Early Libyan Border Actions

Officers of the 11th Hussars use a parasol to give shade during a halt, while out patrolling on the Libyan frontier, 26 July 1940. The vehicle is a Morris CS9 armoured car.

In Egypt the declaration of war found the armoured cars of the 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) tinder Lieutenant-Colonel John Combe lying close by the frontier. With instructions to raise hell, they immediately crossed the fence of barbed wire built by Italian engineers along the 400-mile (644km) border. In a series of dashing hit-and-run raids, they attacked forts and shot up transport columns, capturing bewildered soldiers whom nobody had bothered to inform about Mussolini's declaration. By dawn on 12 June, all their patrols had returned, bringing with them 70 prisoners and having suffered no casualties. More importantly, they had established a moral superiority over the Italians.

Encouraged by this start, plans were made to assault Forts Maddalena and Capuzzo; the attacks were launched on 14 June. Joined by elements of 4th Armoured Brigade commanded by Brigadier J. R. L. 'Blood' Caunter (named after his favourite exhortation 'Buckets of Blood!') and 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps, Fort Maddalena fell without a shot being fired, having already been abandoned by all but 18 of the garrison. Fort Capuzzo offered some small resistance, but its 226 men also surrendered without bloodshed. Of some significance was the result of an encounter with six Italian Fiat-Ansaldo LS Tankettes. These were engaged with a Boyes anti-tank rifle, which knocked one out immediately while the others ran 'like a lot of little pigs'.

Two days later, two troops of 11 H were 'swanning around' between Sidi Omar and Fort Capuzzo when one troop encountered an Italian column of 12 L3s and 30 lorries, apparently on their way to re-garrison the fort. At almost the same time, the second troop reported another column of 17 L3s and 40 lorries heading to meet the first. Although the squadron commander ordered them to withdraw, the two troops had eagerly charged forward to engage the enemy. During a brisk skirmish, they managed to knock out three of the L3s before retiring behind a slight rise when the column produced a field gun. Combe quickly gathered all the available reserves, including a mixed squadron of Light and Cruiser tanks from 7th Queen's Own Hussars, and an anti-tank troop of the Royal Horse Artillery from 4 Armd Bde, and rushed to join the action. When he arrived at the rise, he was staggered to see the column (the second one never appeared) some three miles away on a completely open plain, formed up in square as if fighting colonial tribesmen.

Unsure if the Italians had more artillery, Combe sent forward some of the tanks who were fired at by the single grin and charged by the L3s. These were knocked out with one shot each, whereupon the tank circled the square in Red Indian fashion, shooting up the unprotected infantry and lorries. They made two complete circuits before the Italians revealed hidden guns at each corner. After a bitter but intense firefight in which the gallant gun detachments were shot down to a man, the square broke, only to be promptly rounded up. Barely 100 men and a dozen lorries were left to make the sad .journey into captivity. Thus ended the 'Battle' of Nezuet Ghirba. Among the dead was Colonello D'Avanso whose pocket yielded his orders. They were to 'destroy enemy elements which have infiltrated across the frontier, and give the British the impression of our decision, ability and will to resist'.

The free-wheeling continued until the end of July, by which time the Italians were deploying heavy all-arms columns supported from the air. Steadily, their strength was increasing, including support from a few MI 1/39 tanks and invariably from their efficient and brave artillery. At sea, the Royal Navy shelled a flotilla of minesweepers in Tobruk harbour, an action admired by an 11 H patrol on the beach, only 100 miles (161 km) behind enemy lines! Apart from continuous anti-submarine operations, the RN encountered no surface opposition and bombarded Bardia on 21 June. The Italians retaliated with night air-raids on Alexandria and Aboukir. A week later they attacked Royal Air Force bases at Sidi Barrani and Mersa Matruh, whose Gladiator fighters matched the opposing Fiats. But they failed to launch an effective air campaign, either against the RAF or against vulnerable Allied shipping.

Desert conditions impose considerable wear and tear on equipment, especially on vehicles, and in mid-August, 4 Armd Bde was withdrawn and replaced by 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Armoured Division's Support Group under Brigadier M: H. E. 'Strafer' Gott. His orders were to maintain observation and impose delay with his two infantry battalions, artillery regiment and supporting elements. 11 H were ordered to reduce their activities and rest half their number. Neither side had made any territorial acquisitions but the opportunity had been there for the testing of equipment, techniques and, most importantly, of men. Both sides suffered from technical deficiencies but where the Italians had the benefit of superior numbers, the British undoubtedly held a professional and moral advantage. The first three months of the campaign saw the British inflict 3,500 casualties upon the Italians for the loss of just 150.

