. When the Italians saw the tanks coming, they opened the gate, and the tanks cruised through a mob of surrendering men. Another platoon walked down a goat track into the town and took thousands of PoWs.
Hordes of Italian support troops tried to hide from the attackers, but were scooped up by Aussies shouting, "Lashay lay armay," a corruption of the Italian phrase "Lascie le arm," which meant, "Lay down your arms." The Italians obeyed, climbing up the goat tracks.
Col. G.W. Eather of the 2/1st Battalion, a future general, was told some Italians had been captured. Thinking it was a dozen or so, he said, "Bring them in." More than 1,500 came in. Eather, embarrassed at the number of his PoWs, told them to come back in the morning.
It was impossible to count the horde -- some Italians meandering across the battlefield were "captured" several times. Among the PoWs bagged by 19th Brigade were the commanding generals of 62nd and 63rd Divisions, Tracchia and Guida, respectively.
While the ground forces advanced, RAF Blenheim bombers blasted Italian airfields to the west, clearing the skies.
Nothing Left
There was nothing left for Bergonzoli but to burn his code books and flee. Meanwhile, his men shamed into captivity, officers clutching swords, while Australians moved into Bardia, and ransacked the Italian stores of wine and clean linen.
The British claimed to have captured 44,868 PoWs, while the Italians estimated their dead at 40,000 and that the British captured 38,000. The victory was smashing. 13th Corps captured twice as many guns as were in its inventory, along with 12 M13 tanks and 113 L3 tankettes, and most importantly, 708 motor vehicles, badly needed to relieve 7th Armoured's exhausted trucks. Australian casualties were 136 dead and 320 wounded.
Australian troops equipped themselves with captured pistols, watches, compasses, gunsights, and signal equipment. "The behaviour of the troops in the face of quantities of liquor was exemplary," the Australian provost marshal noted. However, the Aussies threw away useless Italian rifles and grenades.
The collapse of Bardia left Graziani with only two Italian infantry divisions, 60th Sabratha and 615'Sirte, in Cyrenaica, and four more in Tripolitania. Of the 248,000 Graziani began the campaign with, some 80,000 had been lost.
Now Mussolini was upset. On 12 January, he told Ciano that the Italians were "a race of sheep," adding that, "In the future we shall select an army of professionals, selecting them out of 12 to 13 million Italians there in the valley of the Po and in part of central Italy. All the others will be put to work making arms for the warrior aristocracy."
Graziani himself was also depressed. He sent his wife to Ciano with a letter pleading for the Luftwaffe, blamed the whole mess on Badoglio, and finally talked of suicide.
German Intervention
But Adolf Hitler was looking hard at North Africa, too. On 11 January he ordered German armour be sent to North Africa, and dispatched Luftwaffe Fliegerkorps 10 to Sicily. Germany's Fuhrer did not want to be drawn into a campaign in North Africa, but had to support his ally.
"The success at Bardia demonstrated that there is no fortress so strong in its engineering that men of determination and cunning, with weapons in the their hands, cannot take it," wrote the Australian official history. With Bardia in hand, Wavell ordered O'Connor to keep on towards Tobruk, seizing this town with its water-purification plant and superb natural harbour, and drive the Italians back.
But now Churchill was intervening, demanding that Wavell withdraw three divisions and an armoured brigade to Greece. Such a move would halt O'Connor in his tracks. While the leaders bickered, O'Connor rolled on.
Tobruk, a fortress town that would become legend, was held by 25,000 men, including Gen. della Mura's 61st Sirte Division, 45 light and 20 medium tanks, 200 guns, and the usual antitank ditches, two forts, Solaro and Pilastrino, and strongpoints. There was also the Italian cruiser San Giorgio, which had run aground after being bombed by the RAF, but which still had working guns. Twice as much ground and half as many men as at Bardia. But the Italians had no illusions about this defense.
The Australians advanced, short of water. 10th Corps was running out of vehicles due to the difficult terrain and dust storms. Trucks were being cannibalized. Tanks had thrown their treads. The Australian Divisional Cavalry had been forced to re-equip with captured and slow- moving Italian M-13s, all painted with the Aussies' leaping kangaroo symbol. Australian troops replaced their boots with captured Italian gear. The advance was slowed by fleas, lice, and Italian booby traps.
O'Connor and Mackay planned to hit Tobruk from the town's southeast corner, relying on the 16th Brigade to punch a hole, the 17th Brigade to follow up, and the 19th Brigade to exploit. Australian gunners prepared their bombardment thoroughly, to make up for the shortage of tanks -- there were only 18 to support the attack.
The assault went in on 21 January, delayed three days by dust storms. At Bardia, the Aussies were weighted down with equipment. At Tobruk they only wore jerkins, and carried weapons and ammunition.
The Italians fought back, relying on barbed wire and booby traps to augment their machine guns. Sgt. F. J. Hoddinott of Queensland hurled grenades to overcome Post S5. After half an hour, it fell. Post 62 fought back under tank and artillery shelling until Lt. F. D. Clark of Adelaide poured a mixture of crude oil and kerosene through the post's windows to silence it. 11 Italians died and 35 surrendered.
The expanding Australian drive became a torrent, as troops fanned out, losing contact with each other. Officers had to send dispatch riders out on captured motorcycles through the dust. Italian defenses collapsed under accurate Australian artillery fire. Again came heavy surrenders -- one company captured 300 men. Another hauled in 1,000 PoWs, including a general.
By mid-day, 19th Brigade's 2/8 Battalion was moving on Fort Pilastrino, the 61st Division's headquarters. The 2/8 came under fire from dug-in Italian tanks, so the Australians charged with bayonet and grenade, destroying the first tank. The rest surrendered. Next, 2/8 captured some mobile tanks, then some machine-gun positions.
The Italians counterattacked with nine tanks and hundreds of infantrymen. Private O. Z. Neall knocked out three Italian tanks with his Boyes anti-tank rifle, a feat that astounded everyone -- the Boyes rifle was noted for its uselessness. But the Italians continued to advance until two British Matildas rumbled up. At that point, the Italians ran, Australian infantrymen charging after them.
FortPilastrinofumed out to be simply a collection of barrack buildings surrounded by a wall, and Australian infantry took it quickly.
The 2/4 and 2/ll Battalions were also attacking, supported by British and Australian artillery. Their first objective was Fort Solaro, which housed the Tobruk garrison's headquarters. After a battle with Italian tanks on Tobruk's airfield, the Australians also found Solaro, which was just a few army buildings, unworthy of the title "Fort." Capt. H.S. Conkey saw some Italians driving away in trucks, and he and his pals hopped on some Italian motorcycles to capture the enemy. He scooped up 600 PoWs, but not Tobruk's top defenders; they had already fled.
The Australians continued to fight their way through sangars and wadis with tommy guns, and stumbled into some tunnels, which were obviously an enemy headquarters. Soon enough, an Italian officer came out, telling Lt. J. S. Copland of the 2/4 battalion he would surrender only to an officer.
"I'm an officer," Copland said, and Gen. Petassi Manella, commander of the 22nd Corps and the Tobruk garrison, looking dignified, quiet, and tired, handed over his pistol to Copland, in tears. Along with Manella, Copland bagged his chief of staff and 1,600 PoWs.
Manella was driven to 19th Brigade HQ and requested to surrender all of Tobruk. Manella told his captors his troops had orders from Mussolini to fight to a finish.
2/3 Battalion relied on heavy fire to make up for its lack of strength (a dozen men in one platoon) to intimidate the Italians. Soon Capt. J. N. Abbot's company was finding hundreds of Italian soldiers approaching, waving white rags.
By the end of the 21st, the Australians knew they had won. Most Italian guns were silent, Tobruk harbour was covered with black smoke, as the enemy was destroying ammunition and fuel. Behind Australian lines some 8,000 PoWs were trying to keep warm by lighting fires.
During the night, Italian SM.79s flew in to bomb the Australians, saw the fires lit by the PoWs, and bombed them. Italian bombs killed hundreds of their own men.
Next day, the 22nd, Mackay ordered the coup de grace. The Australians advanced on a wide front. Gen. della Mura of the 61st Division was bagged early and refused to surrender to the junior officer who caught him. No matter, thousands of della Mura's men were shuffling in to give up, anyway. At 9:30, Capt. I. R. Savige took the surrender of a local commander, who was persuaded to phone other Italian positions and order them to give up, too.
Lt. Col. K. W. Eather rode a Bren gun carrier over the edge of depression, saw a line of white flags, and found 3,000 Italians drawn up in parade formation with the officers in front, holding their luggage. The officers were shaven and wore well-tended uniforms and polished boots. Eather took the officers' pistols -- the other ranks had already thrown away their Mannlicher-Carcanos -- and thumbed them back.
Now the Australians were at the last escarpment before town. Lt. E. C. Hennessy of divisional cavalry rolled into Tobruk in a Bren carrier. He hit a barrier consisting of an iron girder supported by sandbags. Sgt. G. M. Mills hopped out with his crew to remove it and two Italians ran out to help. Then Hennessy and his team drove into the port.

