Capturing Tobruk, 21–22 January 1941

Soldiers fighting with Australia’s 6th Division dealt a huge blow to the German/Italian strategy for controlling North Africa when they caught the Italian garrison by surprise and captured Tobruk.

After Major John Copland led a successful attack on an Italian post defending Tobruk, helping his men to enter the town where Allied forces took thousands of Italian prisoners, his comrades from the 2/4th Battalion captured the municipal flag of Tobruk, holding it up as a trophy outside the town hall. AWM

The Italians had been at war with the British and Commonwealth forces in North Africa since June 1940. Italian forces in Libya, an Italian colony since 1912, had started what would become known as the Desert War by attacking British troops stationed in Egypt in the latter half of 1941. Benito Mussolini, also known as Il Duce, the fascist dictator of Italy, wanted to push east from Libya through Egypt, which for years had been home to a small contingent of British troops, and take control of the strategically important Suez Canal.

After a series of skirmishes around the Libyan border, Mussolini ordered a large and concentrated offensive into Egypt on 8 August. Though initially successful, the Italian offensive was opposed by British and Commonwealth forces in Operation Compass, a large-scale counterattack designed to push the Italian army out of Egypt and then Libya itself, on 9 December. The operation was immediately successful: by 10 December more than 20,000 Italians had been taken prisoner.

Advancing west along the North African coast from Egypt to Libya, Australian men of the 6th Division soon found themselves on the outskirts of Tobruk, an important Libyan port town with a natural, deep and protected harbour, perfect for resupply and reinforcement. This was the sole major harbour on that part of the North African coast, and along with it came jetties, great depth close to shore and one of the few reliable sources of fresh water for nearly 1300 kilometres. Controlling the harbour would be of great benefit to any army waging a war in the North African theatre.

Manned by a strong force of Italian soldiers under the command of General Manella, Tobruk had become a fortress for the Italians. Designated as the defensive nerve-centre of their Libyan colony, it provided a good shelter for battleships and submarines and allowed the Italians to be reinforced and resupplied when necessary. It was the perfect base from which to wage war in the desert.

Over the previous three decades the Italians had poured huge amounts of energy and resources into constructing strong defences on the outskirts of the town, including an anti-tank ditch, endless lines of barbed wire, booby traps and fortifications from which men could sweep the desert with their machine guns.

Rolling steadily west through Libya, the Australian 6th Division, led by Major General Iven Mackay, soon found themselves approaching the perimeter of Tobruk. It was January 1941, and the men of the 6th Division were charged with penetrating the perimeter, charging into Tobruk and occupying the town and its harbour.

The first to move in was a small group from the 2/1st Field Company. Just after midnight on 21 January 1941, these men set off to crawl along the desert floor, their faces blackened with paint, to find and ‘de-louse’ the area of the mines and booby traps scattered around the Italian defensive line. In silence, the sappers stealthily got on with their all-important work.

The rest of the 6th Division waited behind the lines for the attack, showing typical Australian calm. After watching the Australians prepare for the attack, Chester Wilmot, the Melbourne-born ABC journalist, later reported to his listeners that the men ‘might have been more worked up before a football grand final’.

At 5.40 a.m. the Allied artillery barrage began. As Wilmot later described it, ‘great clouds of dust like huge waterspouts marked each explosion and in the still morning air these took some time to drift away, so that for a few minutes they looked like silver poplars’. This ‘arty’, as the Australians called it, would provide cover for the sappers still out in the open and smash the Italian barbed wire, clearing a path for the Australian infantry.

The barrage ceased at 6.05 a.m. and, as the smoke cleared, the assembled Australians began to make out the gaps in the defensive wire. Suddenly a voice rang out from behind: ‘Go on, you bastards!’ And they did. Yelling as they charged, the Australians stormed towards Tobruk.

Stunned by the artillery barrage and terrified by these rampaging Australians, Italian soldiers appeared from holes all over the desert waving white handkerchiefs and crying ‘Ci rendiamo! Ci rendiamo!’ Radio announcers in Rome had for days been predicting that Australian ‘barbarians’ were about to be ‘turned loose’ by the British at Tobruk. These barbarians had indeed been turned loose, and the Italians wanted no part of it.

Those posts that did offer any resistance were quickly silenced, though many brave young Australians were cut down by Italian machine-gun fire and tank blasts. One soldier, Sergeant Burgess of the 2/8th Battalion, ran towards an Italian tank holding up the Allied advance and, trying to heave up the lid to drop in a grenade, was hit by a spray of machine-gun fire. As one of his mates wrote in his diary, ‘his last effort before he died was to struggle to put the pin back and throw the grenade clear of his comrades’.

It was during this advance that Copland captured the tearful Manella. Even with Manella’s surrender, however, pockets of resistance remained, and spasmodic fighting continued during the day and night. Although Manella had surrendered himself, he had refused to order the surrender of the rest of the Italian force guarding Tobruk.