The 70th Tank Battalion - independent tank battalion

Most Americans think of World War II tank warfare in terms of long thrusts by armored divisions, probably led by Patton. To his credit, he did lead such thrusts just as planners had envisioned when they created the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions as the principal components of the Armored Force of the United States in July, 1940. Modelled after German Blitzkrieg forces, armored divisions had enormous power and mobility. Tanks set the pace for their own motorized infantry. However, for tanks to use their manoeuvrability and speed, terrain and conditions had to be right. When they were not, such as in the hedgerows of Normandy, or in the forests of Germany, regular infantry with close tank support had to slug it out with the enemy at close quarters.

To provide this support, the 70th Tank Battalion was included in the original Armored Force as the first of the independent tank battalions. Called independent because they were not part of a division, these battalions were available to be attached to an infantry division when the need arose. It is believed that General Adna R. Chaffee, the first commander of the Armored Force, insisted upon the creation of independent tank battalions so infantry divisions wouldn't constantly be breaking up armored divisions by borrowing tank battalions from them every time tank support was needed.

As always in the Army command structure, a division controlled all attached units, including an independent tank battalion. This, at times, presented difficulties for tankers. It was a wise infantry commander who used tankers' advice on how best to use tanks. Most of them did so, but not all.

During the course of their combat, most independent tank battalions were attached to a number of infantry divisions. In its eight campaigns (the most for an independent tank battalion), the 70th was attached to the U.S. 1st Infantry Division (twice), the 9th, the 4th, the 63rd, C Company to the 45th in Sicily, and A Company to the French in Tunisia.

Because it was not always possible to foresee needs, an infantry division and its attached tank battalion often had little or no prior joint training. This could lead to a lack of coordination. Combat is a poor place for one unit to get to know the ways, styles, and idiosyncrasies of the other. In preparation for invasions, however, the infantry that would lead an assault and their tank support usually trained together. As the first independent tank battalion, the 70th was selected to be the first to undergo amphibious training with an infantry division, the 1st. Training was still in progress when Pearl Harbor was bombed on December 7, 1941.

As the only tank battalion and infantry division with joint amphibious training, the 70th, the 1st, along with the 1st Marine Raider Battalion, were sent on a mission to Martinique on January 9, 1942. Control of this Caribbean island in our own backyard by pro- Nazi, Vichy France was intolerable. Seeing the force against him, the Vichy governor capitulated without a shot being fired. In early March, the 70th and the 9th Infantry Division began training for "Operation Torch," the invasion of French North Africa. On November 8, 1942, B Company and the 47th Infantry Regiment landed at Safi, French Morocco, C Company and the 60th at Port Lyautey, French Morocco, and A Company and the 39th at Algiers, Algeria. Combat was over in a day except at Port Lyautey where it lasted three days.

The 70th was soon detached from the 9th, which meant A Company was alone and available in Algiers. It was sent to Tunisia in late December, 1942. The rest of the battalion set up a training school in Tlemcen, Algeria, to teach "Free French" cadres the use of MS light tanks.

In Tunisia, A Company was attached to the "Free French" XIX Corps. Not only was there no prior training, but the company found itself providing tank support for French, Senegalese, and Ghoumier infantry, all speaking a different language and with different military traditions. Even worse, French commanders at first deployed A Company tanks as sentinels and mobile pillboxes, out ahead of infantry in exposed positions and ineffective for an assault. On another occasion, the light tanks were used as bait, parading in front of heavier German tanks to draw them within range of French big guns and the 75s of U.S. 601st T.D.s and British Churchill tanks. Such misuse of tanks ended only when the A Company commander, Atlee Wampler, insisted that he be involved in all planning when company tanks were employed. In time, the French and A Company developed a good, solid relationship which lasted until the end of hostilities on May 13th.

