DESERT AFV QUIZ

AFV Quiz Answers

Signals Intelligence and Communications – North Africa

In addition to the tank and aircraft, another piece of technology came of age during World War II. Signals intelligence, or SIGINT, was yet one more instrument or arm that the commander had to integrate and coordinate with others. Recent histories of the war probably has overstated the strategic importance of SIGINT, while they have understated its tactical role. An army's ability to plan for future operations and concentrate the different arms at the decisive location depended in part on such intelligence.

Ultra, the British codeword for intelligence based on decoding highly classified German radio messages, gave the western Allies only limited access to German military intentions and capabilities. The German Army normally used secure landline communications for high-level messages, except when fluid operations forced them to make radio transmissions. Even then the Allies did not necessarily intercept, let alone decode in a timely manner, every German message. The Germans changed their code every twenty-four hours and periodically made major shifts in codes or equipment. The Allies might go for days or even months without being able to decode transmissions on specific radio networks. On 1 May 1940, for example, Germany changed virtually all its codes, blinding the Allies" SIGINT effort until 22 May, by which time the German offensive through the Ardennes had succeeded. Similar problems recurred during most of the War.

Nor were the deciphered messages of Ultra always illuminating for the tactical and operational situation. Only rarely did the most senior German commanders communicate their specific plans, except where Hitler was personally interfering in operations and required detailed reports. Intelligence analysts pieced together much of the most valuable Ultra information over long periods, or inferred capabilities on the basis of logistical messages. Moreover, few Allied commanders below field army level had access to this information.

The worst drawback of Ultra-level SIGINT was that it discouraged the use of other sources of intelligence collection that might confirm or deny Ultra information and blinded Allied commanders to threats that were not discussed in German radio traffic. In early 1943, for example, the Allied forces in Tunisia relied heavily on Ultra; their other intelligence collection means were improvised and largely ineffective. The German offensive of Sidi-bou-Zid-Kasserine Pass in February 1943 surprised the Allies because available SIGINT indicated that higher German headquarters had disapproved such an operation in favor of an attack elsewhere. Of course, SIGINT could not know that Rommel and other German commanders had met face-to-face on 9 February and had developed a plan that led to the attack on Sidi-bou-Zid. This attack mauled a dispersed U.S. armored division. Lack of SIGINT and misinterpretation of available intercepts also had a considerable effect on Allied failure to predict the scale and intensity of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944.

Although the western Allies held a priceless asset in the strategic intelligence they received from Ultra, for much of the war German SIGINT was more effective at the tactical level. From 1940 to 1942, for example, a single Horch (listening or intercept) company in North Africa skillfully interpreted the unencrypted tactical communications of British units, giving Rommel a complete picture of enemy dispositions and intentions during battle. When the British finally became aware of this unit's activities in July 1942, an Australian battalion raided and captured the company. German replacements could not replace the expertise of the analysts lost in that company and thus had more difficulty detecting later British deception operations.

By contrast, relatively little information is available concerning Allied tactical SIGINT, including the British "Y” Service and American "Radio Intelligence." German tactical communications were often unencrypted, or used easily deciphered code systems. From a miniscule prewar basis, the Allies had to develop their knowledge of German tactical radio networks and procedures. In terms of offensive electronic warfare, the Allies had a number of notable successes. During the evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940, the British effectively jammed German bomber communications, hampering Luftwaffe attacks on the retreating British forces. Two years later, when Montgomery launched the second Battle of Alamein, airborne jammers disrupted German tactical radio communications for hours.

The development of effective tactical radio communications was the basis for controlling fluid, mechanized operations as well as the raw material for tactical SIGINT. The demand for such communications greatly accelerated research and development in this area. In particular, the U.S. Army pioneered the use of frequency modulation (FM) radios for short-range tactical communications, and both very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) radios for longer range communications. Unlike the European armies, the U.S. Army used FM extensively, because it provided static-free signals over a wide variety of channels without using a separate crystal for each frequency.