TobrukFalls
As they clattered down a street a neat Italian officer came forward to lead Hennessy to naval headquarters where Adm. Massmiliano Vietina was waiting to surrender. Hennessy sat the officer on the front of his carrier as "a guarantee of good faith" and they rattled through town to a large building. There stood Vietina ready to offer his sword.
Hennessy declined it, and sent a carrier back to fetch Brig. Robertson, who came quickly, along with a brace of Australian and British war correspondents.
The ritual was perfunctory. Vietina and his 1,500 men wished to surrender. All the booby traps and mines in town had been "sprung" and so were the ammo dumps and confidential papers. After the ceremony, Robertson and his men fired off Very flares to signify that Tobruk had fallen. An Australian soldier lowered the green and red flag of Italy and replaced it with a Digger's hat. Tobruk had fallen.
Hordes of defeated Italians trooped up from bunkers and shelters to surrender, while Australian troops fanned out to take control. About 25,000 PoWs had been taken, along with 208 guns, 23 tanks, 200 vehicles, the water distilleries, the port, and enough tinned food to keep the Italians going for two months. Australian casualties were 49 killed and 306 wounded.
16th Brigade soon found that victory was melancholy, as they had the near-impossible task of caring for thousands of PoWs, amid dust storms. The Australians themselves were short on water and supplies. It took 2/7 Battalion seven hours to feed all its captives. 2/2 Battalion kept its PoWs occupied by having them sing.
Only five of the 12 Italian divisions in Cyrenaica were left, and nearly half of these 250,000 men dead or captured.
O'Connor's new target was Dema, where "Electric Whiskers" Bergonzoli was organizing his 20th Corps. This force consisted of 60th Sabratha Division, 17th Pavia Division, and 27th Brescia Division, reinforced by Group Babini, a 70-tank armoured brigade.
While the Australians sorted out Tobruk, 7th Ammoured was on the move. Wavell approved the advance to continue to Mechili and Dema, 11th Hussars leading the way. They ran into 50 M13s on the track and in the battle, destroyed nine for the loss of seven British. Clearly the Italians weren't done yet.
But Graziani was in despair; the Ariete Ammored Division hadn't arrived from Italy, and he frantically wired Rome that he faced 17 British divisions. "I had a vision of the future," he wrote, "I saw that it was not possible to avoid the fatality of the future!"
The two British divisions Graziani actually faced rumbled on through abandoned Italian colonial homesteads being torn up by looting Arabs. O'Connor planned to grab the Mechili crossroads by coup de main. Errors ensued. First, 4 Armoured Brigade got lost in the unmapped terrain -- O'Connor's men had literally driven off the edge of their maps -- but Babini Brigade's tanks didn't attack, missing a chance to chew up the 4th.
O'Connor rewrote his plan. 6th Australian would hit Dema and Bergonzoli's 21st Corps on the coast, while 7th Armoured would put Babini Brigade at Mechili in a neat pincer, cutting the Italian armour inland from the coastal infantry.
As usual, the Italians reacted slowly, hampered by a byzantine chain of command and a lack of radios. But Babini fought hard on the 23rd at Mechili, ripping up the 11th Hussars light tanks and knocking the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment off balance. In a desert tank battle that looked like battleships maneuvering on the high seas, 2nd RTR counterattacked, caught the Italians skylined on a ridge, and picked them all off.
Even so, Graziani was pleased; his men were fighting back. He ordered 10th Army's commander, Tellera, to order Bergonzoli, to in turn order Babini, to attack the British flank. Tellera wavered, reporting that Babini had seen 150 British tanks (he was wrong), and Graziani lost his nerve, and ordered his armour to withdraw.
"If I had an armoured unit, I could manoeuvre around enemy lines," he wired Mussolini. Graziani had an armoured unit. He just didn't use it. "I am more or less in the position of a captain in command of his ship which is on the point of sinking, because errors are present on all sides," he whined.

Desert Dawn Part IV

2011-06-02T02:18:00.000+08:00

The long road of retreat. They may just make it as they have a vehicle.