It was the capture of yet another Italian commander the next day that saw the Allies finally take control. On 22 January a group of surrendering Italians approached two men of the 2/4th Battalion, Lieutenant Hennessy and Sergeant Mills, who were both in the advance guard of a party heading into the old Libyan town. Asking their captors to follow them, the Italians led Hennessy and Mills to Admiral Massimiliano Vietina, the commander of the naval garrison.

When it was offered first to him in surrender, Hennessy did not accept Vietina’s sword. He thought it more proper that his CO, Brigadier Horace Robertson, take it. The men would wait for Robertson.

The rest of the 6th Division didn’t really care for such formalities. As far as they were concerned, the supplies left in the deserted town by nearly 25,000 Italians were more important. Among the spoils were Italian cheese, red wine and fresh water, not to mention silk shirts, blue cavalry cloaks and elaborate leather toilet sets.

While Hennessy, Mills and Vietina waited for Robertson to arrive and formally accept the Italian surrender, one Australian did, however, take it upon himself to perform a symbolic act to mark the Australian triumph.

Climbing up a flagpole just off the main street of the old Italian fortress, he hoisted and ran his slouch hat from the mast. The Australians were in Tobruk.

The Luftwaffe Retreats

With their supplies reaching North Africa in steadily increasing quantities thanks to much improved air and naval protection of convoys, the British forces rallied under Montgomery, who moved against Rommel only when the 8th Army was strong enough for a decisive offensive. When the battle of El Alamein began on 23 October, the Germans reeled under the combined onslaught of artillery fire, tanks and co-ordinated air support, and soon fell back. By the end of the month, the Afrika Korps was clearly on the defensive as German air support had been seriously weakened. Fighters from the Stab, II. and III./JG 27, III./JG 53 and the Jabos of I./Sch.G 2, nevertheless contributing to the land battle as much as they were able. I./JG 27 returned to the fray on the 27th flying in from Sicily with I./JG 77, whereupon the battle-weary III./JG 53 pulled back across the Mediterranean.

Plans now called for JG 27 to be entirely replaced by JG 77, and III.Gruppe duly arrived from the Eastern Front, to be followed by the Geschwaderstab under the command of the redoubtable Major Joachim Müncheberg. Since his earlier successes almost 18 months before, Müncheberg's score had risen to over 100, and his pilots were generally in excellent spirits after a successful period in Russia.

That the North Africa theatre was both unpredictable and now far more dangerous than the Eastern Front was quickly shown to III./JG 77 when on 29 October, just a day after their arrival in-theatre, Staffelkapitan Hptm Wolf-Dietrich Huy (a 40-victory experte) succumbed following a fierce dogfight with a formation of Spitfires - he was duly made a PoW. Also lost to the strength of I./JG 27 at the same time was another North African veteran, Staffelkapitan Hptm Ludwig Franzisket being shot down and suffering a badly broken leg in the ensuing crash. He had scored 37 kills in the desert up to this point.

November saw the Germans still retreating in the face of the Allied offensive, and so serious had the situation become that Rommel prepared to abandon Egypt altogether and withdraw into Cyrenacia. The Jagdwaffe also began to move back, briefly occupying familiar airfields en route - Sidi Barrani, Menastir and Gambut. With each hasty departure westwards, more and more fighters that could not be evacuated due to unserviceablity were left behind. II./JG 27, reduced to only three serviceable Bf 109G- 2s during the hurried retreat, was re-equipped with new Bf 109G-6s at Gambut, and was ready for operations again by 6 November.

A week or so later, the Geschwader was ordered out of North Africa, thus bringing to a close the most momentous period in its entire history. Not all personnel returned with the Stab and I.Gruppe to Germany, however, II. and III.Gruppen dispersing to Crete and Greece respectively.

JG 77, which had absorbed all of JG 27's remaining Bf 109s, followed the retreating armies. The Germans had, meanwhile, received news of the Allied Torch landings in French North Africa, which brought with it the potentially grim portent that eventually the Afrika Korps could be sandwiched between two advancing armies. By December further re-equipment of the Luftwaffe had taken place in the form of Hptm Anton Mader's II./JG 77 from Russia. This move enabled the almost decimated II./JG 27 to evacuate to Italy, which was one of the more popular decisions made by the high command from the Geschwaders viewpoint after having endured weeks of retreating!

The Afrika Korps: Beaten and Running

The Pursuers

A dangerous retreat for the Panzerarmee Afrika.