The combination of reliable radio communications with efficient tactical signals intercept services also provided a new opportunity for senior commanders to follow the course of battle without delays in the communications system. Both the British and American armies developed means for senior headquarters to receive battle reports by radio without waiting for the messages to be processed through intermediate layers of command. That is, the senior headquarters could monitor tactical unit radio networks directly, or else assign a radio-equipped liaison detachment to each forward unit to report the situation to the senior headquarters. The British GHQ Liaison (Phantom) units and the American Signal Information and Monitoring (SIAM) companies performed this service admirably during 1944-45, and in the British case as early as 1942. The danger with such a monitoring system, as Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower noted after the war, was that the senior commander might be tempted to bypass the intermediate headquarters and interfere directly in the battle, using the system for command rather than as a source of timely operational and intelligence information. In the latter role these monitoring services enabled much more effective coordination of the battle, allowing the commander to react through his subordinate commanders to situations as they developed.

Sonderverband 288

General Ulrich Kleemann of German 90th Light Africa Division speaking to a photographer aboard his SdKfz. 250 half-track command vehicle, 1942-1943; note StuG III in background

Special Unit 288

The Sonderverband 288 was raised on July 1st, 1941 at Potsdam (near Berlin). It was composed of units from all over Germany.

Special Unit 288 or z.b.V.288, was also known as Combat Group Menton, after its commander. It originally contained crack units from all branches of the German army: anti-tank men, Alpine troops, engineers, and eventually 3 of the new StuG.III assault guns. There was also a company of Brandenburgers, trained for special operations behind enemy lines.

These units were intended to prepare the way for the DAK as it flowed across the Nile and into the Middle East and on to India. Their most important component was a group of interpreters with their own printing presses. These men knew all the languages that would be needed, from Arabic and Persian dialects to Hindi, Urdi and Sanskrit. There was also a specialized group who had been trained to seize and rebuild the oil fields of the region.

When it became obvious that Rommel's rush to the Nile was not going to be a cake walk, the 288th minus its interpreters and technicians was sent to Africa as special reinforcements. During the Gazala Line battles the 288th saw action supporting the Italian Ariete against the French forces defending Bir Hacheim at the southern tip of the British defenses. They also participated in the El Alamein battles, and the last of their StuG.IIIs was left behind for the British to contemplate.

By October 31 the Sonderverband 288 was reorganized and renamed Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment Afrika.

They were the first unit to be issued & try out the new StuG assault gun during the attack on Bir Hachim on the Alamain line.

As they were made up of virtually any and every unit in both the Heer, Luftwaffe with a few Kriegsmarine personnel.

Originally there were 2 Sonderverband units, 278 and 288.

Sonderverband 278 never made it to Afrika, but went to the Russian front instead.

Marder III in Afrika

From around May 1942 a small number of Marder IIIs were brought into the desert. This was the version with a Russian 76.2mm gun on a Panzer 38t chassis. These increased in numbers.

There were about 60-66 shipped in total, in theory 30 each to the 2 PzJgr Abts (33 & 39) in the 2 Panzer Divisions (3 companies of 9 + 1 HQ) and 6 for the PzA Afrika Kamfstaffel (Army HQ Defence Group). The latter got the first 6 vehicles that arrived at start of Gazala (May 1942). However as all the rest did not arrive together (i.e. they shipped from about July 1942 to November 1942) it's unlikely either Abt got enough to get to full strength at any one time...

Some sources suggest that some Marders also went to PzJgr 605 when were serving with 90th Light Division at the time, but I have not seen anything conclusive and believe this is erroneous as there are no references to Marder IIIs with 90th Light.

By El Alamein, there were probably Marder IIIs.

At the Second Battle of Alamein the estimate would be 4-6 Dianas and 6-12 PzJgr I's (as above), plus about 40 Marder III's. There were definitely as least 3 Marder III's still in the PzArmee Afrika Kampfstaffel, as they served alongside the 5-6 captured Stuart Tanks in that unit.

Carl Rohrig Verlag - Marsch und Kampf des Deutschen Afrikakorps Band 1 1941 Part I

Part of a book printed in early 1943 by Carl Rohrig Verlag in German and Italian recalling the 1941 Desert Campaign.