Book – ‘The Longest Way’

"Le chemin le plus long" (The Longest Way), by Pierre Quillet, Paris, ed. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1997, ISBN 2-7068-1253-2. This is the story of a tank company (of the 501st RCC = Régiment de Chars de Combat) that went with the French expeditionary force to Norway in May 1940. After the French defeat, they went to Britain and a number of them, and all of their remaining H39s, joined De Gaulle's small band. They fought the Vichy troops in West Africa, and then in Syria (to get to the point, finally), still with their original tanks. The book has photos of the engagements there. After that, they served with the 8th Army in North Africa, re-equipped with Crusaders, and finally in Europe with the famous French 2nd Armoured Division (Leclerc's 2me DB) on Shermans, taking part in the Liberation of Paris. This company must have had the most remarkable, or at least most unusual, history of any armoured unit in WWII.

Rommel’s Logistics

The simple fact is that the North African ports under Axis control were unable to supply Rommel's campaign as he had envisioned it. Every time he attacked he was creating the very problem which he begged assistance for.

The OKH, before sending Rommel had established an operational plan based on the port capacity available at Tripoli, the one port left under Axis control after O'Connor's drive into Cyrenica. Tobruk was capable of unloading 45,000 tons of equipment a month. By the time the 15th panzer division arrived the total Axis force had amounted to 7 divisions requiring 70,000 tons of supplies a month given a 300 mile operational radius (taken from "Supplying War" Van Creveld).

I think you can begin to see the problems here and how adding more reinforcements would simply make matters worse. Before you start shouting how the capture of Tobruk would have erased all supply problems, take into account that Tobruk at its peak could only unload an additional 18000 tons a month. That means the majority of the supplies would still have to be unloaded at Tripoli and carried overland. This problem is the is the same problem that the quartermaster-General of the OKH saw, the same problem Rommel's own quartermaster saw and the same problem Hitler saw which lead him to order Rommel not to attack.

Rommel didn't listen and his early victories (because of poor British tactics) resulted in Hitler changing heart. But every kilometer he advanced, he made his own supply situation worse. It is not enough to merely transport supplies oversea and drop it on the docks. You must bring them up to the front lines (now thanks to Rommel’s advance was now 700 miles over the original intended operational radius) and that was simply not possible with the existing number of trucks available.

The failure of the North African campaign rests solely on Rommel's shoulders because of his lack of interest in maintaining operations which made logistical sense.

Merely recognizing his tactical ability is certainly not "--enough said!!"

The same source mentions a couple more relevant items:

- Port capacity dictated the size of the supply convoys, thus, it was extremely uneconomical to send supplies to Africa, and the Italians on occasion escorted 50,000 tons of shipping with 100,000 tons of warships.
- Up to 10% of POL shipped to Africa was consumed bringing it up to the frontlines for distribution.
- Rommel demanded 8,000 trucks to support his advance into Egypt at a time when the entire German force in Russia fielded 14,000 trucks in its logistics columns.

North Africa – US ARMY Combined Arms Doctrine

The combined arms training undertaken by the 3rd Infantry Division and the 756th Tank Battalion (L) reflected a major push by the Armored Force to increase infantry-tank proficiency. In early 1942, COL Edwin K. Wright, Armored Force Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations and Training), began stressing the need for combined arms training, emphasizing tank support of infantry divisions in the attack. Army Ground Forces, the Armored Force's higher headquarters, "replied with a supplement to its initial training directive, stating that `combined infantry division-tank unit training will be emphasized,' and that problems for the maneuver period should include infantry-tank unit operations." However, this training often did not occur, or at least not to levels which made for real combined operations proficiency. COL Wright, in analyzing reports from the North African battlefront in May 1943, wrote the following:

In spite of constant attempts to provide infantry division-tank battalion cooperative training in this country, practically no success has been obtained. All infantry division commanders, whether contacted direct or through Army Ground Forces, have indicated the desirability of such training but fend it off on the excuse that "Time is not available," "After we complete our unit training," "After we finish maneuvers," etc. Army Ground Forces has been of no assistance to us in forcing this training.

The results of this failure to provide cooperative infantry-tank training is being reflected in the combat zone. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Lou Hammack's very fine 751st Tank Battalion (M) was practically wiped out because in four successive attacks, the infantry refused to follow him. Four times he took the objective and each time had to pull back, trying to pull the infantry forward, the Germans in the meantime re-obtaining the position.