North AfricaBefore Rommel

By David H. Lippman

At Derna
Meanwhile, the Australians took their whacks at Derna. 19 Brigade slugged it out with enemy artillery and machine guns for control of Dema's airstrip at Siret el Chreiba. The Aussies took on an "uncommonly determined" Italian rearguard. Little progress was made.
7th Armoured was stalled, too, mostly because its vehicles and men were exhausted from six weeks' campaigning and a stretched supply line. O'Connor doubted he would take Benghazi before German reinforcements arrived.
Bergonzoli's defense of Derna was determined and efficient. He placed his guns well, and his Bersaglieri troops fought hard. Italian supplies were plentiful, while 6th Australian's guns were down to 10 rounds a day. But the British pressure was too much. Bergonzoli asked Tellera to ask Graziani for more tanks.
Graziani received this flimsy with another signal from Mussolini on 27 January: "I want you to know, dear Marshal, that we are eating out our liver, night and day, to send you the necessaries for this arduous battle." The message promised more aircraft, the Ariete Armoured Division, and more delays.
Graziani ordered his field commanders to "disengage speedily" from Derna. The Italians, after a burst of gunfire, set their ammo dumps ablaze, and retreated. Next morning, local Arabs told the baffled Aussies that the Italians were gone. 6th Australian charged into an empty town of modern box-like houses on the coast, with gardens full of flowers and fresh vegetables -- the first the Australians had seen in a month. Libyans and Australians proceeded to loot the place.
When McKay himself drove into town, he found the few roads clogged with supply vehicles and Australian soldiers driving captured Fiats and trucks. The general fired off a blistering memo to his senior officers to get the Military Police in town to restore order and traffic control, then spent the last day of January playing traffic cop at an intersection.
Bergonzoli had fled again, and the British couldn't pursue to Benghazi; 6th Australian lacked transport, and 7th Armoured's tanks had practically all thrown their treads. More importantly, 6th Australian found itself responsible for protecting nearly 90,000 Italian civilians who been brought to Libya to colonize the place.
Still, the Aussies kept moving. One battalion marched 70 miles in three days, slowed mostly by booby traps. Graziani, whose Cyrene bunker was now under RAF attack, fled to Tripoli, leaving Tellera and Bergonzoli in command.
O'Connor, racked by fatigue and stomach trouble, was facing the certainty of his offensive stalling out in front of Benghazi. The Germans would reinforce through the port, and reverse Axis fortunes. O'Connor cast round for another scent.
O'Connor's solution was breathtaking in its genius...his Australian infantry would continue to drive steadily on Benghazi. Meanwhile, the overworked and exhausted 7th Armoured would cut across the desert tracks south of Benghazi to a hamlet called Beda Fomm, and cut off the retreating Italian 10th Army in a classic ambush. If the move worked, the 10th Army would collapse. If it failed, 7th Armoured would have only three days of supplies to hold out in the desert. After that, it would be doomed.
Risky and Dangerous
It was the kind of move that Hollywood would later attribute to American generals, and not consider possible by British officers and troops -- risky and dangerous, but with great potential if it worked.
O'Connor sent his chief of staff, Brig. Eric Dorman-Smith, back to Cairo with the plan on 31 January. Wavell heard Dorman-Smith's report and said, "Tell Dick he can go on, and wish him luck from me. He has done well."
Wavell backed his quote with a supply convoy that sailed to Tobruk, whose vehicles were sent to Mechili to re-supply 7th Armoured's panniers. It was just possible for the division to move out with full vehicles 11th Hussars had already started; the rest of the division would move on the 5th, with barely 45 heavy tanks, 80 light tanks, two days' supplies of food and water, and two refills of ammunition. Hardly enough against Tellera's four divisions.
"It is likely that tonight the enemy mechanical columns will move on Msus Sceleidima, marching even with lights on," Tellera's radio intercept teams noted. The Italians were right, but Tellera could do lime to block the British advance over tracks through villages named Msus, Sceleidema, and Antelat.
Can't Do It
In any case, the Italians weren't worried. '`They can't do it," one Italian officer said. "And even if they do it we still have two days to spare." The Italians confined countermeasures to light aerial minelaying, and alerting their detachments in the area.
The British weren't sure the move was possible, either. British war correspondent Alexander Clifford wrote, "For mile after mile they juddered over great slabs of sharp, uneven rock. Then they crossed belts of soft, fine sand, which engulfed vehicles up to their axles. Sandstorms blew up, and the trucks had to keep almost touching if they were not to lose one another.
Whole convoys lurched off into the gloom and only re-established contact hours later. It was freezing cold, and the latter half of the division had to contend with fierce, icy showers. All kit had been cut to the bone, and there were no extra blankets or greatcoats, and scarcely more than a glass of water per man per day."
A tank commander in 1/RTR wrote, "The march was a complete nightmare and I remember little about it because most of the time I was too tired and bruised by my bucking tank."
It was bitterly cold, and, for much of the way, it was either raining or blowing a sandstorm...by day the squadron was deployed on a very wide front with the task of finding the easiest passage through the rough and rocky countryside. If a tank broke down, and many did, the crew reported its position and they stayed with it until the Divisional recovery teams towed it back to Tobruk."
One light tank, lost in this way, spent three weeks without recovery, eking out three days rations, until their word HELP, etched in the sand, caught the eye of a passing RAF aircraft.
With the indefatigable 11th Hussars leading, Msus was reached and cleared of a small Italian detachment on 4 February. While the British advanced, word came down that the Italians were retreating into Tripolitania. Maj. Gen. O'Moore Creagh, commanding 7th Armoured, was ordered to speed his offensive.
Faster
Creagh organized his fastest vehicles into an ad hoc team under Lt. Col. John Combe, called Combeforce, and sent them on ahead. This force consisted entirely of 11th Hussars, 2nd Rifle Brigade, C Battery ofthe 4th Royal Horse Artillery, and 106th Battery RHA with is truck mounted 37mm anti-tank guns. Most vehicles were wheeled. Combeforce had 2,000 men and no tanks. They would pin down the Italians until the rest of the division arrived.
Combe looked at his maps, and chose to move via Antelat across the tracks and cut the Italian retreat off at a spot called Beda Fomm, which consisted of a few huts and a mosque.
Just before dawn on the 5th, Combeforce jolted across the terrain, armoured cars leading, artillery behind, across uncharted ground, relying on compass bearings to stay on track. At noon the 11th Hussars reached the coast to find no Italian vehicles. That meant the Italians had yet to arrive.
Relieved, Combe settled his infantry into a system of shallow ridges through which passed the road from north to south. The Bren carriers were left behind, out of gas. Behind the infantry the artillery and armoured cars dug in.
At 2:30 p.m., sharp-eyed British soldiers saw a cloud of dust heading towards them. It was the retreating Italian 10th Army. Combe and O'Connor had won the race -- by two hours.
The Italians were weary men of the 10th Bersaglieri, escorting a motley collection of air force ground-crew, colonial administrators, gunners without guns, and frightened civilians. As they made the turn in the road, the vehicles came under machine gun fire, and hit land mines.
10th Bersaglieri stopped its retreat to take on the 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps, but came under 25-lbr. artillery fire. The Italians, realizing their retreat was blocked, attacked with ferocity, but made no headway against British fire-discipline.
At dawn on the 5th, the 4th Armoured Brigade moved towards Beda Fomm behind Combeforce, clearing the 40-mile journey by 4 p.m. They reached the scene north of the British ambush line to find an endless line of Italian vehicles strung along the Coast Road, waiting to retreat. 4th Armoured was down to its last drops of fuel, but it charged into the Italian mass with gusto.
The Italians themselves were shocked, and in many cases, unable to respond, as the columns were mostly poorly-armed support troops. Panicked Italian drivers turned their vehicles into sand dunes and became bogged down. Those that didn't flee received 40mm ordnance, which set fuel trucks alight, providing illumination for Combe's artillerymen, who added their 25-lbr. shells to the din.
British infantry dismounted to take more than 800 PoWs and salvage captured vehicles. Some of them were fuel trucks, and British tank crewmen refuelled their empty vehicles on the spot.
Bizarre
The battle took on bizarre tones. One Hussar sergeant kept his PoWs in check with his Very pistol until he was politely handed a Breda automatic by an Italian who spoke English with an American accent and had spent 11 years in the United States.
The British fanned across the area. One British squadron shot its way along the 10 miles of fighting, replenished its shells and fuel, and then fought all the way back. When Italian tanks tried to counterattack, Royal Engineers moved forward, laid a minefield in front of the enemy, and the attack was halted.