Once more Panzergruppe Afrika recovered, this time getting ready for the unavoidable enemy offensive which, as everybody knew, would be launched with overwhelming resources. On 20 October 1942 Panzergruppe Afrika combat units' rations strength was 48,854, with the following breakdown: 15.Panzer Division 9,368, 21.Panzer Division 9,517, 90.leichte Afrika Division 6,269, 164.leichte Afrika Division 9,623, 19.Flak Division der Luftwaffe 6,302, Luftwaffe Jäger Brigade 1 (formerly the Ramcke Brigade) 4,706, Höhere Artillerie Kommandeur Afrika 3,069. Actual infantry combat strength was 12,147, mostly with 164.Division (5,076) and the Luftwaffe Jäger Brigade (2,380). Panzergrenadier Regiment 104's combat strength was 1,792, while Panzergrenadier Regiment 115's was 1,393. Tank strength included 12 PzKpfw II, 38 PzKpfw III, 43 PzKpfw III Sp, two PzKpfw IV and 15 PzKpfw IV Sp with Panzer Regiment 8, plus another 18 PzKpfw II, 43 PzKpfw III, 43 PzKpfw III Sp, six PzKpfw IV and 15 PzKpfw IV Sp with Panzer Regiment 5.

The British offensive at EI Alamein started on 23 October, and the battle eventually ended on 4 November 1942 with Rommel's decision to withdraw, which marked the first, real defeat of the DAK. By 26 October Panzer Regiment 8's tank strength was down to eight PzKpfw II, 16 PzKpfw III, 16 PzKpfw III Sp, one PzKpfw IV and six PzKpfw IV Sp. It decreased steadily until the end of October (on the 30th it was six PzKpfw II, 11 PzKpfw III, 15 PzKpfw III Sp, one PzKpfw IV and four PzKpfw IV Sp), until Operation Supercharge was launched. On 4 November Panzer Regiment 8's tank strength was three PzKpfw III, one PzKpfw III Sp, one PzKpfw IV and one PzKpfw IV Sp. By 8 November it no longer possessed a single Panzer. On 18 November DAK's strength, inclusive of both 15. and 21.Panzer Divisions, was 17,767 (15.Panzer Division's combat strength on 21 November was 1,125, its rations strength 6,923). Army, corps and supply troops added 14,650 more. DAK's weapons inventory included 541 MGs, 14 mortars, 12 Paks, 35 Panzers, 16 armoured cars and 14 various guns. 90.leichte Afrika Division's strength was 5,118 (the division had 322 MGs, 22 mortars, 31 Paks, four armoured cars and seven guns). 164.leichte Afrika Division's strength was 4,935 (the division only had 127 MGs, 30 mortars and two Paks). The long road back had begun.

On 31 October, Montgomery renewed the attack with strong support from the Royal Air Force. Critically short of fuel and ammunition, Rommel was forced to disengage on 3 November. The following day, the 1,400-mile Axis withdrawal to Tunisia began.

For the next three months, Montgomery followed rather than aggressively pursued Rommel and the Axis forces across the northern coast of Africa. Rommel reached the Tunisian border at the end of January 1943. By the time he got there, however, another Allied force was waiting for him.

On 8 November 1942, four days after Rommel began his long withdrawal, the British and Americans initiated Operation TORCH, the invasion of Northwest Africa. U.S. Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower had overall command. In a coordinated series of landings, the Western Task Force under Major General George S. Patton Jr. landed on the Atlantic coast near Casablanca; the Center Task Force under Major General Lloyd Fredendall landed just inside the Mediterranean around Oran; and the Eastern Task Force under Major General Charles Ryder landed near Algiers. Although all the landing sites were in Vichy French territory, the ultimate objectives of the operation were the Tunisian city of Tunis and the port and airfield complex at Bizerte.

Once Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika crossed into southern Tunisia, it occupied positions in the old French fortifications of the Mareth Line. Rommel’s 10 divisions were well below half strength, with a total of only 78,000 troops and 129 tanks. Before he had to face Montgomery, rapidly closing from the rear, Rommel intended to eliminate the threat of the British First Army to his north. On 14 February, the Germans launched the first leg of a two-pronged offensive, with von Arnim’s forces attacking through the Faid Pass for Sidi Bou Zid. The following day, Rommel in the south attacked toward Gafsa. The bulk of Rommel’s forces, however, remained along the Mareth Line. By 18 February, the Kasserine Pass was in Axis hands, and the U.S. Army had suffered its first major defeat at the hands of the Germans. Rommel tried to advance north through the Kasserine Pass on 19 February, but he did not get the support he expected from von Arnim. Hampered by a divided German command structure and the rapidly massing Allied reinforcements, the attack stalled.

The Allies recaptured Kasserine Pass on 25 February. Rommel returned to the Mareth Line and prepared to face Montgomery. When the Eighth Army reached Tunisia, the Allies reorganized their command structure along the lines agreed to at the Casablanca Conference. General Eisenhower became the Supreme Commander of all Allied forces in the Mediterranean west of Tripoli. Alexander became Eisenhower’s deputy and simultaneously commander of the 18th Army Group, which controlled the First and Eighth Armies, and the now separate U.S. II Corps commanded by Patton. On 24 February, the Axis powers also realigned their command structure, with Rommel becoming the commander of Armeegruppe Afrika, which included the Afrika Korps, von Arnim’s Fifth Panzer Army, and the Italian First Army under General Giovanni Messe. For the first time, the Axis powers had a unified command structure in Africa.