Finally, by September 1943, Army Ground Forces had published FM 17- 36, Employment of Tanks With Infantry. The publication of this field manual allowed units still training in the United States to learn some of the lessons learned the hard way by forces already in contact with the enemy. Unfortunately, the manual alone was insufficient. The commanding general of the 84th Infantry Division wrote: "We have worked constantly with armor, and with no training in the U.S., it was hard to receive our training on the battlefield. I cannot stress too much the absolute necessity for combined tank-infantry training even in replacement training centers. We have worked with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 7th Armored Divisions. They are all excellent units, but it is difficult to teach infantry-tank tactics actually on the battlefield. We now have our own tank battalion, and I spend every available minute in training my infantry to operate with tanks." The tactics kept evolving, however, and tankers and infantrymen continued to send hard-fought lessons home from combat theaters around the world.

The first major employment of tanks with infantry by the United States was on November 8, 1942 - the Operation Torch landings on the North African coast. Amphibious assault technology still required the use of LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanized) to transport heavy vehicles from ship to shore. The LCM was capable of carrying only one tank or large artillery piece at a time. Nevertheless, tanks made it ashore and were able to assist the infantrymen right from the outset of combat. During the initial assault from the beaches, the tank's speed and armor were exploited to seize key mission objectives and destroy enemy positions.

One example comes from the 3rd Infantry Division's landing at the town of Fedala, about ten miles northeast of Casablanca. The 7th Infantry Regiment had as an initial objective the seizure of French antiaircraft, coastal and field artillery batteries located on the Cape north of Fedala. COL William H. Wilbur, a senior liaison officer from MG George S. Patton Jr.'s headquarters, took control of 2nd Platoon, Company A, 756th Tank Battalion (L), which was just coming off landing craft. COL Wilbur sped through town to assist the regiment's first battalion in silencing the coast artillery battery, which had been engaging landing craft enroute to the beach. After the tanks assumed an assault position, Company A, 7th Infantry opened fire on the battery's fire direction center. The MS tanks made an initial breach in the defensive wire, and infantry quickly seized the objective.

Units not in contact in North Africa continued to train while others eventually met the enemy in Tunisia. By the spring of 1943, Allied forces had made considerable progress in driving the Germans out of Africa. While the British 8th Army under General Bernard Law Montgomery pressed from the east, American, British and Free French units advancing from the west beat back the Afrika Korps into a tight perimeter on the Tunisian peninsula. At the end of April, the American II Corps was attacking German defenses along an east-west row of hills near the town of Mateur. The main defenses were atop Djebel Tahent, identified on U.S. maps as Hill 609. Riflemen from the 34th Infantry Division had fought their way to the base of the hill, but by April 29, had reached an impasse. Both sides had been exchanging mortar and artillery fire incessantly and the infantry could advance no further. Company I of the 1st Armored Division's 1st Tank Regiment, another II Corps unit, was assigned to assist in breaking the stalemate. In the early morning of April 30, the tanks picked up the infantry and proceeded up the hill, at times literally pulling the riflemen along where the slope was too steep. The tanks destroyed a number of enemy positions, and when antitank fire became too deadly, the American infantry conducted a bayonet charge against the gun crews, allowing the tanks to continue. The absolute summit of Hill 609 was inaccessible to the tanks, but they supported the infantry with cannon and machine-gun fire until the position was secure. The tank-infantry team repelled counterattacks both at 609 and at the neighboring Hill 531. On May 2, the GIs saw heavy traffic moving north. The Germans were leaving.

This photograph shows all of the men and machines that made up the 66th Armored Regiment, part of the 2nd Armored Division, assembled on a hillside in Southern England about a month prior to entering the war In Europe.

Troops and equipment disembark from one of the tiny LCMs used to land in Algeria, North Africa in 1942. Compare this quiet beach landing scene with the complexity of the later Normandy invasion. But at the time, this was the largest seaborne invasion in history.

The North African Campaign of 1942-43 demonstrates some of the earliest combat techniques of the tank-infantry team. There was yet no permanent affiliation of specific units with one another, so there was often no way to retain lessons learned from one engagement to the next. The infantry typically fought without the aid of armored forces, and called on the tanks to penetrate defenses or advance in the face of heavy small arms and artillery fire. Tank units were used to break through enemy formations, destroy tanks and other pieces of equipment, and reduce hardened fortifications and wire obstacles. However, the general lack of prior training created some major deficiencies in effective prosecution of the campaign.