2nd RTR rolled north and dismembered a flak battery, sweeping up guns, men and vehicles by the light of burning trucks. The Italians were in a shambles.
Problem was, so were the British. They were down to their last fuel, despite some captures. Tankers were siphoning fuel from their gunner vehicles. Creagh ordered his division to dig in for the night, refuel, and move 5,000 PoWs out.
While the British ate gummy bully beef, two Italian tanks came rumbling up. A 2nd RTR trooper knocked in turn on the Italian hatch tops, and at pistol point, persuaded the Italians to surrender.
During the night, the British supply vehicles came up, and 7th Armoured refilled its panniers. The situation was serious for both sides: The Italians were cut off, and the British were practically out of supply.
Next Day
The next day, 6 February, dawned wet and windy. Both sides were exhausted, having been unable to rest during the night. Tellera and Bergonzoli were determined to break through to safety. To the east of Benghazi, the Australians advanced. Barce's Italian ammunition dump went up in a dramatic ball of smoke, and Babini Group faced the whole 6th Australian. At Sceledeima, Italian troops fought hard against advancing Australians.
Tasked with the breakout at Beda Fomm, Bergonzoli knew his 21st Corps was on its own. Lacking reconnaissance and adequate information, he voted for a short hook east through the desert and outflank the British defenders, relying on superior numbers.
The Italians moved out at 8:30 a.m., without artillery, targeting a small rise in the road just west of the mosque, logically called the Pimple.
Meanwhilc, the British, under Brig. J. A. L. Caunter, prepared for the attack. 4th Armoured Brigade was nearly at the end of its tanks division's reserve was only 10 cruiser tanks. Caunter had plenty of worries: cold, wind, rain, sandstorms, and the fact that he was far beyond the range of RAF support.
At dawn, patrols told Caunter the Italian column, stretching for miles, was moving south. Caunter's men stood to. 2nd RTR, with 19 tanks at the edge of a slope, faced 60 Italian machines at the Pimple.
But as the Italians attacked, the British got in the all-important first shot, their guns ripping through the Italian armour, turning M13s into burning coffins, wrecking eight. Before the stunned Italians could return fire, the British had withdrawn down the slope, to repeat the example, destroying seven more tanks with no loss. The Italians opened up with artillery and committed their reserves, as did the British.
The Italian numerical advantage was no help. Most Italian vehicles had no radios. The British instituted a drill movement right out of Salisbury Plain training exercises. With the snap order, "Hello all stations. Tanks left and attack the Pimple," the British counterattacked.
The Italians, lacking the efficiency of radio, stolidly moved to their predetermined objectives, and waited for orders. The Italians fought with great determination but in total disarray.
A Squadron of 2nd RTR soon scooped up 250 PoWs. British artillery expended nearly all it ammunition to break up attacking Italian infantry columns.
At 10 am., The Italian defenders at Sceledeima were told to pull out and get to the Pimple. They raced down the road and into the 7th Hussars.
Even so, the British were in trouble. The Italians were streaming down endlessly; 60 tanks had been knocked out, but more were coming...and 2nd RTR was out of ammunition...4th Brigade needed more help. Where was 1st RTR?
By 11:25 a.m., 2nd RTR was down to 13 cruiser tanks. At noon it only had 10. 7th Hussars was in worse shape -- it had only one cruiser tank left.
The Italians, sensing victory, kept charging, firing artillery over open sights at pointblank range.
The crisis hit at 3 p.m. 7 Hussars found the tail of the Italian column and attacked it. 3rd Hussars battled Italian tanks. 2nd RTR, driven off the Pimple, tried to break round. Now British radio communications had broken down. At this point, it seemed the British might crack.
But the 1/RTR finally arrived, and rumbled towards the sound of the guns, driving the Italian tanks northwest. Bergonzoli was halted. 2nd RTR had destroyed 51 M13s for a loss of 3 tanks and seen men. Other outfits destroyed 33 tanks. 10,000 Italians had surrendered.
Poring over his maps, Bergonzoli decided to try a night attack on the sand dunes west of the Coast Road. No luck. British artillery closed that route.
Both sides, exhausted, flopped down in the gathering desert dusk.
To the north, the Australians enjoyed yet another success, as 6th Division finally entered Benghazi. Lt. W. M. Knox of 2/8 Battalion drove into town to find the population of 50,000 Greeks, Jews, Italians, and Arabs, waving and cheering the Australian column. Knox drove to town hall where the Italian civic rulers awaited him. Knox handed the Italians orders that charged them with maintaining law and order until the rest of the division could arrive. The mayor delivered a speech of welcome, calling the Australians" our brave allies," which baffled the Diggers.
Next morning, at Beda Fomm, Bergonzoli mustered his last 30 tanks for one final dawn assault. With 6th Australian breathing down his neck, Bergonzoli was out of time, space, and ideas.
The attack was based on the courage of desperation, and it hit the 106th RHA's portee-mounted guns. The Italians pressed through, having knocked out all but one of the anti-tank guns. That gun was manned by the battery commander, his batman, and a cook. They destroyed the last Italian tank.
British infantry battered the attacking Italian riflemen, leaving the M13s 20 yards from their objective, but completely unsupported. Tellera himself led a bayonet charge and was mortally wounded. 10th Army was defeated. At 9 a.m., white flags went up over the Italian lines.
O'Connor himself, who had directed the British battle, drove to a farmhouse near Soluch where half a dozen Italian generals in snappy uniforms and polished boots were held prisoner, the elusive "Electric Whiskers" Bergonzoli among them. O'Connor, like Grant at Appomattox, was casually dressed -- corduroy trousers, leather sleeveless jerkin, tartan scarf, and sagging cap.
"I am sorry you are so uncomfortable," said O'Connor."We haven't had much time to make proper arrangements."
"Thank you very much," said Gen. Cona, for his defeated colleagues. "We realize you came here in a great hurry."
O'Connor's aide Dorman-Smith fired off a message to Wavell, "Fox killed in the open."
Around O'Connor was the wreckage of the Italian 10th Army. He surveyed a scene clogged with more than 25,000 PoWs, more than 100 tanks (some of which were serviceable), 216 guns, and 1,500 wheeled vehicles. Under the blue African sky, small gazelles bounded through the scrub.
"I have seldom seen such a scene of wreckage and confusion as existed on the main Benghazi road," wrote O'Connor. "Broken up and overturned lorries; in some places guns, lorries and tanks in hopeless confusion. Elsewhere guns in action and broken down M13s. All over the countryside and everywhere masses of prisoners. Most of the enemy tanks had dead men inside them...Gen. Tellera, the Army Commander, was in one lying seriously wounded. He died later in the day."
The mess was too great for even the Arabs to loot. The wreckage of 10th Army lay strewn around Beda Fomm for years.
O'Connor wasted no time. Within hours, 11th Hussars, on captured fuel, was speeding along the road to El Agheila, where they stopped, ending the "5-day raid" two months after it began.
British Triumph
The campaign was over. It was a complete British triumph, one that would be studied for decades in staff colleges. For a loss of 500 dead, 55 missing, and 1,373 wounded, 30,000 British troops had advanced 500 miles in two months, destroyed an army of 10 divisions (including Mussolini's vaunted Blackshirts), and taken 130,000 PoWs, 400 tanks, and 1,290 guns. The reputation of Mussolini's Fascist Italy had been torn to shreds.
So had Graziani's. He was summarily fired, and replaced by his subordinate, Gen. Gariboldi. Gariboldi dug in to await the inevitable British drive on Tripoli.
It never came. Wavell's eyes were on Greece. O'Connor sent Dorman-Smith to Cairo for permission to advance, but was too late. "I am beginning my spring campaign, Eric," Wavell told Dorman-Smith, while looking at a map of the Balkans.
7th Armoured returned to Egypt to re-fit. 6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand Division shipped out to Greece. The new 2nd Armoured Division was to man the line at El Agheila. The British had given up the initiative in the Libyan desert
This decision, made by Churchill, and backed completely by Wavell, to drain off scarce British strength to hold Greece, was one of the worst of the war. The Axis had lost the Italian 10th Army, and Mussolini what was left of his reputation, but Hitler was about to rewrite the play on Libya's barren stage.
Rommel Arrives
"Dearest Lu. Landed at Staaken 12:45. First to C-in-C of the Army, who appointed me to my new job, and then to the Fuhrer. Things are moving fast. My kit is coming here. I can only take barest necessities with me. Perhaps I'll be able to get the rest out soon. I need not tell you how my head is swimming with all the many things there are to be done. It'll be months before anything materializes. So 'our leave' was cut short again. Don't be sad, it had to be. The new job is very big and important..."
So wrote Maj. Gen. Erwin Rommel of the Germany Army to his wife Lucie on 6 February, the day of the battle of Beda Fomm. The "new job" was to take over an outfit the Germans were shipping to Libya, the Afrika Korps. The shape of the desert war was about to change completely, and a legend was about to be born.