Montgomery’s units crossed into Tunisia on 4 February, reaching Medenine on 16 February. Hoping to catch the British off balance, Rommel on 6 March attacked south from the Mareth Line. Warned by ULTRA, Montgomery was ready. Immediately following the failure of the Medenine attack, Rommel returned to Germany on sick leave.

A brief History of Folgore Division

Folgore Parachute Division was officially formed in September 1st 1941. The Division was supposed to take part in the planned "C3" plan, the invasion of Malta, thus the Folgore was sent in southern Italy to begin the training for such an operation.

After the success earned during the Gazala battle, the OKW and Comando Supremo thought that the "C3" operation was no longer necessary; they thought that the forces freed up dropping the operation would have been much more useful in the final attempt to reach Alexandria, so Folgore division was sent to North Africa between July and August 1942.

The division itself saw his baptism of fire during the battle for Alam-el-Halfa, which the Italians call "corsa dei sei giorni" or "six days run". Placed under the XX Corps, Folgore division, with Brescia and Pavia divisions, was ordered to advance in the center of the offensive, as the left flank of the armoured units of the Italian-German Tank Army who were though to break through the southern defence of the British Army, in the same manner as they did during the Gazala battle.

As soon as the attack has begun on 30th August 1942, the Italian and German forces where caught by intense RAF bombings and saw themselves slowed down by an intense mine netting, also the British defence mounted up as the axis forces advanced. After two days of fighting, on 1st September 1942, Rommel called off the attack and ordered his units to return to the starting positions.

As the attack ceased the British forces begun operation Beresford, their counter attack on 4th September 1942,  focusing their efforts in the southern sector, where Folgore took built a bulge in the British defensive assets. The attack, begun by the VI NZ brigade and by the CXXXII British brigade, was repulsed with heavy casualties by IX and X battalions, with the latter being incorporated in the IX after the battle because of the losses, which comprised the BtG commander, Aurelio Rossi, fell in the counter attack. It was in this battle that Clifton was captured by the men of the IX BtG!

Forming Raggruppamento Ruspoli
After Alam-el-Halfa the two armies took time for rest. In this period the Axis forces dug in, reinforcing their position in order to resist to the incoming British offensive. El Cairo and Alexandria being so far right now.

Folgore division was assigned to the extreme southern sector of the army, within the X corps. Her deployment lay between Haret-el-Himeimat and Deir-el-Munassib.

The central portion of the division was held by "Raggruppamento Ruspoli" ( Ruspoli Group), which comprised the VII/186° and VIII Btg, with the II/28th from Pavia division. The raggruppamento had various artillery group taken from other divisions, which comprised some 88/56, 90/53, 100/17 and 75/27.

The Battle
October the 23rd, 1942, at 21:40 the British begun their attack on the Italian line. Raggruppamento Ruspoli was one of the main objectives of Monty's assault, as he began his initial assaults in order to find a weak spot in the axis defences.

The attack begun with a heavy shelling from British artillery which lasted until 23:30, after that the Infantry of the 51th HD and the tanks of the 7th AD attacked the Folgore front.

The first night saw fierce combat, with the 6/II company being surrounded and destroyed, the 19/VII having only 16 survivors. The VIII battalion is one that suffered the heaviest losses of the Raggruppamento, with his 24th company being the only formation emerging almost intact from the bitter fight.

Despite these heavy losses the British attack was repulsed, with the exception of some position in the sector of 20/VII. By 2:30 AM the fighting ceased, the raggruppamento having lost also a mortar platoon and 6 AT guns.

On the second day of the offensive Ruspoli counterattacked, sending forward his 20/VII company supported by some three semoventi da 75/18 and a number of German Panzers. The counter attack begun at 16:00, with the fighting ceasing by 16:30, with the company having reconquered all the ground lost.

Between the 25th and 26th October the British resumed their efforts, advancing in the sector of the 20/VII and 21/VII companies. Their offensive spirit being again frustrated by the bitter defence opposed by the paratroopers, with many local assaults and counterassaults. The British gained a foot hold tough, with their forces threatening now the flank of the raggruppamento.

Seeing the danger of an outflanking manoeuvre Ruspoli ordered his VII Btg to counterattack the British foot hold. The btg was support directly by the 100/17 guns, taken into the front line in order to shoot on tanks with open sights, the assault was so ferocious that the British forces retired back to their starting line, capturing half battalion in the process!

The 28th October, 20th anniversary of the march upon Rome, the British forces retired to their starting line, 500 m back from Folgore positions. The operation took two days. The men from Folgore division couldn't rest tough, as the British resumed their attack the 31st upon the position of the 21/VII company, threatening the position of the battalion commander, they were repulsed, but during the night they mounted up another assault upon the 20/VII that lasted until dawn, when the British retired. By this time it was destroyed the 100th Tank in front of the Raggruppamento.