Shermans and German tank designs.

Just as the Germans reacted to existing threats in 1941 after fighting the French, and the British in the desert, or in 1942 after fighting the Soviets. Again we find the cycle: enemy vehicle appears, and a year later the friendly side has devised a counter. There's nothing shameful about that, as it takes a while between the time when the first enemy tanks appear and the time when they make up the bulk of the opposition. The T-34 may have shocked German tankers, but the bulk of the Soviet armor was light tanks in 1941

The British experience is worth noting because their mid-to-late war tank designs were influenced by many factors, and they foresaw enemy developments. They (meaning the RAC and the Ministry of Supply) clearly did anticipate that the Germans were going to develop something new and had plans for a cruiser tank with a 17-pdr in 1941 to counter it. They also saw that their basic cruiser by 1944 would have to surpass the Sherman in capability, particularly firepower.

However, the Army's experience with inadequate British designs British prior to the Sherman's arrival resulted in the War Office plumping for Shermans in the 1942-3 period - following home grown cruisers they were a god send - and Montgomery and the 8th Army's influence here is very important.

Consequently, the drive for new improved British designs waned. By the time the RAC and the Ministry of Supply convinced the War Office that the Sherman was becoming obsolete - mid-to-late 1943 it was too late to change things significantly. Matters were also not helped by the relative failure of the A30 Challenger programme and a miscalculation that resulted in the new High Velocity 75 mm gun (later named the 77mm and fitted to the Comet) not fitting into the Cromwell's turret.

Turret rings. Ahh, there's another debate... We should also note that too much is made of technical differences between tanks, particularly in 1944. Less than a third of German tanks and similar in Normandy were obviously superior to Allied types, and many were distinctly inferior. What mattered far more was the tactical environment in which the Allies were forced to operate - on the offensive in particular.

In areas of dense enemy concentration, with an enemy fielding more self-propelled guns which were less vulnerable to supporting artillery, and in close terrain, it was little wonder that attacking armour suffered. At those ranges in Normandy - average range of a-t gunfire was about 600 yards; few tanks offered any survivability against decent guns. The British Churchill VII with more frontal armour than the Tiger could not withstand hits from big German guns at that range.

The Allies’ real failing was in firepower - the medium velocity 75mm gun was simply out of date by 1944. For once, the Brits were ahead of the Americans and had done more to rectify this by mid-1944. These efforts helped, but did not solve the problem. The point always worth bearing in mind is that the Germans, with all these supposedly superior tanks, endured heavy armour casualties whenever they attacked the Allies in Normandy. The technical edge existed in some cases, but in reality it was only a small part in explaining the difficulties encountered by Allied armour crews in 1944-5.


Dr. John Buckley

Senior Lecturer in War Studies and History
University of Wolverhampton

Crusader III at Alamein

At the time of El Alamein 8th Army used Crusader Mk III alongside older Mk II with 2pr guns and 3" Howitzers.

They were used alongside Grants and Shermans. Wherever possible, individual squadrons with regiments would have one type of tank, for example in 2nd and 24th Armoured Brigades a Regiment usually had one squadron of Crusaders and two with Shermans while in the 8th Armoured Brigade this was one squadron each Crusaders, Grants and Shermans.

As to the actual quantities used by each unit, as far as I can tell according to the official "Tank State - Egypt" in the Public Record Office, Kew file PRO.WO.169/3861 they were used in -
1st Armoured Division -
2nd Armoured Brigade - Queen's Bays, 9th Lancers, 10th Hussars - 29 Crusader III out of 76 Crusaders
7th Armoured Division -
22nd Armoured Brigade - 1RTR, 5RTR and 4th County of London Yeomanry - 48 Crusaders including 8 Crusader III
10th Armoured Division -
8th Armoured Brigade - 3RTR, Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, Staffordshire Yeomanry - 12 Crusader III out of 53 Crusaders
24th Armoured Brigade - 41RTR, 45RTR, 47RTR - 17 Crusader III out of 45 Crusaders
2nd New Zealand Division -
9th Armoured Brigade - 3rd Hussars, Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, Warwickshire Yeomanry - 49 Crusaders including 12 Crusader III
Those Crusaders used by the 9th Australian Divisional Cavalry were Mk II, and other non-Mk III Crusaders were used in Divisional HQ's.