Afrika Korps – An Overview

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The Afrika Korps was an expeditionary combat force of the German army that fought in North Africa from February 1941 until May 1943. Adolf Hitler ordered the establishment of a German expeditionary force in North Africa in January 1941, following Italian defeats in Tobruk and Benghazi, at the request of the Italians, who had refused an early German offer for military assistance. Originally known as Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Libyen (Commander of the German Troops in Libya), from 21 February 1941 the unit was called the Deutsche Afrika-Korps. Hitler formed the Korps for strategic reasons; he had planned a campaign against Greece and feared the loss of the eastern Mediterranean and a severe weakening of his Axis ally. In addition, the occupation of North Africa was a major precondition for German supremacy in the Near and Middle East as envisaged in Hitler’s long-range plans.

The Afrika Korps was led by General Erwin Rommel (1891–1944), a highly decorated World War I hero who served as military commander guarding Hitler’s headquarters from 1938 and as commander of a tank division in 1940. The Afrika Korps itself in early 1941 consisted of the Wehrmacht’s Fifteenth Tank Division and the Fifth Light Tank Division (later the Twenty-first Tank Division). Its forces were highly motorized and equipped with specific uniforms for desert warfare. The overall German-Italian military organization was gradually extended and renamed Panzergruppe Afrika in September 1941, Panzerarmee Afrika in February 1942, Deutschitalienische Panzerkräfte Afrika in October 1942, and finally Heeresgruppe Afrika in January 1943, always under the command of Rommel. The actual Afrika Korps, which was led from August 1941 by other generals, then constituted only a part of these forces. Nevertheless its name is generally used for all of them, until the German forces became part of the First Italian Army in March 1943.

German troops landed in Libya on 8 February 1941. On 31 March 1941 they bombed the Suez Canal and attacked Cyrenaica, which was conquered by mid-April. British forces were weakened by a simultaneous attack by the Wehrmacht in southeastern Europe but regained their strength during the course of 1941. As a consequence of the German attack on the Soviet Union starting in June of 1941, the Afrika Korps was not reinforced during 1941, so it was not able to defend all of the gains it had made in the spring of 1941. In November Rommel had to retreat to the earlier front line.

After German naval successes and the transfer of German Airforce Fleet 2 [Luftflotte 2] from the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean, Rommel on 21 January 1942 surprisingly again took the initiative and attacked British troops, and the Afrika Korps occupied Benghazi. But the advance was stopped because the Italian army had not been informed and did not participate in the offensive.

Supplied with information from broken U.S. diplomatic codes, Rommel was able to continue his offensive on 26 May. On 21 June 1942 his troops conquered the Tobruk area, where a decisive line for British logistics was cut. The Wehrmacht was able to capture twenty-eight thousand enemy soldiers and major supply stocks of the British army. Immediately thereafter the Afrika Korps entered northwestern Egypt as far as the village of El Alamein, almost one hundred kilometers west of Alexandria, where it was halted at the end of June by fierce British resistance. Rommel’s next attack in the battle of Alam al-Halfa at the beginning of September failed. Since Hitler did not order the occupation of Malta as the Italians had suggested, the British Eighth Army was able to obtain excellent supplies, including new U.S. tanks, through the Royal Navy.

Rommel’s new British counterpart General Bernard Law Montgomery, who could rely on airpower supremacy and excellent intelligence information, launched a counterattack on 23 October 1942 and overran the German positions on 2 November in a major tank battle at El Alamein. Thirty thousand Axis soldiers were captured. Meanwhile on 7–8 November in Operation Torch, the Allies landed to the rear of German troops in Morocco and Algeria. This took the German and Italian military totally by surprise. The German troops were quickly reinforced by 150,000 men but had to retreat from Libya, which was lost to the Germans at the end of January 1943, and into Tunisia. Rommel on 9 March was replaced by Colonel General Hans-Jūrgen von Arnim. Since Hitler forbade any evacuation of troops, the Heeresgruppe Afrika surrendered with 275,000 men, among them the soldiers of the Afrika Korps, on 11 May 1943.

Hitler considered the North African theater of war a sideshow until November 1942, despite its strategic value, especially for Britain and the Royal Navy. Nevertheless considerable German forces were drawn from the European continent, especially after October 1942. German defeats occurred simultaneously in Stalingrad and North Africa.

The Afrika Korps has gained a major place in German and British memories of the war, especially due to the fact that in North Africa modern armies fought in a rather unusual environment. Already during the war Rommel was considered a brilliant operational performer, called the Desert Fox by his soldiers, among whom he was very popular; he was also admired to a certain extent by the British. His successes predominantly relied on his capability to surprise the enemy and on excellent logistical support. In June 1942 he was promoted to field marshal, the highest rank in the German army. The Afrika Korps was less implicated in German war crimes than units in other areas, although it took some responsibility for the internment and forced labor of Tunisian Jews. Rommel’s suicide on 14 October 1944, after the failure of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler, further bolstered his image as a military professional with a clean record.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Baxter, Colin F. The War in North Africa: 1940–1943: A Selected Bibliography. Westport, Conn., 1996. Boog, Horst, et al. The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative, 1941–1943. Translated by Ewald Osers. Vol. 6 of Germany and the Second World War. Oxford, U.K., 2001. Mitcham, Samuel W. Rommel’s Desert War: The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps. New York, 1982. Porch, Douglas. The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II. New York, 2004. Schreiber, Gerhard, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel. The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy’s Declaration of Nonbelligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. Translated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers, and Louise Willmot. Vol. 3 of Germany and the Second World War. Oxford, U.K., 1995.

Rats with Compass

2011-05-05T05:06:00.002+08:00

HMS YORK and British armour newly unloaded at Port Alexander, Egypt 1940.

Fighting began with a desultory and ill-prepared Italian advance into Egypt from Tripoli that ended in disaster for Italy. The British struck back in Operation COMPASS starting on December 8, 1940. The British counteroffensive saw a breakthrough assault by the Western Desert Force at Sidi Barrani, 60 miles inside the Egyptian border. In the first week of January 1941, Major General Richard O’Connor sent freshly arrived Australians into their first offensive action in the desert at Bardia . More sharp fighting and additional Italian defeats followed at Tobruk and Beda Fomm in February. O’Connor hoped to press the attack to Benghazi, but was held back by shortages of supplies and men as he reached the end of a stretched logistical tether—pulled even thinner because Britain simultaneously mounted another assault on the Italian empire in East Africa. The Western Desert Force thus halted at El Agheila. It had lost just over 1,700 total casualties while inflicting over 130,000 Italian casualties, killed or wounded or taken prisoner. The cumulative effect of COMPASS was destruction of Italian 10th Army and large stocks of Regio Esercito war matériel. The Western Desert Force also advanced nearly 500 miles, the first of several lateral movements across the top of Africa that would become a singular mark of the desert campaign. At the time, it remained to be learned by both sides that desert advances might be just as quickly turned into comparable or even worse reverses.

Desert Rats
The nickname Desert Rats was applied to at least three British army organizations that were instrumental in the North African Campaigns against the Italians and Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. The name derives from the jerboa, a nocturnal rodent native to North Africa, which hops like a kangaroo.