Despite their heroic resistance the division was ordered to withdraw in the night between 2 and 3 November 1942, they had to retreat 15km back from the line while destroying everything that wasn't transportable. The orders looked grimmer as the hours passed, by the 4th November the division was supposed to fall back to Fuka, without any kind of motor transport, with all the ammunition stocks being depleted, without water nor food while British armoured car squadrons harassed the exhausted paratroopers, which returned fire with their last 47/32 while refusing the British proposal to surrender.

The 6th November the survivors of the divisions surrendered to the British forces at the gates of Fuka, receiving the honour to keep their personal weapons (onore delle armi in italian, honour of arms/weapons?). The division destroyed some 120 enemy tanks, while inflicting heavy losses to 51st HD, 7th AD, the Free French brigade and the Greek brigade.

Raggruppameno Ruspoli OOB
Along the first mine layer from north to south:

- 6/II company, capitano Paolo Emilio Marenco with a 2km front

- 1/I company, tenente Carlo Massoni with 4 47/32 ATGs

these two companies had support from two mortar platoons

- 19/VII company, capitano Alfonso Salerno with some battalion ATGs with the 16/VII to his south

Behind the first mine layer, behind 6/II:

- 22/VIII "Guastatori Paracadutisti" company, tenente Stelio Silleni supported by the 1/II artillery section with two 47/32 ATGs

Behind the second mine layer (resistance mine line, fascia minata di resistenza), directly behind the 22/VIII, Northern Sector:

- 20/VII company, capitano Carlo Lombardini

- 24/VIII "Guastatori Paracadutisti" company, capitano Scalettaris

Behind this position stands the command post of the VIII BtG "Guastatori Paracadutisti", maggiore Giulio Burzi, to the right behind the 24/VIII

Southern Sector:
- 21/VII company, capitano Gino Bianchini, with one of his platoons deployed in front of the main line of resistance

- 16/VI company between the first mine layer and the main line of resistance

Between 20/VII and 21/VII stands the command post of the VII btg of capitano Carlo Mautino with two mortar platoons (one with captured 3" mortars).

Between the 24/VIII and 20/VII are deployed the reserve, formed by the II/28 "Pavia" of maggiore Priano, with only three under strength companies. Among the reserves, on their right flank, stood the command post of the Raggruppamento, commanded by tenente colonnello Marescotti Ruspoli di Poggio Suasa and the command post of the I ATG group of capitano Giovanni Curti.

The artillery count:
- I/21st "Trieste" battery, with 100/17 howitzers
- II/27th "Pavia" battery, with 75/27 and 100/17
- IV/26th "Pavia" with 75/27 and 100/17
- "German mixed heavy group" from 21st panzer, with 210mm howitzers and 25pdr cannons.
( This is the artillery assigned to the raggruppamento, the division had some more pieces)
The raggruppamento counted about 1300 men.

The 150th Infantry Brigade at Gazala, May 1942 Part I

The 150th Infantry Brigade formed part of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, commanded by Major-General W. H. C. Ramsden, in May 1942. This Territorial division had served in France in 1940 and on garrison duty in England before being sent to the Middle East. The 150th Infantry Brigade served in Eighth Army's rear areas during Operation Crusader and its aftermath, during which its training was assisted by the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade and by New Zealand troops. Following a brief stint in Cyprus and Syria, in 1942 the remainder of the formation joined Eighth Army in Cyrenaica early in January, where its men immediately set about learning the ways of the desert.

The 50th Division was deployed as part of XIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General W. H. Gott, in the northern section of the Gazala Line. This linear 50-mile-long defensive position consisted of a deep minefield belt, behind which were constructed a series of fortified 'boxes', each organized for all-round defence and surrounded by minefields and barbed wire. It ran from the coast southwards to Bir Hacheim deep in the desert. This new defensive layout was a deliberate attempt to make the infantry 'tank-proof'. None of the widely separated boxes, however, were mutually supporting. Although the intervening ground was criss-crossed by patrols, allowing many of the men of 150th Infantry Brigade to be 'blooded' in a series of patrol actions carried out by mobile columns operating in no man's land, large parts of the dense minefield belt were not covered by fire. This lack of mutual support was not perceived as a problem, however, since a key element of the defensive plan was that massed armoured reserves would manoeuvre between the boxes.

The 150th Infantry Brigade was redeployed early in May from its original well-prepared defensive box to Sidi Muftah farther south. This new position, situated between the Trigh el Abd and Trigh Capuzzo tracks, was incomplete, too big for three infantry battalions and very difficult to defend from the rear. The brigade immediately began improving the position with a will by digging trenches, laying mines and erecting barbed-wire obstacles. It was a hot and exhausting task for its men, still new to life in the Western Desert. Unfortunately, time proved to be in short supply.