 

 

The Africans who fought in WWII

Jagama Kello, middle, left home at just 15 to fight Italian invaders

By Martin Plaut
BBC Africa analyst

The 70th anniversary of World War II is being commemorated around the world, but the contribution of one group of soldiers is almost universally ignored. How many now recall the role of more than one million African troops?
Yet they fought in the deserts of North Africa, the jungles of Burma and over the skies of Germany. A shrinking band of veterans, many now living in poverty, bitterly resent being written out of history.
For Africa, World War II began not in 1939, but in 1935.
“ I greeted Gandhi with a military salute and asked him: 'What are you going to do for Africa now that India is going to be free?' ”
Marshal Kebby Nigerian soldier
Italian Fascist troops, backed by thousands of Eritrean colonial forces, invaded Ethiopia.
Emperor Haile Selassie was forced to flee to the UK, but others, known as Patriots, fought on. Among them was Jagama Kello. Fifteen years old at the time, he left home and raised a guerrilla force that struck at the Italian invaders.
Mein Kampf
Other Africans learnt what Fascism could mean for them. Among them was John Henry Smythe of Sierra Leone. His teacher gave him Adolf Hitler's book, Mein Kampf.
"We read what this man was going to do to the blacks if he gets into power. And he attacked the British and Americans for encouraging the blacks to become doctors and lawyers," Mr Smythe said.
"It was a book which would put any black man's back up and it put mine up."
He volunteered to join the Royal Air Force, becoming a navigator, flying bombers over Germany. Others took a similar view.
Joe Culverwell, who went on to fight for the liberation of Zimbabwe, volunteered the day war was declared in 1939.
"Don't forget in those days we were very loyal Brits - stupid as that may sound now," Mr Culverwell says. "We were brainwashed into being little brown Britishers."
Others were conscripted. They were picked up when they went to visit a local market or on the orders of a local chief.
And many found that once they enlisted they were badly treated. The reality of military life for African soldiers like Nigerian Marshall Kebby was very different from the propaganda.
"As a colonial soldier I had very rough treatment. At that time we hadn't even a single Nigerian officer, all were British. And many of us revolted against injustice, what I might call man's inhumanity to man."
'Hell'
But once the fighting began there was little time for protest. For men like Mr Culverwell, serving in Somalia, being bombed by the Italians was a terrifying experience.
“ We, the ex-servicemen, gave this country the freedom it's enjoying today. ”
Marshall Kebby
"Boy that was hell. We all had foxholes. I never felt so frightened in my life. They were bombing 100 yards away. We daren't even look up, you see."
Mr Smythe took part in air-raids over enemy territory.
But on the night of 18 November 1943 his plane was shot down over the German city of Mannheim. He spent 18 months in a prisoner of war camp, where the Germans tried to extract intelligence from him.
"You must use some special instruments to navigate your way here," his interrogator told Mr Smythe.
"He said: 'I want you to co-operate to get you out of this place.' I said: 'I will give you my name and number'. He started to scream at me; became a real Nazi officer.
"He said: 'You know they are talking about whether to execute you tomorrow or not. Because you, as a black man, should not involve in white man's war.'"
Meeting Gandhi
On the other side of the world, Mr Kebby was meeting Indians.
Among them was the leader of India's independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi, who was addressing a crowd of one million people in Madras. Mr Kebby worked his way to the front.
"It was one of the greatest things I did as a soldier. I greeted Gandhi with a military salute and asked him: 'What are you going to do for Africa now that India is going to be free?'
"He said: 'India will not do anything for you. But India will give you moral support on condition you fight the British non-violently'."
By 1945 the war was over, African troops had helped the allied powers defeat Germany, Italy and Japan.
Mr Culverwell remembers talking to other black soldiers he met about what would happen to them now.
"We used to have long chats about the colour problem and we were determined that we were not going to be treated that way any more."
Freedom fighters
But for most Africans independence was still 15 years away.
In the meantime, the veterans had to get home and find a job.
BBC WORLD SERVICE
You can listen to Africa's Forgotten Soldiers on BBC World Service at 10:05am on Friday 13 November.
Many found little gratitude for their years of service and no work.
In February 1948 veterans from Ghana, among them Kalimu Glover went to petition the governor.
But instead of receiving them, police opened fire. It sparked off an outpouring of anger on the streets of Accra.
"After the shooting, we said we should damage all British things in the city. We got stones, sticks to break down shops. We broke them all down. Those were wonderful days: February 1948, Saturday to Sunday."
Mr Kebby is convinced that he and others like him helped end colonial rule.
"Every soldier who went to India got new ideas and learnt new things. We came back with improved ideas about life. We, the ex-servicemen, gave this country the freedom it's enjoying today. We gave this freedom and handed it over to our country."