The 4th Armoured Brigade, which was formed in Egypt in 1938, before the outbreak of war but after the Munich Conference and Agreement, has traditionally claimed to be the first British unit to have adopted the sobriquet Desert Rats. However, the 7th Armoured Division appropriated the name and preceded the 4th Armoured Brigade back to England in preparation for the Normandy landings (D-day). The 4th Armoured Brigade left North Africa and participated in the fighting in Italy before returning to England prior to the D-day invasion. When the 4th reached England, it discovered that the 7th was not only calling itself the Desert Rats, but had created a divisional badge featuring an image of a jerboa. Thus spurred, the 4th Armoured Brigade created its own jerboa badge. Finally, the nickname the Desert Rats was also often applied generally to the entire Eighth British Army to honor its combat success against the Axis forces in North Africa.

Buq Buq 1940

2011-05-05T05:05:00.002+08:00

The camps at Sofafi and Rabia had managed to evacuate despite the presence of 7th Armoured Brigade. They were sent off in pursuit of those Italians who had retreated to Buq Buq but found it empty. Elements of the 3rd (King's Own) Hussars passed Buq Buq and fell into an area dominated by salt pans and sand dunes and missed the presence of Italian artillery. In trying to avoid the artillery fire they became bogged down and easy targets. Elements of the 8th Hussars and Royal Artillery maneuvered to the flank and the Italians quickly surrendered.

Bogged British tank Mk.IV

Buq Buq is something of a mystery. Italian artillery positioned on a ridge massacred a whole lot of British light tanks getting stuck in a quagmire, only to surrender to one cruiser tank that almost miraculously made it through the guns' line. The least one can say is that something was seriously wrong with the Italian leadership in that encounter. Like on many other occasions during Compass.

Mechili was a helter-skelter draw, in which the Italians suffered proportionally more heavily in that the medium tanks were drawn to an anti-tank trap (just like they had done on August 5th, 1940: experience hadn't taught much) and lost several mediums vs. a number of British Mk.VIs and reportedly only one cruiser. Then the British packed up and withdrew, as they tended to do when challenged resolutely across open ground.

British equipment was, maybe better but not exceptional. M.VI light tanks and A9's were as vulnerable as the L3 tanketes even they were better armed. A13's and A10 where better protected but in no case invulnerable against Italian AT fire or artillery fire. Buq Buq was an example of this.

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64th Catanzaro Truckborne Infantry Division
64a Divisione autotrasportabile "Catanzaro" tipo A.S.
The service history of the 64th Catanzaro Division was ill-starred throughout its brief existence. The 64th Catanzaro Division was formed in late May/early June 1940 in Cyrenaica. To form this new division, the 203rd Artillery Regiment and certain other the support and service troops of the disbanded 3rd CC.NN. Division "21 Aprile" were utilized. The majority of the troops however were newly raised and the division's two infantry regiments (141st, 142nd) were completely green. It should have taken six months to work this division up to level acceptable for a combat formation, but it was not to get it.
On formation, the division was composed of the following elements:
141st Infantry Regiment
142nd Infantry Regiment
203rd Artillery Regiment
64th Machinegun Battalion
64th Mixed Engineer Battalion
64th Antitank Company
After only two months of training, the Catanzaro Division was activated for war service even though it was rated as being not capable of combat operations. In the "great invasion" of Egypt in September 1940, the Catanzaro was placed in reserve at Tobruk. Only after Italian forces had consolidated their positions in the Sidi al-Barrani area was the inestimable Catanzaro Division brought forward. On October 5th 1940, the Catanzaro Division, supposedly a semi-motorized formation, had 105 trucks on strength of which only 39 were working. The 63rd Cirene Division on the same day had 274 trucks on strength of which 192 were working. The situation in terms of weapons and other equipment was similar if not so bad. In true awareness of the unique qualities of this division, the Italian command chose not to deploy any units to reinforce the Catanzaro Division in its positions southeast of Buq Buq in the region of Alam Samalus. It was in these positions, the Catanzaro Division found itself at the start of Operation Compass. Fortunately for the men of the Catanzaro Division, the initial British attack did not fall upon them as had been the case in the original draft of the British operational plan.

After the destruction of the Italian forces in the military camps in and around Sidi al-Barrani, the remaining Italian forces in Egypt were ordered to withdraw back into Libya. While the Cirene Division (deployed to the south of the Catanzaro Division in the Sofafi area) was able to side slip the advancing Commonwealth forces using its greater mobility, the slow moving 64th Catanzaro Division was confronted by the 7th Armoured Brigade (plus some troops from the support group) as it began its retreat. The British 7th Armoured Brigade caught the Catanzaro a few miles west of Buq Buq. The divisional artillery engaged the tanks, either in a desultory manner or to some effect depending upon the sources you read. When the tanks closed, the mass of the division quickly surrendered showing its ill trained men (and bad officers) had no desire to fight. The lead elements of the retreating columns of the division managed to escape the collapse, and passed into the fortress of Bardia. These remnants showed they were of like mind of their former comrades, and played no role, that I know of, during the battle for Bardia. When the last troops in the fortress surrendered on January 6th 1941, the sorry history of the 64th Catanzaro Truckborne Infantry Division finally ended. There were no plans ever conceived to reform this miserable division.

NORTHWEST AFRICAN PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE WING (NWAPRW).

2011-05-05T05:04:00.002+08:00

Created in September 1942 from the U.S. Army Air Force’s 3rd Photo Group, South African Air Force, and the Royal Air Force, the NWAPRW was commanded by Colonel Elliott Roosevelt and undertook missions in anticipation of Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa.

To support the campaign, the Eighth Air Force transferred several reconnaissance units from England to the operation; while others arrived directly from the United States. The 12th Air Force supported the Center Task Force assault on Oran supported by the 3d Photo Reconnaissance Group, hereafter referred to as 3d Group. The XII Ground Air-Support Command, later the XII Air Support Command (ASC), supported the Western Task Force landings at Casablanca. The XII ASC contained the 68th Observation Group with the 16th, 111th, 122d, and 154th Observation Squadrons. None of these units directly supported the landings, and at least some 68th elements went ashore on D-day.

It took time for the various units to consolidate their equipment and personnel. As late as 26 November 1942, neither the 12th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron nor the 68th Observation Group had its aircraft. Eventually the observation units united at Oujda, Algeria, with their P-39s and A-20s. From there the 16th and 122d spent the next three months conducting anti-submarine patrols, and thus provided nothing to ground force units. The 111th helped defend Oran so that only the 154th supported ground combat operations. Meanwhile, the 3d Group sent its squadrons overseas in parts to prevent the group‘s destruction if the Germans sank one or two ships. Given this staggered movement plan, Lieutenant Robert Boyle selected the older men in his unit to deploy first to have the greatest possible experience available. The group‘s personnel and equipment arrived in phases at different locations and started only limited operations in late November. Compounding this problem, the reconnaissance units lacked organic transportation to move and regroup. Ultimately, the unit reformed at Algiers, Algeria, in late December where it remained until Tunisia fell. Over its first few months of operations, 3d Group faced a number of organizational changes.

In October 1942, before the 3d Group even reached North Africa, its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Elliot Roosevelt, reorganized to accommodate personnel shortfalls. He centralized laboratory and interpretation resources to meet the anticipated photo requests and overcame the personnel shortage by effectively disbanding the squadrons, except for accountability purposes, because of their inability to operate independently. All personnel worked for the group in one of five sections, Mission Planning, Field Operations, Photographic, Photo Mapping, and Administration. This organization remained in place for the entire North African campaign partly because the group had at least ninety empty positions until late summer 1943.