The long-anticipated Axis offensive began on the night of 26-27 May 1942, with the DAK, the Italian XX Corpo and the German 90. leichte Afrika-Division leading the advance. This bold attack began well, with the DAK sweeping down past the end of the Gazala Line and then hooking northwards behind the dense minefield belt towards Tobruk, Acroma and El Adem, while the Ariete Division attacked the isolated Free French box at Bir Hacheim. During the initial onslaught, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade's box was overwhelmed by 21. Panzer-Division and the Italian Ariete Division, the 7th Motor Brigade by the whole of the 90. leichte Afrika-Division, the 4th Armoured Brigade by the 15. Panzer-Division and lastly the 22nd Armoured Brigade by the 15. and 21. Panzer-Divisions. Initially, the British reaction was slow and uncoordinated. A series of unsuccessful piecemeal attacks were launched on 27 May by widely dispersed British armoured brigades as a result, effectively squandering British superiority in tank numbers. By the end of the day the Axis spearheads were deep behind the British front line, despite meeting stronger resistance than anticipated and suffering significant tank losses. The Free French garrison at Bir Hacheim remained defiant while small columns of motorized troops savaged Rommel's long and highly vulnerable lines of communication.

The DAK pressed onwards towards the coast and Tobruk on 28 May, although its armoured spearheads were already running short of fuel and ammunition. Even so, the 21. Panzer-Division advanced past the Knightsbridge Box towards the coast and the 90. leichte Afrika-Division reached El Adem. The 15. Panzer-Division was immobilized, however, by a lack of fuel. Although several supply columns reached Rommel's leading troops, the DAK's overall logistical situation was so critical that Rommel ordered his leading troops to assume a defensive stance. On 29 May the 90. leichte Afrika-Division and Ariete Division began gradually concentrating in a defensive position in a depression 4 miles by 2 miles in area, quickly dubbed by the British the 'Cauldron', lying between the Trigh Capuzzo and Trigh el Abd right in the centre of the Gazala position, with its back to the original deep British minefields. A dense artillery and anti-tank screen was quickly deployed facing westwards while Rommel concentrated on clearing a shorter route for his supply columns through the minefield belt behind him. It was a development warmly welcomed by the British high command, since it offered Eighth Army an ideal opportunity to destroy Rommel's armoured spearheads while they were out of supply, out in the open and penned in by the deep minefields and the defensive box occupied by the 150th Infantry Brigade, whose existence German intelligence had completely missed.

The 150th Infantry Brigade had initially escaped the full fury of the German offensive inside its fortified box, with its attention occupied by diversionary attacks mounted in the Gazala-Sidi Muftah area by Gruppe Cruwell and by shelling and Stuka dive-bombing raids. This pressure gradually intensified, however, as the Italian Brescia Division nosed forward along the Trigh Capuzzo and Trigh el Abd and began gapping the undefended minefield lying between the 69th Infantry Brigade and the 150th Infantry Brigade, effectively isolating the formation from its parent division. Similar progress was made by the motorized Trieste Division in gapping the minefields to the south of the box. Attempts by the 150th Infantry Brigade to interfere were only partially successful. On 27 May the 4th East Yorkshire Regiment, occupying defensive positions covering the Trigh el Abd, for example, successfully destroyed 13 Italian tanks. A shortage, of artillery ammunition - each 25-pdr was rationed to 25 rounds per day - made it difficult to halt the work of the Italian engineers. For most troops in the box little could be done other than listen to the increasing noise of fighting to their rear.

The growing threat from the DAK within the 'Cauldron', and the fact that the 4th East Yorkshires were badly overextended, made an increasingly anxious Brigadier J. C Haydon radically rethink his defensive dispositions late on 28 May. To meet the growing threat from his rear, shallow new minefields were hurriedly laid and slit trenches and gun positions were dug on the eastern side of the box, as the brigade reorganized for all-round defence. During the night the 4th East Yorkshire Regiment withdrew into the box, where it deployed its two companies on the eastern side of the perimeter, with one on either side of the 232nd Field Company, Royal Engineers. The 72nd Field Regiment and a battery of anti-tank guns were placed in support, with its 25-pdrs and a battery of newly-arrived 6-pdrs carefully sited in an anti-tank role. The defensive strength of the box at Sidi Muftah was massively augmented on 28-29 May when the Divisional Mobile Reserve - consisting of the tactical headquarters of the First Army Tank Brigade, commanded by Brigadier O'Carroll, and accompanied by the 44th Royal Tank Regiment and one squadron of the 42nd Royal Tank Regiment - withdrew into the box with 30 Matilda tanks.

The 'fog of war' cloaking the Gazala battlefield meant that the German high command only discovered the size and full extent of the 150th Infantry Brigade's heavily fortified position early on 30 May, when strong DAK detachments bumped into it by accident. It was an extremely serious discovery, since the box dominated the two existing gaps in the minefield with artillery fire and made large-scale resupply impossible except at night. The 150th Infantry Brigade had to be defeated and defeated quickly, while the anti-tank screen dealt with British armoured counter-attacks from the east.