The second major modification mirrored the merger of the 12th Air Force and British RAF Eastern Air Command into the Northwest African Air Force (NAAF). This marriage brought together the 3d Group and the No. 4 Photo Reconnaissance Unit into the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (NAPRW) on 18 February 1943 under Colonel Roosevelt with Wing Commander Eric Fuller, RAF, as his deputy. This reorganization aimed to correct reporting inaccuracies and to reduce duplication problems through greater coordination of taskings. This truly became a coalition operation, with one French group, and one RAF, one South African, and four U.S. squadrons by September 1943. Since no provision had been made for the NAPRW, personnel came from the 3d Group until April 1943 when personnel from other units became available. Only in October 1943 did the wing ‘assume its full functions.’ Until that time, the wing handled policy, but pushed many responsibilities to the group.

In contrast to the idea of centralization, a third organizational change started in January 1943 with self-contained detachments to work for supported air and ground units ‘for more immediate demand-control and to expedite delivery of first phase interpretation reports.’ These advance units served in addition to the wing and group headquarters at Algiers, and contained a flight of four to six aircraft, a first phase interpretation section, and a laboratory. The first detachment supported the strategic air force headquarters at Telergma, Algeria, but based on its success, a second forward unit stood up in March at Souk El Khemis, Algeria, with the British First Army, another on Malta with the RAF, and a fourth at Oujda, Algeria. The 3d Group selected the most experienced men for this duty and rotated them through on a periodic basis. This technique provided a good first impression representing the unit, improved support to combat units, and helped the interpreters better understand what supported units needed.

LINK

BATTLEAXE (JUNE 1941)

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HALFAYA PASS Or “hellfire pass.” A narrow pass through a high escarpment on the border of Egypt and Tripoli. It repeatedly changed hands during the desert campaigns in 1940–1942.

A British armored offensive during the desert campaign that began on June 15, 1941. It failed because General Erwin Rommel set a tank trap in the Halfaya Pass south of Bardia, site of an earlier fight between the Australians and Italians. Novel tank tactics by the Afrika Korps blunted a British armored assault by drawing the latter’s tanks onto a firing line of ’88 mm anti-tank guns. As British armor was severely mauled (91 tanks were lost to just 12 Panzers), German armor was freed to counterattack British and Commonwealth infantry. The stinging defeat led Winston Churchill, who had pressed hard for aggressive action in the desert, to sack General Archibald Wavell. He was replaced as commander in chief Middle East by General Claude Auchinleck.

CRUSADER (NOVEMBER 1941)

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A British offensive operation assayed in November 1942, during the desert campaigns (1940–1943). British 8th Army pressed a real advantage in numbers of tanks against the Afrika Korps and Italians, for once taking General Erwin Rommel by surprise. But British armored doctrine, officers, and training had not mastered combined-arms operations, and the advantage was wasted in sequential brigade-sized tank assaults that were often unsupported even by infantry. The Germans also made mistakes, such as a wasteful counterattack without proper intelligence or air cover. The British offensive failed, possibly along with the command nerve of General Alan Cunningham . The main failure came in the face of heavy casualties inflicted by enemy resistance along the Sidi Rezegh ridge. Hesitation in continuing the advance led to Cunningham’s dismissal and replacement by General Claude Auchinleck, who resumed the attack on November 26. The New Zealand 2nd Division retook the ridge line in a bloody fight, but was assaulted and thrown off the ridge on December 1 by a German counterattack. That rebuff cut the corridor to the besieged British garrison of Tobruk. British and Commonwealth forces suffered nearly 18,000 casualties in CRUSADER while inflicting over 24,000 on the Germans and Italians. Even so, Rommel had again unnerved an offensive by a much larger British 8th Army.

SIEGE OF TOBRUK - 1941
Australian defenders of the coastal fortress city of Tobruk withstood a German siege in 1941, after General Erwin Rommel ’s successful desert campaign isolated the enclave. Fearing to leave an enemy force in his strategic rear as he advanced toward Egypt, Rommel twice attacked the Australian garrison. The Australians held, then counterattacked and captured two battalions of Italians. Two British and Commonwealth attempts to break the siege failed. With war approaching Australia’s shores, Australian troops were mostly pulled out and replaced by British and Polish troops. Rommel was preparing to strike at Tobruk a third time in the fall of 1941 when the British offensive CRUSADER interrupted his plans. The Tobruk garrison fought its way out and linked with British 8th Army.

Rats of Tobruk mark 70th anniversary

Schwerer Zugkraftwagen 18-ton Sd.Kfz.9

2011-04-19T22:20:00.000+08:00

This series, developed and produced by Famo (Fahrzeug und Motorenbau GmbH) of Breslau, was the largest of the German semi-tracks to enter service. Production began during 1938 and ended in 1944 after the construction of some 2,500.

The 18-ton semi-track was designed primarily as a heavy tank-recovery vehicle and as a prime mover for 24-ton trailers or 21 cm howitzers. It could also be used as a troop-carrier for up to thirty men. One of its principal tractor roles was the towing of the huge 24cm K3 gun.

The most commonly encountered type was the standard recovery version (called the 'Bull '), which normally had a short canvas hood fitted over the crew compartment-although a longer hood was sometimes employed. The vehicle had an open body with pressed-metal sides, a tail board, a wooden floor, and two rows of seats. A 40-ton winch was fitted. A tool compartment was located beneath the driver's seat and there were two others immediately behind it, accessible through doors at each side of the vehicle. The centre section was in the form of an open box, and it held pulleys, chains and spare cables. The remainder of the body provided stowage space. It was designated Panzerbergegerat 18t.

There was also a bridging vehicle, capable of carrying fifteen men, which towed an equipment trailer; and there were two recovery versions fitted with cranes. The first crane version was the Sd.Kfz.9/ 1, which had a flat deck with a 6-ton crane that could rotate through 180’. The crane was manufactured by Bilstein of Altenvōrde. The crew had folding seats behind the driver's compartment and a large toolbox was attached at the rear. An order for conversion of these vehicles was issued during April 1940.

The second version, with a 10-ton electric crane, was designated Sd.Kfz.9/2. This vehicle weighed 27 tons and was intended for lifting tanks. In the travelling position, the telescopic sections of the jib were stowed and protected by canvas covers against damage. A counterweight was provided to compensate for heavy loads, and levelling jacks were normally carried in a trailer with other equipment. These were, when in use, located in special square sections. The operator was seated at the base of the jib and controlled the crane by means of hand and foot levers. About forty of these vehicles were built and mainly used on the Eastern Front. With the occupation of France, the firm of Dietrich Lorraine, at Luneville, undertook manufacture of the 18-ton half-track. Panhard-Leassor also received orders to manufacture this vehicle and had actually received one manufactured by Borvag of Brennan from the Germans to use as a prototype. The original order was placed with Panhard in March 1942, but no complete vehicles had in fact been delivered up to VE day.

Chronological development was as follows:
1936 FM gr 1 was the first model built by Famo and it served as the pre-production model for the series. It was powered by a Maybach HL98 TUK V-12 230hp engine, had ZF constant-mesh transmission, mechanical (self-servo) steering brakes and pneumatic road brakes. The front wheels were sprung by leaf springs and the tracked section (which had six wheels per side) by torsion-bars.
1938 Famo F2 was a further prototype in the series, automotively identical to the previous model.
1939 Famo F3 was the first production model, designated Schwerer Zugkraftwagen 18t Sd.Kfz.9. It was powered by a Maybach HL108 TUKRM V-12 engine developing 250hp, and provided with a new clutch. Otherwise, it was automotively similar to the previous model. It remained in production until 1943.

1939 Famo F4 was the projected design as further proposed development of the 18-ton vehicle. It was to have had the new Maybach HL116 6-cylinder engine developing 260 hp. Otherwise it was to have beer similar to the previous model.

Production of the Sd.Kfz.9 was as follows:
1940 - 240
1941 - 240
1942 - 384
1943 - 643
1944 - 834

Vichy French Forces in North Africa

2011-04-19T22:19:00.002+08:00

Rearming the French by Marcel Vigneras, a book in the series U.S. Army in World War Two is a good source for this information.

French forces in North Africa.
There were 55,000 of them in Morocco, 50,000 in Algeria, 15,000 in Tunisia. Most are native infantry units with French officers, leavened with Foreign Legion regiments, Chasseurs d'Afrique, and colorful Zouaves. These forces, left out of the 1940 defeat, are veteran troops, at home in North Africa, experienced at desert war. Veteran outfits like the Foreign Legion are the stuff of legends. Even so, their rifles and equipment are obsolescent. They will have to rely on discipline to make up for technical deficiencies.

They are backed up by 12 units of motorized field artillery, and about 270 tanks in Morocco and Algeria, mostly Hotchkiss H35s and Somua S35s, armed with 37/47 mm guns. In 1940, these were among the best tanks in Europe. But they are outclassed by the British and American Sherman.

The French deploy about 500 planes, including a few Dewoitine 520s, which are outstanding fighters, able to take on the German Me 109. The rest are a mix of elderly MS 406s and Curtiss Hawks.

The French Navy.
France's most powerful battleship, Richelieu, is at Dakar. Her sister ship, Jean Bart, uncompleted, has been towed to Casablanca to avoid German or British seizure. She cannot move, but her 15-inch guns are operating. The other French ships in North Africa are light cruisers and destroyers. The main fleet included the modern battlecruisers Strasbourg and Dunkerque.

The Germans allowed such a large force to prevent the Vichy colonies from falling easily to the Allies. They were better equipped than the Vichy forces in the Vichy Zone of metropolitan France.

Vichy itself regarded its North African forces, (which were organised, into one Tunisian, three Algerian and three Moroccan divisions), as the strategic reserve with which it was going to join the Allies in liberating France. This is exactly what they were later used for, but in the name of the Free French. In fact, they formed the vast majority of Free French front line divisions over 1943-45.

Luftwaffe in Northern Afrika

2011-03-30T15:46:00.000+08:00

The fast-moving ebb and flow of the war in the desert, with huge advances and retreats, ironically became known as the Benghazi Handicap! In fact, the changing fortunes of each side can to a fair degree be linked with the situation on Malta.

Luftwaffe units were first deployed to North Africa in January 1941. Compared to other theatres, the bombers and Stukas played a relatively minor role. One reason was the paucity of fixed targets. For example, given the flat and generally firm terrain, airfields could be set up almost anywhere, which meant that there was little point in bombing runways. Another was the numerically small force involved, which was spread over hundreds of miles of desert. The harsh climate reduced serviceability, while fuel, spares and ordnance shortages often limited the number of sorties that could be flown.

The port of Alexandria and the Suez Canal were just within reach for much of the time, but the raids that could be mounted against these were mere pinpricks. As was so often the case, the lack of a true long-range bomber handicapped the Luftwaffe, and the damage caused was hardly worth the effort and the losses. Future Ritterkreuz and Eichenlaub winner Georg Sattler of LG 1 had a lucky escape on one of these raids in June 1942. His aircraft was attacked by a night fighter and an engine was set on fire. He was forced to ditch off Tobruk. Fortunately for him the latter was then in German hands, and he managed to swim ashore.

One interesting long-range raid was, however, mounted. On 21 January 1942 a Heinkel fitted with long-range tanks set out for a French base on Lake Chad used as a trans-Africa staging post by the Allies. This was a round trip of nearly 2,500 miles, and consequently the bomb load was minuscule. Almost inevitably the aircraft ran out of fuel on the return leg and landed in the desert. So remote was the spot that it was a week before a reconnaissance aircraft found it. A Ju 52 flew out with fuel and the Heinkel, piloted by Theo Blaich, returned safely to base.

Occupied by the Free French under General Koenig, this was the southernmost of a line of fortified positions linked by minefields. On 3 June 1942 Walter Sigel's StG 3 commenced the air bombardment. Little damage was done: most bombs buried themselves in the soft sand, which smothered their explosions. British fighters joined the fray, and StG 3 lost fourteen aircraft in seven days. In all, more than 1,000 sorties were flown against Bir Hacheim, but even this was not enough. Two Gruppen of LG 1 were ordered to assist. The next attack failed because smoke and dust obscured visibility, but finally, with Rommel's troops closing in, the fortress fell. The myth of Stuka invincibility had crumbled a little more.

Under desert conditions the Jabo was rather more useful. Spraying an area of desert with cannon and machine-gun fire was potentially far more effective against diffuse targets such as deployed infantry than dropping bombs on them, although bombs were routinely carried. Another advantage was that they could attack at high speed and low level, which improved the chances not only of surprise but also of survivability. Fast, low-flying aircraft were difficult to see from above by fighters, while they presented fleeting targets to anti-aircraft gunners.

Two Jabostaffeln were quickly on the scene in 1942, one each from JG 53 and JG 27 and both with Bf 109s. Their primary targets were Allied airfields. Also available in this role were the Bf 110s of III/ZG 26 and the 'solid nose' Ju 88C heavy fighters of 12/LG 1.

In October the two Bf 109 Staffeln and aircraft of a third unit combined in Sicily to form a Schlachtgruppe—I/SG 1, equipped with the FW 190. This latter was a far more robust aircraft than the Bf 109 and better suited to the attack mission. I/SG I went to North Africa in November. Meanwhile III/ZG 1 started to re-equip with the Bf 210. A tricky aircraft to handle, the 210 was not a success and served with only a handful of units.

The only other new type to see service in North Africa was the Henschel Hs 129. Designed exclusively for the close air support mission, this aircraft had a heavily armoured cockpit with a pathetic view 'out of the window'. It was underpowered, not very manoeuvrable, and unreliable. The type served with a modest amount of success on the Eastern Front, but in North Africa it served only with 4 and 8(Panzer)/SG 2 and achieved little, mainly because of unserviceability.

Following the Battle of El Alamein, and Operation 'Torch', the Allied landing in Algeria, the North African campaign inexorably drew to a close. The Luftwaffe strike forces were very heavily outnumbered in the air, and most were withdrawn in spring 1943.

First Army (United Kingdom)

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The First Army was also part of the British Army during the Second World War. It was formed to command the British and American land forces which had landed as part of Operation Torch in Morocco and Algeria on 8 November 1942 and it was commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth Anderson. First Army headquarters was formally activated on 9 November 1942 when Anderson arrived in Algiers to assume command of the redesignated Eastern Task Force.

It initially consisted of British and American forces only. After the surrender of French forces following the German abrogation of their armistice agreement with Vichy France, French units were also added to its order of battle. It eventually consisted of four corps, the U.S. II Corps, the British V Corps, British IX Corps and French XIX Corps.

After the landings, Anderson's forces rushed east in a bid to capture Tunis and Bizerte before German forces could reach there in large numbers. They failed. After that failure, a period of consolidation was forced upon them. The logistics support for the Army was greatly improved and airfields for its supporting aircraft greatly multiplied. By the time the British Eighth Army approached the Tunisian border from the east, following its long pursuit of Erwin Rommel's forces after El Alamein, 1st Army was again ready to strike.

Supported by elements of XII Tactical Air Command and No. 242 Group RAF, First Army carried the main weight of 18th Army Group's offensive to conclude the Tunisia Campaign and finish off Axis forces in North Africa. The victory was won in May 1943 in a surrender that, in numbers captured at least, equalled Stalingrad. Shortly after the surrender, First Army disbanded, having served its purpose.