The 150th Infantry Brigade at Gazala, May 1942 Part II

The nervous, outnumbered and already weakened 150th Infantry Brigade was quickly subjected to probing attacks, and the brigade reserve was moved onto the perimeter to the right of the 4th Green Howards. Aggressive patrolling by the British infantry yielded results, with heavy casualties inflicted on an enemy working party by one patrol. On the morning of 30 May 1942, German engineers began lifting the hastily laid minefields on the eastern side of the box, which were a pale imitation of those to the west. An assault by German motorized infantry from the 15. Panzer-Division gained some ground, but these positions were successfully counter-attacked throughout the remainder of day by the Matildas, which successfully plugged the gaps opened in the defences. Panzer-Regiment 5 lost 11 tanks in the initial exchange of fire. A position occupied by 232nd Company Royal Engineers on the eastern face of the defences was overrun during a determined infantry assault, however, giving the enemy a vantage point overlooking a great part of the box. Efforts to dislodge them by combined infantry and tank attacks failed, despite large quantities of precious ammunition being expended. Attacks on the carefully dug-in 4th Green Howards were defeated, and heavy Axis casualties were inflicted during a counter-attack carried out by the battalion's Bren Gun Carriers. As darkness fell, aggressive patrolling immediately began all along the perimeter to prevent further German infiltration across the new minefields into the box.

The eventual fate of the beleaguered 150th Infantry Brigade, if left unsupported under concentrated armoured attack, was never in doubt to all those who served at Sidi Muftah. Unfortunately, it received little of the promised aid as the noose gradually tightened around its position, apart from periodic 'stirring' messages from divisional headquarters and the British high command. Efforts to resupply it with ammunition proved abortive. Although two small diversionary armoured attacks were mounted at Bir Aslagh Ridge and in the Bir Hamat area, they had little impact on the German anti-tank screen. Similarly, a small sortie made from the Knightsbridge Box along the Trigh Cappuzzo was badly mauled by the 21. Panzer-Division. Although plans were put in train by the hesitant and indecisive British high command for further infantry attacks on 31 May and 1 June and a larger armoured counter-attack, it proved to be too little and too late.

The full fury of the DAK descended upon 150th Infantry Brigade on 31 May, after elements of the 90. leichte Afrika-Division and the Trieste Division deployed overnight around the perimeter. A formal request for surrender by Rommel preceded the initial attack, but was dismissed out of hand by Brigadier Haydon. A heavy bombardment heralded the first assault, with German infantry from the 90. leichte Afrika-Division moving up close behind the barrage. Little progress was made, however, despite a furious exchange of close-range fire in the face of skilful and stubborn resistance by the defenders, and the attackers withdrew at 0800hrs having suffered heavy losses. A German attack supported by tanks on the north-east corner of the box, which was held by the 4th East Yorkshire Regiment, proved more successful and penetrated the outer defences of the box, despite desperate resistance from the 6-pdrs, Bofors guns and infantry that continued until 1600hrs. This penetration was successfully sealed off, however, by the handful of remaining Matildas. The steady destruction or capture of the 6-pdr, 2-pdr and assorted captured Axis anti-tank guns pressed into British service and their crews, however, undermined the brigade's ability to defend itself against tank attack. Heavy attacks were made on the south-east corner of the box at the vulnerable junction between the 4th East Yorkshire Regiment and the 5th Green Howards, where the Germans took ground and prisoners, but the gap opened in the defences was quickly sealed by a counter-attack launched by the headquarters of the 4th East Yorkshire Regiment. The 4th Green Howards also beat off an assault on its sector. A heavy price, however, was paid in dead and wounded by the defenders for these local successes. By nightfall most anti-tank guns had been destroyed, ammunition supplies had dwindled alarmingly and all available reserves had been committed. Only 13 Matildas still remained operational, along with six medium guns, with 20 rounds each, and 12 25-pdrs with less than 100 rounds all told. No support was forthcoming from outside the box. Both sides drew apart as darkness shrouded the position.

The writing was clearly on the wall for the exhausted and increasingly desperate survivors of the 150th Infantry Brigade, whose defensive box had contracted to half its original size under heavy German pressure. The DAK was ordered by Rommel to end British resistance at Sidi Muftah once and for all by bringing to bear all its strength, and to do so it had been resupplied overnight using the nearby gaps through the minefield. Early on 1 June the box was subjected to intense shelling and dive-bombing by Ju87 Stukas, following which the assault from all sides redoubled, with the attackers reinforced by more artillery and part of the 21. Panzer-Division. A series of concentric attacks employing massed tanks and infantry began, which lasted into the late afternoon and steadily wore down the remaining British troops. Although every remaining trench, dugout and gun position was bitterly contested in fierce hand-to-hand fighting by the remaining tough Northumbrian infantrymen, the box was overrun. Casualties rapidly mounted, including Brigadier Haydon, who was killed by shellfire. This bitter fighting also taxed the morale of the attackers, with Rommel personally taking charge of a faltering lead infantry platoon. A German report stated: 'The encircled enemy, supported by numerous infantry tanks, resisted stubbornly. Each separate point within the fortress-like, strengthened defences had to be fought for. The positions had to be taken in hand-to-hand fighting for each individual bunker... The enemy suffered extraordinarily heavy bloody losses.' By late afternoon, as water and ammunition ran out, further organized resistance was impossible and the survivors of the 150th Infantry Brigade emerged from their slit-trenches and bunkers with their hands in the air and capitulated after destroying their remaining guns and small arms.

The 3,000 exhausted British troops who marched into captivity on 1 June had displayed considerable courage, self-sacrifice and dogged determination during intense close-quarter infantry combat despite clearly being massively outnumbered and out-gunned from the beginning of the engagement. Such bravery proved to be of no avail, however, in the face of the DAK's concentrated armoured units. Ultimately, this hard-fought defensive action had proved to be another classic demonstration of the inherent weakness of the Gazala Line and of the static infantry box as a defensive tactic in the Western Desert. The wide gap between the 150th Infantry Brigade and neighbouring boxes ensured that no external support from these sources was possible and as a result its vulnerable, out-gunned and immobile garrison had been overwhelmed. The failure to mount a strong, well-coordinated armoured counter-attack, upon which the Gazala defences depended, effectively sealed the fate of 150th Infantry Brigade as soon as the DAK turned its full weight against it.

The time won by the brigade's extremely gallant defence and the opportunity the situation had offered to inflict a decisive defeat on the DAK was ill-used by the British high command, who failed to mount a decisive armoured counter-attack while the concentrated German armoured spearheads were at their most vulnerable as they were penned within the Cauldron. It was a turning point of the battle of Gazala and arguably one of the greatest lost opportunities of the North African campaign. In comparison, the Axis high command acted with commendable vigour by immediately opening a supply line through the minefield belt and restocking its armoured troops with water, fuel and ammunition. The revitalized DAK, occupying a salient deep in the heart of Eighth Army behind the Gazala defences, husbanded its strength and calmly awaited developments. The badly botched British counter-attack on 4-5 June that had taken so long to organize proved a damp squib that cost Eighth Army another 200 tanks, four artillery regiments and an infantry brigade.

The initiative had now firmly passed to Panzergruppe Afrika. On the afternoon of 5 June the DAK and the Italian Ariete Division attacked the now much-reduced British formations opposing them, with 21. Panzer-Division quickly advancing towards the Knightsbridge Box, while 15. Panzer-Division swung round through Bir el Hamat in another outflanking manoeuvre. Unable to offer effective resistance, the demoralized Eighth Army struggled to prevent the Gazala defences from being overwhelmed. The box at Bir Hacheim was attacked in strength from 2 June onwards by the redeployed Axis troops. It finally fell on 10 June, effectively ending the Gazala battles, although 2,700 Free French successfully escaped. The freed-up German forces quickly moved northwards, adding their weight to the main Axis attacks that inflicted heavy tank losses and eventually ended with the fall of Tobruk and the withdrawal of Eighth Army to El Alamein.

Back on the move again after 70 years: A mighty Tiger 131 is put through its paces for anniversary challenge

2012. Making tracks: Tiger 131 is put through its paces at Bovington Tank Museum
By Daily Mail Reporter
PUBLISHED: 22:26 GMT, 1 April 2012 | UPDATED: 07:51 GMT, 2 April 2012
With its huge cannon and almost impenetrable armour, the German Tiger tank struck fear into the hearts of Allied troops.
Although more than 1,300 were produced during the Second World War, this is the only working example in existence.
Tiger 131 has been restored to its original war time specification after a two-year restoration project costing £80,000.
The 55-ton tank can be seen tackling the tank course at Bovington Tank Museum in Dorset.
It has been fitted with a genuine German Second World War Maybach engine and its fan drives have been re-engineered from original blueprints. Now it is coaxed into life using a starting handle.
The Tiger was superior to anything the British and Americans had until near the end of war.
Rounds from Allied tanks could not penetrate its thick armour, while its 88mm cannon had huge destructive power. The tank soon gained legendary status after its introduction in 1942.
Tiger 131 was captured following a lucky hit by a British Churchill tank, belonging to 48 Royal Tank Regiment, in the Tunisian desert in April, 1943. The shot wedged in the turret ring, rendering it useless.

Historic: George VI the inspects the captured Tiger in Africa in 1943.

The five-man German crew abandoned the Tiger, which was captured intact. Winston Churchill, who was in Tunisia at the time, had the chance to inspect it.
The Tiger was then sent back to Britain so the Allies could look for design weaknesses.
It was taken to Bovington in 1951. Although museum staff have had the tank moving before, the old engine kept breaking down.
David Willey, museum curator at Bovington, said: 'The Tiger outmatched anything that the Allies could field at the time.'